

# Alexander of Aphrodisias on the Cosmos

*Arabic text with English  
Translation, Introduction and  
Commentary*

*By*  
Charles Genequand

ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS ON THE COSMOS

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# ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS ON THE COSMOS

BY

CHARLES GENEQUAND



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## INTRODUCTION

### I. ALEXANDER'S COSMOLOGY

#### 1. The place of the *Mabādi'* in Alexander's work

The *Maqālat al-Iskandar al-Afrūdīsī fī al-qawl fī Mabādi' al-Kull bi-ḥasab ra'y 'Aristāṭālīs al-faylasūf* was first published by 'Abd al-Rahmān Badawī in *Arisṭū 'inda al-'Arab* in 1947 on the basis of the sole Damascus manuscript which is defective in many places. It therefore seemed justified to undertake a new edition taking into account other manuscripts in order to arrive at a more satisfactory version of this difficult but important text.

Until Badawi published his *editio princeps* of the *Mabādi'*, it was only known from brief mentions in the standard Arabic bio-bibliographical works and some rare explicit quotations in philosophical texts (Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Rushd). A comparison with some major productions of the *falāsifa*, however, reveals that its influence was far more pervasive than the few direct acknowledgements would lead us to assume. The unusually large number of copies of this work that have come down to us bears witness to the favour it enjoyed in the Muslim Middle Ages. The works of Ibn Sīnā are probably the only philosophical texts from that period which could be compared with it in this respect. The influence of Alexander's tract on Arabic philosophy will be examined in some detail below.

The Greek sources are silent on the existence of this treatise, but this need not surprise us much in view of the very unsatisfactory state of our information concerning the life and works of the Exegete. This is certainly not sufficient reason for doubting the authenticity of the Arabic text. The numerous parallels from the Greek works of Alexander quoted or referred to in the notes make it abundantly clear that all the themes and doctrines developed in the *Mabādi'* are typically Alexandrian. The *Quaestiones* I 1 and 25, in particular, set forth the same themes as our tract and in the same order, although in a much more concise form (2 pages each in the Greek). The authenticity of the text has nevertheless

been questioned by at least two scholars. S. Pines<sup>1</sup> argues that the doctrine of the “spiritual power” permeating the world is identical with the Stoic doctrine of *pneuma* attacked by Alexander in his *de Mixtione* and concludes that either (a) the two treatises belonged to different periods in the evolution of Alexander, (b) the passage in question in the *Mabādi*’ is an interpolation, or (c) the *Mabādi*’ is not by Alexander. Pines does not say which of the three possibilities he favours, but in any case the similarity between the Stoic doctrine of *pneuma* and that of the “spiritual power” which appears in the *Mabādi*’ is greatly exaggerated. The doctrine refuted in the *de Mixtione* is that of “total blending” and of the identification of the *pneuma*, which is regarded as a material element, with God, whereas the spiritual power of the *Mabādi*’ is clearly distinguished from God, the First Mover. The difference between the two conceptions is expressed in all clarity by Alexander himself in the *de Mixtione* (223,6-14). Alexander’s own position is that stated in the *Quaestio* II 3, namely that the cause holding the world together is the regular and eternal motion of the heavens and the power emanating from it. This doctrine, well attested to in the Greek works of Alexander, is probably derived from the pseudo-Aristotelian *de Mundo* (cf. below the references given in the notes *ad loc.*), and cannot be used as an argument against the authenticity of the *Mabādi*’ or even as evidence that the passage in which it appears is interpolated. Nor is it necessary to assume an evolution in the Commentator’s thinking. The similarities in vocabulary should not mislead us into ascribing to Alexander the opinions of his adversaries; they merely tend to stress that he was giving a different answer to the same question. The Stoic colouring of this doctrine is superficial and should be viewed as an attempt by Alexander to salvage from the other school’s thought that which could be incorporated into his own system in a form which did not endanger its fundamental tenets, particularly God’s transcendence.

The other objection raised against the authenticity of the *Mabādi*’ is even less cogent. In the concluding paragraphs of his treatise, Alexander defends his interpretation of Aristotle’s cosmology and explains that divergences of philosophical opinions derive from three main causes: man’s contentiousness, the intrinsic difficulty

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<sup>1</sup> S. Pines, “The spiritual Force”.

of the subject and the weakness of our intellect. According to Alexander, the correct attitude in the face of such difficulties is to examine the whole theory anew and try to find satisfactory solutions to its more doubtful points. D. Gutas detects in these lines an “apologetic attitude” towards enemies of philosophical research, Christians, “in all probability”; this would point to a date “in late Alexandrian times” (whatever that means) for the composition of the treatise. As an example of the type of argument to which Alexander might be replying, Gutas cites a passage by the Christian apologist Tatian.<sup>2</sup>

It must first be pointed out that, since Tatian lived before Alexander, it is hard to see what kind of terminus *post quem* “in late Alexandrian times” it could provide for ideas found in the *Mabādi*. More importantly, the significance of the passage and its insertion in the Aristotelian tradition have been missed by Gutas. The themes developed there, particularly the insistence on the cumulative nature of philosophical knowledge, go back to Aristotle himself. As for the enemies of philosophical research whom Alexander may have had in mind, they are much more likely to have been the Sceptics who used the διαφωνία (cf. *ikhtilāf al-ārā*’ (149)) of the philosophers as one of their main argumentative tools against dogmatic thinking. Sextus Empiricus lived in the 2nd cent. A.D. and an allusion to his position would have been as topical then as a critique of the Stoics. Gutas’ case for doubting the authenticity of the *Mabādi*’ thus appears to be as unfounded as that of Pines and the treatise may therefore be considered with reasonable certainty as being the work of Alexander himself.

Alexander of Aphrodisias wrote three kinds of works: full-length commentaries on Aristotle, short exegetical notes on points of detail (the so-called *Quaestiones* and some texts preserved only in Arabic), and medium-sized independent treatises, the latter being his most personal productions, usually dealing with problems not treated *ex professo* by the Stagirite, such as fate or providence, to which the Exegete endeavours to give answers consonant with the Peripatetic system.<sup>3</sup> The *Maqāla fī Mabādi’ al-Kull* belongs to this last

<sup>2</sup> D. Gutas, *Avicenna* 215-7.

<sup>3</sup> For general up-to-date surveys of Alexander of Aphrodisias see in particular Sharples, “Alexander of Aphrodisias: scholasticism and innovation”; P. Thillet’s introduction to his ed. of the *de Fato*; the article “Alexandre d’Aphrodise” (R. Goulet and M. Aouad) in Goulet (ed.), *Dictionnaire des philosophes*; for the works preserved

category, although a fragment of the commentary on the *Physics* seems to have been interpolated into it.<sup>4</sup> Nonetheless, for the most part the text is in the first person. It shares with the other works of the same category (*de Mixtione*, *de Fato*, *Fī al-‘Ināya*) a polemical tone (see in particular the introduction (1) and the conclusion (145-151)), and although the intended adversaries are explicitly identified (mostly the Stoics) in the other tracts, in the present case it is not always clear who they are. It would appear from the gentler character of the polemic (*tawbīkh jamīl*) that the controversy is internal to the Peripatetic school, but there is very little indication in the text as to the precise points at issue. Another instance of such an internal discussion is provided by the *Quaestio* II 21 in which Alexander deals with the problem of providence in the form of a dialogue with one of his “companions”.

The *Mabādi*’ links up on the one side with the theory of motion and the defence against Galen’s attack of the premises upon which the doctrine of the Unmoved Mover is founded—an argument which we know mainly through its Arabic translation<sup>5</sup>—and on the other side with the theory of providence, also preserved in Arabic,<sup>6</sup> for which the present work in many respects paves the way.<sup>7</sup> Its main purpose is to give a general account of Aristotelian cosmology and metaphysics, or perhaps it would be more accurate to say cosmological metaphysics, for the ontological part of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* is completely disregarded in it. It may have been its aim to provide a Peripatetic counterpart to the numerous Platonic compendia which had appeared during the 2nd century AD, of which Alkinoos’ *Didaskalikos* is the most typical example to have come down to us. By elaborating a doctrine of providence, Alexander may have tried to counter the criticisms

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in Arabic, see A. Dietrich, “Die Arabische Version” and J. Van Ess, “Über einige neue Fragmente” (D and VE followed by a figure refer to the lists established by these two authors).

<sup>4</sup> See below 89-91 and n. *ad loc.* *The Refutation of Galen* might represent a similar case; Pines, “Omne quod movetur” 22 regards it as wholly part of the commentary on Aristotle’s *Physics*, but his reasons are not entirely convincing, and his position has been challenged by Rescher and Marmura in their edition of the text (60-62); it may also be an independent tract in which some fragments of the commentary were inserted.

<sup>5</sup> N. Rescher and M. Marmura, *Alexander against Galen on motion*.

<sup>6</sup> H.-J. Ruland, *Die arabischen Fassungen*.

<sup>7</sup> These three works were translated, at least in part, in the same circles; see below 31 ff.

of Atticus and other Platonists.<sup>8</sup> In the tradition of his own school, he seems to have had few forerunners, apart from the author of the *de Mundo* whose influence is predominant in some places, particularly at the end of his treatise. But many ideas or problems taken up in the present tract had made their first appearance in Theophrastus' so-called *Metaphysics*. The latter's starting-point is the question whether there is a connection between intelligibles and nature (4a 9-11), which may be regarded as the main theme of the *Mabādi'*. The link between desire and imitation in explaining the heavenly motions is also mentioned there (5a 25-6; 8a 1-2), though ascribed to the Platonists and rebutted. Alexander, taking over the same views, is careful to present them in a way that seeks to avoid Theophrastus' objection that the heavenly bodies, if they imitate the First Unmoved Mover, should be immobile (76-77). The unification of the forces at work in the sublunar elements and in the heavenly bodies may also be regarded as an answer to the passage (5b 10-3) where Theophrastus asks why the rotating bodies alone should have ἔφεσις. His questioning whether the cessation of motion would entail the destruction of the heavens (6a 5 ff.) should be related to Alexander's insistence that this cannot happen (57). Finally, with regard to the problem of the plurality of the heavenly motions, two difficulties are raised by Theophrastus: (a) if there is only one mover, how are we to explain the plurality of the heavenly motions; and (b) if there are several movers, their harmony is not obvious. Theophrastus further expresses his dissatisfaction with the astronomical theories adopted by Aristotle (5a 14-22). Alexander tries to provide answers to these questions (in part. 76 ff.) with the exception of that of the number of the spheres where the complicated calculations of Eudoxus and Callippus taken over by Aristotle are tacitly dropped. It thus seems clear that Theophrastus is one of the main sources of Alexander's reflections on the ἀπορίαί of the Aristotelian system and that the *Mabādi'* deals mainly with a set of traditional questions.<sup>9</sup> The answers provided by the Exegete will now be considered in greater detail.

<sup>8</sup> See e.g. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* 252 ff.

<sup>9</sup> It is highly significant, in this respect, that the original title of Theophrastus' tract was most probably something like περὶ ἀρχῶν. In the conclusion, the phrase ἀρχὴ τῆς τοῦ σύμπαντος θεωρίας (12a 1) is practically the title of our treatise. See Laks and Most's *Notice*, pp. IX-XVIII.

## 2. The heavenly motions

The aim of the *Mabādi*<sup>9</sup> is to give a unified picture of the world, both physical and ethical, on the basis of some fundamental Aristotelian texts, above all *Physics* VIII, *Metaphysics* Λ and the *de Mundo* (which Alexander obviously considered a genuine work), supplemented with occasional references to *de Caelo*, *de Generatione et Corruptione*, *de Anima* and the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Alexander was concerned with filling the gaps of the Aristotelian system and smoothing out its inconsistencies, some of which are exerting the minds of philologists to this day. The main topics are the nature of the heavenly motions and the relationship between the unchangeable celestial realm and the sublunar world of generation and decay. Thus at the beginning of his treatise, Alexander emphasizes that all things in the world have a twofold source of motion: an internal one, viz. nature or soul, and an external one, viz. the object of desire or aim of the motion (4). In this, Alexander merely follows Aristotle's theory of animal motion (*de An.*, III 10, 433b 13-8). Of course, these two causes of motion are not mutually exclusive, but rather complementary; both have to be present simultaneously for motion to occur, the former being the efficient cause and the latter the final cause. But when it comes to explaining the heavenly motions, Aristotle does not use both principles together in the same texts: nature, in the guise of ether, appears mostly in the *de Caelo*, and the unmoved mover as final cause in *Metaphysics* Λ; the *Physics* occupies an intermediate position in this respect, establishing the existence of the Unmoved Mover, but failing to explain its mode of action.<sup>10</sup> Alexander was apparently the first to attempt to systematize Aristotle's cosmology by applying the psychological theory of the *de Anima* to the heavenly living beings, the stars or the spheres.

According to the *Mabādi*<sup>9</sup>, inanimate bodies have an impulse (*ishṭiyāq* = ὄρεμή cf. 4 and n.) which derives from their natural disposition or constitution (*tahayyu*<sup>9</sup>), and this impulse is their inclination (*mayl* = ὁπή)<sup>11</sup> towards their natural place; on the other

<sup>10</sup> Some of the main references in this debate are: Jaeger, *Aristotle* 149-54; 293-308; 342-67; Guthrie, "Evolution"; Moraux (ed.) *Aristote Du Ciel*, introd. LXXXVII-LXXXIX; Guthrie, *Hist. of Gr. phil.* VI 243-76; Lerner, *Monde des sphères*, in part. ch. II and IX.

<sup>11</sup> That ὁπή = *mayl* is the characteristic of soulless bodies is clear from Alex. *Quaest.* II 3, p. 49,2-3; Simplicius, in *de Caelo* 79,12.

hand, ensouled bodies have an impulse which is a desire (*shahwa* = ἔφσεις or ὄρεξις)<sup>12</sup> and stems from their soul. Thus, there is a neat parallelism between inclination in inanimate bodies and desire in living bodies, and these two concepts may be considered as species of the genus impulse. Alexander may not have realized that in considering the inclination as the cause of the upward (for fire and air) or downward (for water and earth) motion of the elements, he departed from the authentic Aristotelian doctrine in an important respect; Aristotle held that everything which moves is moved by something and thus denied that the inner nature of the elements could be the efficient cause of their motion and evolved his theory of the obstacle-remover.<sup>13</sup> This specifically Alexandrian doctrine fully tallies with that found in the *Refutation of Galen* (77-8; transl.17),<sup>14</sup> the difference between this and the *Mabādi'* being that only the latter work sets forth the theory of the various kinds of desire and impulse as a preparation for the theory of the heavenly motions. Desire in its turn is divided into three types corresponding to the three parts or faculties of the soul: appetite (*shawq*), passion (*ghadab*) and will (*irāda*).<sup>15</sup> There is an exact parallel to this in Alexander's *de Anima* (74, 1-2; 78, 22-3): ἡ γὰρ ὄρεξις ὁρμή ἐπί τι, ἥς τὸ μὲν ἐπιθυμία, τὸ δὲ θυμός, τὸ δὲ βούλησις. This of course follows Aristotle (*de Anima* II 3, 414b 2; III 9, 432b 6-7), a doctrine which is itself a survival of Plato's tripartition of the soul, down-graded to a mere division of ὄρεξις.

The heavenly bodies are said to be ensouled on the grounds that the ensouled is more perfect than the soulless, and the eternal than what is subject to generation and destruction; consequently, the eternal body must be ensouled (6-7). A similar argument is found in the *Quaestio* I 1, but not in Aristotle. Alexander thus clearly

<sup>12</sup> Both terms seem to be equivalent in Alexander, with a certain preference for ἔφσεις where the rational part of the soul (and consequently the heavenly bodies) is concerned.

<sup>13</sup> There may be Stoic influence there; see on all this Guthrie, *History* VI 252-8 and Sorabji, *Matter* 151 and particularly 220-6.

<sup>14</sup> Pines' reluctance to admit that Alexander *does* equate the principle of motion in natural bodies with their inclination ("Omne quod movetur" 27 n.37) is odd indeed. On the other hand, Wolfson is clearly wrong in asserting (*Studies* I 31) that Alexander uses ὁρμή and ὁπή in the same sense. There is however a difficulty in that Alexander's Greek texts seem to restrict the use of ὁρμή to animate bodies.

<sup>15</sup> On the terminological problems involved here see below p. 37.



maintains the animation of the heavens which is only scantily attested to in Aristotle's esoteric works, and this, I think, for three main reasons. The first is the tendency of the commentators to accomodate and harmonize all doctrines found anywhere in the Aristotelian corpus. The second is that the belief in the existence of the world-soul, or heavenly souls, was too firmly established to be discarded. The third, as we shall see (below p. 8 ff.), is that Alexander had a special use in his cosmological scheme for heavenly souls.

Of the three kinds of desire recognized by Aristotle and Alexander, the heavenly body has only the highest, will or rational choice, which is in turn identified with the intellect (11-13). It cannot have the two lower kinds as these are purely passive faculties, and the divine body cannot be affected by anything.<sup>16</sup> Another reason adduced by Alexander is that the lower faculties exist merely to preserve life (10). And as the heavenly bodies are eternal, they are thus not in need of them. But since there is no difference between soul and nature in the case of the heavenly bodies, it follows that in them intellect, soul and nature somehow coincide. The concept of intellectual desire thus set forth at the beginning of the treatise is the basis on which Alexander builds up his whole conception of the heavenly motions and their determining influence on the world of generation and decay. It needs to be understood in the light of an important chapter in the *de Anima* (III 10) in which Aristotle explains that νοῦς alone cannot initiate motion without the help of ὁρεξις. It seems to have been Alexander's innovation to combine this rule with the dictum of the *Metaphysics* that the First Mover moves as object of love and then to apply it to the heavenly bodies. It is an essential piece of his scheme, for intellection alone is not accompanied by motion and therefore the motions of the heavenly bodies can only be accounted for by the existence within them of a kind of desire (14). It is at this point that Alexander introduces the Platonic notion of imitation<sup>17</sup> or assimilation (23), ultimately derived from the

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<sup>16</sup> By this Alexander seems to mean that the lower faculties need to be awakened by some impression coming from outside, whereas the rational desire of the heavenly bodies for the First Mover is always active. This is not strictly true because the First Mover alone is said to be pure actuality, so that even the perfect, eternal heavenly bodies should partake of at least some passivity.

<sup>17</sup> On this and on the Platonic elements of Aristotle's cosmology in general see

*Theaetetus* (176b), which plays a prominent role in this text and in Arabic philosophy in general. This notion is in turn equated with the love through which, as Aristotle says in the *Metaphysics*, the First Mover moves the first heaven. The definition of the first principle as object of love and desire is standard in second century Platonism.<sup>18</sup> All natural things, and particularly the heavenly bodies, imitate their cause, or the First Cause (21), each one according to its ability. The eternal, continuous and regular motion of the first heaven is as close as it can get to the absolute immobility of the First Mover.

In the first part of his treatise, Alexander always speaks of the mover in the singular, either because the mover of the first heaven alone is taken into account there, or because the question of the plurality of the heavenly movers is temporarily being set aside. In other words, Alexander is trying to demonstrate the eternity and immateriality of the First Mover, but leaves open the possibility of the existence of several such movers, provided that they should impart motion to different eternal bodies. But if the Unmoved Mover is the object of thought and desire, the question naturally arises as to the subject or seat of this thought and desire. This question too had already been asked by Theophrastus (*Met.*, 5a 28-b 2). It must be pointed out that the place occupied by the Unmoved Mover in the most important treatises of the master, the *Physics* and the *Metaphysics*, meant that it somehow had to be fitted into any system claiming to be Aristotelian, whereas nature and soul could more easily be left aside. Alexander, as we have seen, solved, or by-passed, part of the difficulty by identifying, as regards the heavenly bodies, their nature with their soul. The obvious answer to the other part of it, already suggested by Theophrastus and for which the definition of intellectual desire at the beginning of the treatise paved the way, is that the soul is that desiring element or faculty which desires the Unmoved Mover. That each planet has a soul and that each one of those heavenly souls differs from the others is clearly asserted (96). It was also already implied, in more general terms, at the beginning (9-10), where the heavenly body is described as being ensouled; and this

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E. Berti, "La suprématie du mouvement local" 145 ff. A rare instance of "imitation" in Aristotle is *de Gen. et Corr.* II 10, 337a 3.

<sup>18</sup> See e.g. Alkinoos 165,31: *πρῶτον ἐραστὸν καὶ ἐφετόν*; Plutarch, *de Iside* 374d; Apuleius, *de Platone* II 2, 221: *amabile et concupiscendum*.

declaration, following the passage in which the movers are said to differ according to “nobility”, shows that in both cases the souls, that is the desiring, not the desired entities, are meant.<sup>19</sup>

The problem of the plurality of heavenly movers is one of the major *crucis* of Aristotelian cosmology, confronting as it does the student with two sets of contradictory statements, one asserting the unicity of the Unmoved Mover, and the other admitting as many movers as there are motions. Theophrastus was apparently the first to point out the difficulty (*Met.*, 5a 14-21), although he did not offer any solution. Alexander is thus the first to come to grips with the question, at least the first of whom we have knowledge. In short, if the mover is one, how are we to account for the multiplicity of heavenly motions? And if many, how is this multiplicity to be reconciled with their immateriality, granted that all things that are many in number, but belonging to the same species, have matter (Arist., *Met.* Λ 8, 1074a 33-4).<sup>20</sup> The complicated theory evolved by Aristotle on the basis of Eudoxus’ and Callippus’ computations concerning the exact number of the spheres required in order to account for the visible motions of the planets was already obsolete by Theophrastus’ time (*Met.*, 5a 21-3) and as already noted is tacitly dropped by Alexander who appears to posit one sphere for each planet, that is eight in all (sphere of the fixed stars plus seven planets; *Quaest.* I 25, p. 40, 23-6 and here 94). But even if there are only eight movers, instead of the fifty-five or so postulated by Aristotle, the problem of a multiplicity of immaterial beings of the same species remains intact. Alexander says (86) that different immaterial movers cannot be the same in species for the reason already stated that this would entail their being enmattered, which contradicts the result already reached (28), namely that the mover(s) is (are) immaterial. They must, then, be different in species. That the movers are not individuals (entailing materiality) but species having only one member, in other

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<sup>19</sup> Some confusion arises from the fact that Alexander does not always distinguish clearly the two senses of “mover”, a difficulty compounded by the Arabic script which does not normally distinguish between an active and a passive participle in the derived forms of the verb. In addition to that, I suspect that the translators have sometimes mistaken the middle forms of the verbs *ὀρέγεσθαι* and *ἐφέεσθαι* for passives.

<sup>20</sup> While using this principle to refute the possibility of multiple universes, Aristotle does not seem to be aware of its applicability to the problem of the heavenly movers discussed in the same chapter.

words that each one of them is an *ultima species*, is the solution of the schoolmen, ascribed to Aristotle by Merlan, followed by Guthrie. But this again is impossible because to differ in species implies the presence of a specific difference in a genus, that is to say a kind of composition, and this is in contradiction with the simplicity of the first substances (87). The possibility that they should differ according to priority and posteriority, superiority and inferiority, is also rejected as implying not only compositeness, but also sharing in opposites, while Aristotle had shown (*de Caelo* I 4, 270b 32-271a 33) that there is no contrariety in the heavens. This development is then interrupted by a passage from the last book of the *Physics* (89-90) adduced as proof that it is Aristotle's opinion that the Unmoved Mover is one. But this citation is clearly out of place there; it breaks the continuity of the argument on the multiplicity of immaterial entities; moreover it belongs to a chapter of the *Physics* in which Aristotle tries to establish the impossibility not of several movers' existing at the same time and moving different spheres or stars, but of a temporal succession of movers' being the cause of the continuous and eternal motion of the first heaven. Resuming his demonstration, Alexander shows that the movers (significantly, one of the mss. has "mobiles" instead of "movers", presumably the emendation of a scribe puzzled by the contradiction with what precedes) may be many in number and, up to a point, in species as well; what is meant by this restriction is that they do not constitute altogether different species, but differ according to a hierarchy of before and after (92). Alexander there refers to the *Metaphysics* (the intended passage is probably  $\Lambda$  8, 1073b 1-3, although what Aristotle means here is merely that there is an order of the movers in space, not in substantiality or nobility, corresponding to the order of the planets). This seems to be an innovation of Alexander's and its consequences will be far-reaching in Arabic philosophy (see below p. 160). Alexander tries to explain away the contradiction between the specific multiplicity of the movers and their absolute simplicity and immateriality by means of a comparison: it is like the difference in temperature between fire and red-hot iron, which does not imply the presence of actual coldness in the less hot of the two. There are things, therefore, in which a difference of degree does not imply the admixture of an amount of the opposite quality. What Alexander certainly has in mind here is the so-called  $\pi\rho\omicron\varsigma$  ἔν relation-

ship which exists between things among which there is a prior and a posterior and which consequently cannot constitute the species of a single genus. The example of fire given here, though it is not the one most frequently used by Aristotle, occurs in the *Metaphysics* (Γ 2, 1004b 5). Alexander suggests a little later (95) that the mutual relationship of immaterial entities cannot be compared to that of material things, that is to say it cannot be like the mutual relationship of individuals within a species, but rather is analogous to that of the categories with regard to substance. What is noteworthy here is that Alexander anticipates a solution to the problem of the multiplicity of heavenly movers which has been propounded by some modern scholars.<sup>21</sup> The hierarchy of the movers in nobleness corresponds to that of the heavenly bodies in space, starting from the sphere of the fixed stars.

Two questions arise here: (a) are these movers whose existence is regarded as not only possible, but likely, the objects of desire of the heavenly souls, or are they themselves the heavenly souls moving their bodies through their desire for some other entity? And (b) if the latter be the case, what is their relationship with the First Mover (the mover of the first sphere)? The answer (94) is that the First Mover, through the motion of the first heaven, is the cause of all further motion, including generation and decay and natural motion.<sup>22</sup> The mover of the first sphere has precedence over all the others; it imparts to the sphere of the fixed stars the regular diurnal motion from east to west which is then communicated to all the other spheres, thus accounting for their regular "eastern" (i.e. westward) motion (79), whereas their irregular motions are due to their own particular moving causes (i.e. souls). The regular daily motion of the planets is thus the mere mechanical effect of the motion of the outer sphere, whereas their other motions are due to their disordered striving to imitate the First Mover, meaning the separate mover of the first heaven. The differences which can be observed between the motions of the spheres are thus due to the diversity of their souls, i.e. of the

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<sup>21</sup> See G. Patzig, "Theologie und Ontologie".

<sup>22</sup> This may be a reply to Theophrastus' question (*Met.*, 5b 10-4) why the bodies placed at the centre of the universe (i.e. the four elements) have no impulse of their own like the rotating bodies. The answer, as we have seen, is that they do have an internal cause of motion, but it is the eternal rotation of the heaven which is the cause of their changing into one another.

desiring element in them, not to a multiplicity of movers as objects of desire. Though it has to be admitted that this interpretation is not fully set out by Alexander anywhere, and that it has to be pieced together from scattered declarations, it has nevertheless the merit of explaining away the discrepancy between the texts which maintain the unicity of the Mover and those which mention a plurality of movers. There is no other way of making sense of the sentence (86) which seems to affirm in the same breath the unicity and the multiplicity of the movers. When Alexander says that “it is not correct to speak of a plurality of movers”, I take him to refer to the astronomical scheme of *Metaphysics*  $\Lambda$  8 (hence his cautious tone in criticizing the master). There is only one separate or external mover, but each heaven has its own soul (which may also be called an unmoved mover for the reason to be seen presently). This is fully congruent with the data provided by Simplicius according to whom (*in de Caelo* 270, 9-12) “Alexander wondered for what reason the First Mover, being one, could not be able to impart motion to several rotating bodies, if it imparts motion through desire for itself and as object of love (ἐφέσσει τῇ αὐτοῦ καὶ ὥς ἐρώμενον); nothing prevents a multiplicity from desiring one and the same thing”. Elsewhere (*in Phys.*, 1261, 30-1262, 2), Simplicius quotes Alexander as saying that “the planets’ souls are moved by accident, not by themselves, but by imparting motion to their bodies because they are in these <bodies> which are moved not in the same direction as that in which they are moved by the unmoved in them. But the First Cause, which imparts motion to the <sphere> of the fixed stars, cannot be moved either by itself or by another, because the <sphere> of the fixed stars has only one motion, its poles remaining in the same place, or because it is not at all the form of the movable body, but rather a separate substance”; and Simplicius goes on: “Alexander says this because he regards all other souls as forms inseparable from their bodies”.<sup>23</sup> In view of the passages

<sup>23</sup> Sharples’ suggestion (“Alexander of A. on divine providence” 209) that “when Simplicius cites A. as suggesting that the cause of motion of the first sphere is separate from it, while all other souls are inseparable from their bodies (*in Phys.* 1262,3), the reference may be not so much to the movers of the inferior spheres as to Alexander’s notorious denial the immortality of the human soul” is quite implausible: there is nothing in the context to suggest that Simplicius is suddenly leaving the cosmological level; on the contrary the preceding quotation from Alexander clearly contrasts the souls of the spheres with the First Mover. Nor is

already adduced from the *Mabādi*, it seems clear that Alexander is here again ascribing the westward motion of the planets to the motion imparted to their bodies by the first heaven, and their irregular motions to the desire felt by their souls for the First Mover. Simplicius, following Alexander, explained in the passage immediately preceding this (1260, 22-35) that the mover of something moved in a circle is unmoved, because it is not located in one particular part of the latter, but spread in the whole of it; in this respect, it differs from the souls of animals which are accidentally moved by themselves. The star-souls may therefore be accurately called “unmoved” without being separate from their bodies. Thus, on balance and in spite of some uncertainties, the overall evidence definitely weighs against the hypothesis of a plurality of separate movers (it is better to stick to this expression in order to avoid the ambiguities of the term “unmoved” since, as we have seen, the souls of the spheres can also be said to be unmoved) regarded as final moving causes ὡς ἐρῶμενον.

The multiplicity and irregularity of the heavenly motions, their variations in their mutual relationships and their relationships to the material elements, are the causes of all the processes occurring in the sublunar world and of the eternity of change which can be observed in it. In a different formulation of the same principle, Alexander says that the numerically eternal is the cause of the specifically eternal’s being eternal (80; 52).

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the passage in *Phys.* 1357,6-9 at all decisive: Alexander is not “explicitly holding” that the motions which the lower spheres share with the outermost are caused, not by the outermost sphere, but by its unmoved mover (Sharples *ibid.* 210). Alexander merely says, in answer to an objection which might be raised, that “perhaps” (μήποτε) it is so. Finally, the evidence of the *Quaestio* I 25, p. 40,23-30 is at best problematic, as Sharples himself concedes. Everything seems to hang on the interpretation of a few words: “the seven planets move ἐφέσει τὲ καὶ ὀρέξει τῆς οὐσίας, ὁποίας καὶ ἢ πρὸ αὐτῶν. Even if one keeps the mss. reading τινὸς οὐσίας, this need not be translated “some being of the sort”. Ὅποῖος can express indetermination as well as quality (Kühner-Gerth, *Ausführliche Grammatik* II 2, p. 400: ὁποῖος schliesst wie ὅστις den Begriff der Unbestimmtheit oder der damit verbundenen Allgemeinheit ein) and in late Antiquity was already on its way to becoming the simple relative which it is in modern Greek. Thus: “a being, whatever it may be...” The difficulties of this passage have now been elegantly solved by Bodnar, “Alex. on Celestial Motions” in a way entirely compatible with my own interpretation. We may note in passing that here again, as Sharples admits, it is suggested that the lower spheres are “carried round mechanically by the outermost sphere”. The same seems to be implied by the long discussion in *de Caelo* 471,29-474,6 where the characteristic verb συμπεριφέρεσθαι recurs several times. It is certainly not implied anywhere that each one of the erring spheres has its own object of desire.

The demonstration of the fact that the First Cause must be an unmoved mover (53) is extremely compressed compared with Aristotle's long developments in the *Physics* (VIII, 5). Here again the principle enunciated at the beginning clearly holds, namely that Alexander is not concerned in a tract like this to repeat the demonstrations that can be found in Aristotle, but only to synthesize and harmonize them into a coherent whole. The different senses in which an object could be said to be self-moved are distinguished in a way which depends closely on the tradition of the commentators (33 and n.). By elimination, the conclusion reached is that for something to be said to be self-moved a part of it should only impart motion and another part only be subject to motion, which is the same as saying that there is a First Unmoved Mover, distinct from the first subject of motion (43-44). Even animals are not really self-moved because motion is always conditional on the presence of an external object of desire (or repulsion). They need, then, two principles in order to move: an internal one, source of desire, and an external, object of desire.<sup>24</sup>

The First Mover is also eternal. Here again, Alexander shortcuts in the most remarkable way the demonstration of this fundamental element of Aristotle's cosmology. Firstly, it is not prepared, as it is in the eighth book of the *Physics*, by a demonstration of the eternity of motion. It is only after a recapitulation of the First Mover's main characteristics, viz. substantiality, simplicity and immateriality, and as a kind of after-thought, that Alexander adds that it must be eternal since motion is eternal and then goes on to develop some of Aristotle's arguments to the effect that motion cannot be generated any more than time (64). The First Mover, the heavenly body, time and motion thus all possess eternity by mutual implication. Secondly, the only argument appealed to by Alexander seems to be one of the earliest occurrences of what was to be termed the "principle of plenitude":<sup>25</sup> the eternal is better than the non-eternal, and therefore it must exist, or else it would not be good, since being is better than non-being (45). Once more,

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<sup>24</sup> Cf. Simplicius, in *Phys.*, 1354,29-34: Alexander says: "Even if the rotating body, being ensouled, is moved by the soul in it, it needs something else which will provide it with the principle of motion; all animate beings have an external cause and principle of locomotion, if it is true that their locomotion arises by desire for something (ἐφ' ἧσει τινός)".

<sup>25</sup> See for instance R.T. Wallis, *Neoplatonism* 64-5.



an idea destined to play an important role in Neoplatonism is already foreshadowed in Alexander.

### 3. The heavens and the realm of nature

The First Mover is described as object of thought and desire (97), and henceforth it is only considered under its aspect of intellect and intelligible. This marks the transition from the standpoint of *Physics* VIII to that of *Metaphysics* Λ. It is not only the cause of the heaven's motion and of all the earthly phenomena, but also of man's perfection and happiness, since these consist in applying one's intellect to the contemplation of the intelligible.<sup>26</sup> Alexander then dwells at great length on the fact that intellect and intelligible become one in the act of intellection; therefore, man becomes divine by contemplating divine things. This conception, to be sure, is already found in Aristotle<sup>27</sup> and is well attested to in the Greek texts of Alexander;<sup>28</sup> but the importance that the latter attaches to this part of his cosmology and metaphysics is further evidenced by the relative space devoted to it in the *Mabādi*. It is developed over many paragraphs (99-119), not without repetitions, and links up with the theme of imitation set forth in relation to the theory of motion. Material forms only become intelligible when perceived by an intellect (103), but pure intelligibles are permanently so and therefore permanently identical with the intellect which thinks them; in them, there can be no real distinction between intellect and intelligible (104). Conversely, true intellect is necessarily intelligible (112). This intelligible intellect, furthermore, cannot turn towards something other than itself and think it, because this would entail motion and, as we have seen, the First Mover is essentially unmoved; doing so would also introduce a certain duality or multiplicity into it, and we have seen that it is simple. Moreover, if it thought other things, these would necessarily be lower than itself, since it is the most perfect being; and since thinking implies full assimilation between the intellect and its object, the divine intellect would then become lower (114-116). Furthermore, it would not in that case be pure actuality (as it was shown to be at

<sup>26</sup> Cf. above all Arist., *Eth. Nicom.* X 7 and 8.

<sup>27</sup> *De Anima* III 4, 430a 3-4; *Met.*, Λ 7, 1072b 21; cf. Sorabji, *Time* 146-7.

<sup>28</sup> *De Anima* 86,14-29; 107,34-108,19.

64) but would contain an element of potentiality, since thinking something other than oneself implies that one starts from a state in which that thing is not yet being thought, that is a state entailing potentiality (117). Finally, Alexander resorts to one of his favourite devices (see 118 and n.) showing that there must exist, besides pure potentiality and the compound of potentiality and actuality, pure actuality. This intellect's thinking is absolutely devoid of potentiality and its life is absolutely blissful (125-126). As for the human intellect, being the form of a body,<sup>29</sup> it can only temporarily be in this state of identity with its intelligible (120).

This passage stands out as a kind of digression with regard to the rest of the treatise. Whereas in the other parts of the text the different themes are closely intertwined, the section on the intellect and intellection is a self-contained unit which could easily be removed without affecting the whole. Moreover, this theme is not mentioned in the kind of summary or table of contents placed at the beginning (3) and has no parallel in the Syriac text of Sergius. Finally, it evinces some stylistic disparities in comparison with the earlier part of the work, in particular the characteristic expression *taṣawwara bi-l-'aql* is replaced by the forms *'aqla* or *ta'aqqala* (from 103 onwards). All this arouses the suspicion that this section, although quite faithful to Alexandrian conceptions, might be an interpolation, or at least might have been expanded by a translator/revisor.

In all this, the problem of providence, apart from two brief allusions to the First Mover's thinking what issues from itself (85; 114), has hardly been touched upon. It was clearly reserved for another work. But the last section of the *Mabādi'* (127 ff.) has some relevance to that theme; it broadly corresponds to Aristotle's *Metaphysics* Λ 10, although the main source is the pseudo-Aristotelian *de Mundo*. Reviewing, in the *Metaphysics* (1075a 13-9), the different modes in which order and unity exist in the world, Aristotle uses two similes, that of the army (στράτευμα) and that of the household (οἰκία), to which the Hellenistic *de Mundo* characteristically adds that of the state (πόλις 398a 8)<sup>30</sup> which is ampli-

<sup>29</sup> Alexander seems here to transfer onto the intellect the Aristotelian definition of soul (*de An.*, II 1, 412a, 19-21), but he must have in mind the material intellect which perishes with the soul (*Alex.*, *de An.* 90,10).

<sup>30</sup> On the comparison between the state and the world, cf. Marcus Aurelius IV 4; Moraux, *Aristotelismus* II 24, n.76.

fied in the imposing evocation of the Persian empire and the central role of the Great King. It has furthermore been observed that the organic conception of the cosmos having parts well-fitted together and comparable to a city or an animal is also ascribed to Theophrastus. We have here a further link between Aristotle's successor and the *Mabādi'*. The similarity between Theophrastus' idea and Stoicism is noted by Sorabji<sup>31</sup> and can help us understand the apparent paradox of encountering it in Alexander whose stand is generally anti-Stoic. The replacement of the traditional Greek polis by large empires in Hellenistic times no doubt helped to make the comparison between the state and the universe attractive. The idea seems to have appealed to Platonists, Aristotelians and Stoics alike, each philosophical school giving it its own specific bent. In connection with this, both Alexander and the *de Mundo* introduce the doctrine of the power (δύναμις=*quwwa*) of God which penetrates (διήκουσα 396b 29; 398a 5; 398b 9; διικνεῖσθαι 397b 33; *tasī, sāriya*) the farthest reaches of the world, becoming weaker, however, as it moves further away from its source. This power is described as "divine" (*ilāhī* = θεία 397b 19; θεία φύσις 398b 20) or "spiritual" (*rūhāniyya*), this last term merely being an alternative translation of θεῖος).<sup>32</sup> This power, according to Alexander, links the different parts of the cosmos together (*tarbuṭu*), while the *de Mundo* calls God συνεκτική αἰτία (397b 9). Apparently, the language used in the *Mabādi'* by Alexander is close to that of the Stoics, but it seems evident that it is through the *de Mundo* that this Stoic colouring penetrated Alexander's thought and that it is more verbal than substantial: the divine power which holds the world together is God's instrument and as such quite different from the Stoic pneuma. The analogue of God in the city is the ruler (*ra'īs*) or the revealed law (*al-sharī'a al-mawḍū'a*). The Islamic tone of this is more superficial than real: significantly, the Damascus manuscript gives as a variant the reading *nāmūs*, and

<sup>31</sup> See Sorabji, *Matter* 202-4; 213-4 and the further references given there.

<sup>32</sup> There is no reason to see here an intrusion of the Stoic pneuma as Pines, *Collected Works* II 252-5 suggests; although some Stoic influence makes itself felt in the *de Mundo* and consequently in the theories borrowed from it by Alexander, this is not as strong as has sometimes been asserted (see Moraux, *Aristotelismus* II 78). The crucial differences between the two theories being a) that the Stoic pneuma is a *material* entity, and b) that it is God, whereas the power mentioned by Alexander is an indirect emanation from the First Mover, clearly distinct from it. See above p. 2.

there can be little doubt that the Greek had νόμος or νομοθέτης; *wāḍīʿ al-sharīʿa* (or: *al-nāmūs*) is the normal Arabic equivalent of νομοθέτης. In the *Mabādiʿ*, God's power preserves (*tahfazu*) the world's order and harmony, just as σωτήρ and σωτηρία are key-words in the *de Mundo* to describe his action (396b 34; 397b 5, 16, etc. and see n. ad 144). That Alexander took over this particular idea from the *de Mundo* (and consequently that it is not the work of an Arab adaptor) is fully confirmed by numerous passages in the Greek texts (*de Anima* 172, 17-9; *Quaest.* II 3, p. 47, 30-2; 49, 1, 4, 6, etc.; cf. also P. Moraux, "Alexander Quaestio 2.3" p. 160 n. 2) as well as the tract on *Providence* (*quwwa ilāhiyya* 71,8-77,12). It also occurs in Proclus' *Timaeus* commentary (III 208,8 ff.) where the power in question is ascribed to the demiurge: ὁ δημιουργὸς ... ἐνδίδωσι φρουρητικὴν ... καὶ σωστικὴν δύναμιν καὶ ... συνέχει τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῶν ... τὴν δημιουργικὴν δύναμιν τὴν διήκουσαν δι' ὅλων καὶ συνέχουσιν αὐτὰ διαιωνίως; all the characteristic expressions of the *Mabādiʿ* are found here: the power preserves and holds the whole together, it penetrates all parts of the world.<sup>33</sup> This power is responsible for the world's good order and organization which manifests itself on three levels: things which always happen in the same manner (the heavenly motions), things which happen in the same manner most of the time (nature, cf. the Aristotelian definition of it as τὸ ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ), and finally things which happen by chance and spontaneity. The lack of organization and the ephemeral character of much of what can be observed in the world is not due to the will of the gods, but to the former's imperfection, i.e. to matter (137); although the word "matter" is not used at this point, it is clearly what is meant here (cf. *Ināya* 89 ff.). But the regular phenomena of the world cannot be ascribed to chance and spontaneity (*bakht wa-ittifāq*), a theme developed in *Ināya*.

The two outstanding characteristics of the *Mabādiʿ* are thus the doctrine of imitation and that of the divine power permeating the universe. The Platonic idea of imitation fused with Aristotelian teleology becomes the driving force of the universe, ensuring its cohesion not only on the psychological, but above all on the cos-

<sup>33</sup> A further correspondence between Alexander and the *de Mundo* may be briefly mentioned here: the mechanistic conception of nature regarded as a puppet-show; *de Mundo* 398b 17; Alex. *apud* Simplicius, in *Phys.* 311,8; Moraux, "Alex. von A. Quaest. 2.3" p. 160, n. 2; Genequand, "Quelques aspects" 116.

mological level. The existence of this universal impulse towards the Good and the Principle is asserted as a basic axiom even independently of the specific problem of the circular motion of the heavens (98). It constitutes the upward drive of the universe which will be superseded in later Greek Neoplatonism by the doctrine of ἐπιστροφή, but as we shall see shortly, it is the Alexandrian idea of assimilation or imitation which often prevails among the *Falāsifa*. As for the divine power permeating and inspiring all parts of the universe, it is the descending counterpart of imitation and provides the conceptual basis of the doctrine of providence; combined with the Plotinian πρόοδος, it may be considered as the source of the theory of emanation (*fayḍ*, *hudūth*) in the particular form which it will assume in Arabic philosophy.

#### 4. The influence of Alexander's cosmology

Alexander provides a simplified and in many ways more coherent version of Aristotle's cosmological views as set forth in *Physics* VII-VIII and *Metaphysics* Λ, and seeks to clarify their relationship to other areas of the system, particularly psychology and ethics. At the same time, he introduces some Platonic elements (notably the idea of imitation) which serve to establish on a firmer basis the modalities of the sublunar world's dependance on the changeless realm of the heavens. Aristotle's criticism of the theory of ideas had left a vacuum between the higher and the lower, the intelligible and the material world. Alexander tried to fill it by casting the heavenly bodies in the role of intermediaries. But this astronomical conception of metaphysics, sustained by the typically Hellenistic veneration for the visible cosmos, rapidly fell into disuse and oblivion in late Antiquity when the Neoplatonists set up their purely spiritual, immaterial and invisible universe. Alexander's system must soon have appeared hopelessly outdated,<sup>34</sup> and the loss of the greater part of his commentary on the *Metaphysics*, including book Λ, is symptomatic.

In the Islamic world, however, this astronomical tendency un-

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<sup>34</sup> Proclus provides a good example of the Neoplatonists' contempt for the technicalities of what Aristotle had called the most philosophical of sciences, viz. astronomy (*Met.* Λ 8, 1073b 4-5); cf. Segonds, "Philosophie et astronomie".

expectedly reappeared, relayed by Alexander;<sup>35</sup> Themistius' paraphrase, heavily indebted to Alexander,<sup>36</sup> strengthened the same trend. The world-view developed by al-Fārābī and taken over with few fundamental changes by Ibn Sīnā is in some respects very close to that of Alexander. The most obvious difference is that the descending order of Neoplatonism has taken precedence for the Arab philosophers over the Alexandrian imitation of the superior. Al-Fārābī also recognizes two kinds of movers: the eleven separate movers (*Ārā'* ch. 3, pp. 100-4) and the nine "actual" intellects which are the forms of the heavenly bodies (*ibid.* ch. 7, pp. 120-2) and which Ibn Sīnā calls souls (*Ilāhiyyāt* IX 2, 386). They would dissent from Alexander insofar as the latter, if the reconstruction of his thought suggested above is correct, assumes only one separate mover in all. For al-Fārābī as for Alexander the heavenly bodies have a double motion: a motion proper to each one of them, which may be faster or slower than the others (*Ārā'* ch. 7, p. 128, 12 ff.), and the daily motion caused by the first body (*ibid.* 132, 6-8). In chapters 8 and 9 of the *Ārā'*, al-Fārābī puts forward a detailed and rather complicated scheme to illustrate the ways in which the heavenly bodies and their motions determine the phenomena of the sublunar world.<sup>37</sup> We need not go into its particulars; it is sufficient to note that it is in the direct line of Alexander's theories. The specific eternity of the world of becoming is also contrasted there with the numerical eternity of the heavenly bodies (above p. 13). The extended comparison developed in the *K. al-Milla* (61 ff.) between the state and the cosmos is very close to the spirit of the last part of the *Mabādi'* and some key-words (*tadbīr*, *marātib*, *intizām*, *irtibāt*) are found in both texts. When al-Fārābī says (*K. al-Milla* 63,11-2) that "the world is one through a power which governs it (*tadbīr*) and penetrates (*naḡādh*) all its parts

<sup>35</sup> In the *Mabādi'* and the part of his commentary on book Λ known to the Arabs. It is of course impossible to tell from which of those two works any particular Alexandrian theme was borrowed.

<sup>36</sup> Pines, "Some distinctive metaphysical conceptions" greatly overstates Themistius' originality: the identity of intellect and intelligible and consequently of God and the intelligible forms of all things, the conception of God as the law (*nomos*) of the world, all clearly derive from Alexander and Plotinus. Perhaps his formulations owe a little more to the development of Neoplatonism and were therefore favoured by Ibn Sīnā and others.

<sup>37</sup> For a detailed study of this aspect of al-Fārābī's thought, see Th.-A. Druart, "Al-Fārābī's causation of the heavenly bodies".

according to their grade (*martaba*) and to what is requisite for whoever is in this grade”, it seems clear that he takes his cue from the *Mabādi*. The same vocabulary is used in the *Ārā*, although the action is ascribed there to the First himself (p. 96 Walzer). The *‘Uyūn al-Masā’il* (ch. 17, p. 62,10 ff.) also explains that the sphere has a longing (*shawq*) to imitate (*tashabbuh*) the separate intelligibles, but that its motion is not due to appetite or passion (*shahwa aw ghaḍab*), a typically Alexandrian theme (10).<sup>38</sup> The very concept of the Active Intellect as Giver of Forms, that is to say not only as source of the intelligible forms arising in the human intellect, but also of the forms embedded in the material world, might somehow derive from Alexander’s idea of nature as a divine power informing the formless matter. Even more relevant than the *Mabādi* in this respect is the *Quaestio* II 3, especially its second part (p. 49,28 ff.) where it is said that the matter is formed and shaped by the divine power of the heavenly bodies. These forms are the cause of the essence and nature of the simple bodies whose mixing in turn gives rise to compound bodies (*ibid.* 50,15 ff.). The view which sees in Alexander the starting-point of al-Fārābī’s theory of the Giver of Forms finds support in the curious note at the end of the “summary” prefixed to the *Ārā* (54,3 ff.) and ascribed to Alexander, which sets forth in outline precisely this double function of the Active Intellect.<sup>39</sup> More generally, it may be wondered if the characteristic structure of some of al-Fārābī’s main works (*Ārā*, *Siyāsa*) with their neat division into a cosmological and a political-ethical part do not reflect to some extent the Alexandrian model.<sup>40</sup> The very title *K. Mabādi’ Ārā’ Ahl al-Madīna al-Fāḍila*, in this respect, may be significant.

The conception of nature characteristic of the *Mabādi* became almost standard from the 10th century onwards. It is found with

<sup>38</sup> The importance of Alexander as a source for both al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā has been stressed by Maroth, *Die Araber und die antike Wissenschaftstheorie* 204-7, but he does not seem to be aware that the commentary on *Metaph.* A preserved in Greek is not by Alexander (see his n. 569,571,573).

<sup>39</sup> Walzer, *Al-Fārābī* 333 objects that Alex. of A. “identified the Active Intellect with the First Cause and did not make it an inferior special entity in its own right...” But the few lines placed under Alexander’s authorship say nothing about the Active Intellect’s status, but only that it governs not only man, but also the natural bodies below the sphere of the moon. The sense is exactly the same in Alex. *de Anima* 113,6-9, although the Arabic transl. of the passage is quite differently worded (Badawī, *Commentaires sur Aristote* 41,8-10).

<sup>40</sup> This parallelism has already been noted by Maroth, *Die Araber und die antike Wissenschaftstheorie* 218.

few variations in al-Tawhīdī, al-ʿĀmīrī, Miskawayh and the *Ikhwān al-Ṣafaʾ*.<sup>41</sup>

The influence of the *Mabādiʾ* is felt in almost every line in the first two of Abū Sulaymān al-Sijistānī's three epistles edited by Badawī.<sup>42</sup> The first of these, *Fī anna al-ajrām al-ʿukwiyya dhawāt anfus nāṭiqā*, establishes that the heavenly bodies are ensouled; their nature is nobler than that of the four elements since their motion, viz. circular motion, is nobler than rectilinear motion. Consequently, they must have souls since what is ensouled is better than what is soulless. The impulse of the soul is paralleled with the natural motion of the elements. The Platonic tripartition of the soul is then introduced and it is explained that the heavenly bodies, which agree in species, possess only the highest of the three faculties, through which they seek assimilation with the best of beings, the First Cause and First Mover. The treatise ends with a passing reference to the problem of the multiplicity of the motions, which astronomy can explain, but it does not go into the subject any further.

The main theme of the second epistle, *Fī al-muḥarrik al-awwal*, is the idea that "first mover" is said in two senses: (a) the natural form of the rotating body, which is the first body moved in a circle (i.e. the sphere of the fixed stars); and (b) a mover that is absolutely unmoved (374,11-7). Furthermore, (b) moves (a) by arousing desire (*shāʾiq* 375,6) in it and (a) feels desire for (b) (*mushtāq* 375,7). This is precisely the theory that I think can be ascribed to Alexander.<sup>43</sup> In the second chapter of this epistle, we again find the definition of nature as "a power penetrating bodies, forming and shaping them" (276,12). In conclusion, al-Sijistānī states that

<sup>41</sup> See e.g. al-Tawhīdī, *Imtāʾ* II 39; III 113; *Muqābasāt* 251; al-ʿĀmīrī, *al-Amad* 90; 128; Miskawayh, *Fawz* 56-7; *Ikhwān al-Ṣafaʾ* II 145 ff. *quwwa rūḥāniyya tasrī fī jamīʿ al-ʿālam*; and cf. Genequand, "Quelques aspects".

<sup>42</sup> *Muntakhab Ṣiwān al-Hikma et trois traités* 367-88. English transl. J.L. Kraemer, *Philosophy in the Renaissance of Islam* 278-304.

<sup>43</sup> Kraemer, *Philosophy* n. 46 p. 288 says that "Sijistānī parted company with Alexander in a crucial respect... The first mover, unmoved both essentially and accidentally, is identical, in Alexander's view, with the God of Book *Lambda*. Sijistānī, in contrast, considered the first mover of the first sphere as the first of the series of sphere-movers and on a par with them insofar as all are immanent in the spheres and moved accidentally." This, of course, fails to take into account the distinction established by al-Sijistānī between the two senses of "first mover", a distinction which exactly corresponds, even though the terminology is different, to the difference between soul and intellect in Ibn Sīnā (*not* in al-Fārābī and Ibn Rushd as Kraemer mistakenly says p. 287 n. 46) and between the two series of intellects in al-Fārābī (see above p. 21).



the movers of the spheres “revert (*tarjīʿu*) to one single moving essence which is the mover of the universe”, and rightly sees in this a confirmation of his thesis on the difference between the First Unmoved Mover and the mover of the first heaven. From this we may deduce, although al-Sijistānī himself does not draw the inference, that the movers of the spheres are movers as desiring entities, not as objects of desire. The third epistle, *Fī al-kamāl al-khāṣṣ bi-nawʿ al-insān*, draws on different sources, notably Christian; but it is not our purpose here to go into this; it may be pointed out that it corresponds structurally to the “political” part of the *Mabādīʿ* or of al-Fārābī’s main treatises.

The *Mabādīʿ* also constitutes Ibn Sīnā’s main inspiration throughout book IX of the *Ilāhiyyāt* of the *Shifāʿ* where it is actually mentioned with approval (392,17). It will suffice to stress the more important borrowings. The first principle, as Ibn Sīnā acknowledges at the outset (373,4-5), cannot be demonstrated apodictically (*burhān*, cf. below 2). The rest of the chapter is devoted to proving the eternity of motion along generally Peripatetic lines. In the second chapter the Alexandrian element becomes more prominent. The motion imparted to the heavenly bodies (or to be more precise to the heavenly souls) is ascribed there to a desire (*ishtiyyāq* 387,12) similar to that imparted to the lover by the beloved (*maʿshūq*). Even in nature there is such a longing, and that for which it longs is its perfection (*kamāl* 387,15 and cf. below 22). The three kinds of longing corresponding to the three parts of the soul are again *shahwa*, *ghaḍab* and *ikhtiyyār*.<sup>44</sup> But the two lower kinds of desire, appetite (*shahwa*) and passion (*ghaḍab*), are not fit for (*ghayr mulāʾim*) the unchangeable and impassive body. The motion of the heavenly body has as its principle the longing to become similar to the highest good (*al-tashabbuh bi-ʾl-khayr al-aqṣā* 390,4; *al-tashabbuh bi-ʾl-awwal* 390,14; *al-tashabbuh bi-ʾl-khayr al-mahḍ wa-ʾl-shawq ilayhi* 394,4).<sup>45</sup> This motion is not one whereby one acquires an external good, but an approximation of the First’s immobility (*shabīḥa bi-ʾl-thabāt* 389,8;398,8; cf. *Mabādīʿ* 76). This assimilation is almost always qualified by the equally Platonic

<sup>44</sup> The occurrence of this word here is certainly due to the influence of the *Mabādīʿ*. Ibn Sīnā normally uses *irāda*; the equivalence of the two terms is made clear a few lines below (388,6) where Ibn Sīnā says that the principle of the heavenly motion is *ikhtiyyār wa irāda*.

<sup>45</sup> Note also the use of the verb *iqṭadā*, frequent in the *Mabādīʿ*, at 391,15-6 as synonym of *ihṭadhā* and *tashabbaha*.

phrase “as far as it is possible” (*bi-ḥasab al-mumkin* 390,5; *bi-miqdār al-imbkān* 389,5; 392,1) in order to stress its imperfect character and the essential ontological gap remaining between the mover and the object moved. As for the differences between the various heavenly motions, they are the cause of the eternity of the species (*baqā’ al-anwā’* 394,6 and cf. below 80, 136). Whereas the continuous circular motion of the heavenly bodies is due to their desire for a common beloved, their different motions are the result of their having different objects of longing after the First (399, 4-8). Although, as we have seen, Alexander’s views on the movers of the stars are not entirely clear, it seems reasonably certain that Ibn Sīnā’s more developed and on the whole more coherent system is largely inspired by the former. At any rate, this is how Ibn Sīnā understood the Greek commentator (393,1-2). The ascending order of longing and assimilation provides the counterpart to the descending order of emanation<sup>46</sup> and can thus be regarded as a Peripatetic antecedent to the Neoplatonic ἐπιστροφή. But even the theory of emanation set out by Ibn Sīnā may owe something to the idea of the divine power pervading the universe found in the *Mabādi’*. Although the same author attacks it elsewhere (*Defin.* 21), there seems to be a distinct echo of it in a passage where Ibn Sīnā says that the heavenly bodies have an influence (*ta’thīr*) on the world down below (*yasrī minhā ilā hādihā al-‘ālam* 412,12-3). The root *s-r-y* has the same meaning as *f-y-d* and *sarqayān* is sometimes used as a synonym of *fayḍ*. The same views on longing and imitation on the cosmological plane are found in other works by Ibn Sīnā, in particular the *Risāla fī al-‘ishq* (13; 20-1), in a more concise form.

Ibn Rushd has long been recognized as the most faithful Arab follower of Aristotle, but the extent of his indebtedness to Alexander has on the whole been underrated. His interpretation of Aristotle’s cosmology in his *Tafsīr* of Λ unsurprisingly resembles that of the *Mabādi’*, although his direct source was of course Alexander’s own commentary. He may however have used the epis-

<sup>46</sup> The former aspect of Ibn Sīnā’s cosmology has been generally neglected in modern scholarship. It is entirely overlooked in Gutas, *Avicenna*; A.-M. Goichon, *Distinction* 213, devotes four lines to ‘*ishq* as “movement inverse du *fayḍ*.” The reason for this state of things is not far to seek: the theory of emanation appeared as a philosophical formulation of the idea of creation, evidently lacking in Aristotle, and was as such welcomed by the schoolmen, to whom modern scholars are in some sense the heirs; they over-emphasized it at the expense of other aspects of Ibn Sīnā’s thought. See also above p. 20.

tle to supplement the missing parts of the larger work. The *Mabādi*' is also Ibn Rushd's main source, besides Aristotle, in the fourth part of his *Epitome of the Metaphysics*,<sup>47</sup> where Alexander is mentioned twice, once with explicit reference to our epistle, and there are clear echoes of it, as well as one literal quotation, in the *de Substantia Orbis* (44). The doctrine of the "spiritual power" holding the parts of the universe together also found its way into the *Tahāfut*, with explicit reference to the *Mabādi*'.<sup>48</sup> We need not rehearse here all the similarities between the two authors, the most important of which will be mentioned in the notes. Ibn Rushd's departures from Aristotelian doctrine are to a large extent inspired by, if not directly borrowed from Alexander.<sup>49</sup>

In the next century, the *Mabādi*' are one of the main references of 'Abd al-Laṭīf al-Baghdādī in his *Metaphysics*, of which section 16 is merely a summary of Alexander's epistle.<sup>50</sup> The interesting thing about al-Baghdādī's use of this text is that he places more stress on the theory of emanation (*sarayān*) than on that of motion, as appears from the title he gave to that section: *Fī sarayān al-quwwa wa-'l-nizām min al-Mabda' al-Awwal*. This is quite in keeping with his own syncretistic tendency.

Maimonides cites the *Mabādi*' in his *Guide* (II 51 and see below 149 and note). This may well be the last explicit witness to a direct and personal use of it in Arabic philosophy. It is probably from him, and from an allusion in Ibn Sīnā, that Albertus Magnus derived his limited knowledge of our text which he mistakenly ascribed to Aristotle himself. He also read into it the Avicennian doctrine "*ex uno non fit nisi unum*" which is conspicuously lacking from it.<sup>51</sup>

<sup>47</sup> Published under the title of *Talkhīs* by 'U. Amīn. In my *Ibn Rushd* I denied the paternity of the *Epitome* to Ibn Rushd; I have now been convinced of its authenticity by Davidson's arguments in *Alfarabi, Avicenna* 221, n. 5.

<sup>48</sup> Ibn Rushd, *Tahāfut*, 229-231; 420,12; 421,13.

<sup>49</sup> See on this Jolivet, "Divergences"; his conclusion p. 232 "rassemblant des éléments épars dans la *Métaphysique*, le *Traité de l'âme* et l'*Ethique à Nicomaque*, le Commentateur en a fait une synthèse qui les dépasse de beaucoup" would apply equally well to Alexander and his *Mabādi*'. Endress, "Averroes' De Caelo" contains ample evidence of Alexander's influence on Ibn Rushd, although its extent is generally understated by the author. Ibn Rushd's indebtedness is thrown into sharp relief by his constant use of the expression *taṣawwara bi-'l-'aql* instead of *ta'aqqala*, which, as pointed out *ad* 13, is an archaism of the translators'. See also Genequand, *Ibn Rushd's Metaphysics* 33-48.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. A. Neuwirth, 'Abd al-Laṭīf al-Baghdādī.

<sup>51</sup> See A. de Libera, *Albert le Grand et la philosophie* 55-72 and "*Ex uno non fit nisi unum*".

## II. THE TEXTS

### 1. The manuscripts

S. Pines was apparently the first to observe that there are two distinct Arabic versions of the *Mabādi*<sup>52</sup>: the one published by Badawī, which will henceforth be represented by the siglum A: it is ascribed in the Damascus ms. to Ibrāhīm b. ‘Abdallāh al-Naṣrānī al-Kātib, and in the other mss. to Ishāq b. Ḥunayn.<sup>53</sup> The other version is much shorter, covering only about one third of A (up to 49) and is ascribed to Sa‘īd b. Ya‘qūb al-Dimashqī (henceforth B).

The present edition is based on the following mss.:

#### Version A

1) 𐤆 (Z) Damascus *Ẓāhiriyya* ‘*Āmm* 4871, 107b-112 b. Clear *naskhī* script, about 40 lines a page. The diacritical points are generally omitted where they would be most needed, i.e. in the imperfect forms of the verb. There are some marginal and interlinear notes and corrections or variant readings (it is not always possible to draw a clear distinction between the two) by the same hand which are often identical with readings found in the other mss. These are designated by the siglum 𐤆. The inner margins are damaged, hence some lacunae mentioned by Badawī. It is dated 1 *Dhū ‘l-Qa‘da* 558=1 october 1163.

2) 𐤇 (C) Istanbul Carullah 1279 54a-58b<sup>53</sup>. Clear *naskhī* script with diacritical points often omitted, 35 lines a page, dated 882-3/1477-8. The first four lines of each page are severely damaged. The beginning is missing as noted in the title: *Maqāla al-Iskandar al-Afrūdīsī fī al-* (sic!) *Mabādi’ al-Kull istikhrāj Ḥunayn b. Ishāq manqūla min nuskha inqatā’a awwalu-hā wa-’l-mawjūd min hādhihi ‘l-maqāla mā lafzu-hu an yakūna dhālika al-wāhid al-azālī alladhī huwa aqdam bi-’l-‘aql (sic!) fī al-ashyā’* (14 and *app. crit.* n. 69). Some sentences, or even

<sup>52</sup> Pines, “Refutation” p. 42, n. 85. Ḥunayn b. Ishāq in the Carullah ms. is either a mere slip on the part of the scribe, or the result of a confusion with the Syriac translation ascribed to Ḥunayn by the *Ẓāhiriyya* ms.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. F. Rosenthal, “From Arabic Books and Manuscripts V” 17.

whole passages, are also missing from this ms.: From *mumkinan fī hādhihi* (80) to *alladhī huwa aqdam* (89) (=f. 56a 33 of the ms.); moreover, as already noted by Rosenthal, the passage from *bi-’l-fī’l wa hādhihī hal al-’aql al-ilāhī* (110) to *yataḥarrak bi-’l-’arad* (120)(57a3-26) has been misplaced after *afḍal min al-ma’qūl* (102). Furthermore, it must be pointed out that the text nr. 4 in Rosenthal’s list (=D 26), bearing the title *Fī al-Falak*, merely consists of three fragments of the *Mabādi’* which, strangely enough, overlap in part with the text of Rosenthal 5. They include: *al-ashyā’ al-maṭlūba* (3)...*ghaḍaban wa-shawqan* (10); *wa qad yakūnu* (15)...*al-aṣṣām al-ukhar* (18); *wa-’l-gharaḍ* (23) ... *an yakūna jisman* (26). There is an *explicit*: *tammāt al-maqāla fī al-qawl wa ’l-ḥamdu li-walī al-minna wa ’l-tawl*, which clearly refers to the title *al-qawl (fī al-Mabādi’)*. Their readings are designated by the siglum <sup>۱</sup>ج. This ms. occupies a somewhat intermediate position; it agrees mostly with those of the Ishāq family, but sometimes with Z. It also has many readings of its own. The occurrence of the rare and archaic term *jirm* instead of *jism* in 16 may be nothing more than a copyist’s quirk.

3) ٣ (Th) Tehran, Ilāhiyyāt University 687/7, 19 fols. with no visible numbering, 19 lines a page; clear *naskhi* with very few diacritical points, rather carelessly written with many omissions or minor inaccuracies. Title: *K. al-Mabādi’ li-Iskandar al-Afrīdūsī (sic!)*. Some words and sentences omitted by the scribe were added in the margins, some of them by the same hand, and others by a later one.

4) ٣ Tehran, Ilāhiyyāt University 242/69, 56a-63a (or: 320a-327a), 25 lines a page, fairly regularly pointed *ta’liq*. Title: *K. al-Mabādi’ li-Iskandar al-Afrīdūsī (sic!)*. Probably a copy of the former in which some of the marginal additions seem to be by the same *ta’liq* hand. These two mss. are not normally distinguished in the *app. crit.*

5) Tehran University 434, 38 fols. This ms., mentioned by Van Ess<sup>54</sup>, is a 20th century copy devoid of any value; the text is the same as that of 3 and 4 above, apart from some mistakes of its own.

<sup>54</sup> “Über einige neue Fragmente” 150.

6) ط (T) Tashkent 2385/92 (cat. Nr. 1889), fols. 394b-399a, 29 lines a page, fairly regularly pointed *ta'liq*, dated 1075/1664 I have collated this ms. on the microfilm kept in the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris under Photo Or C 30.

7) م (M) Escorial 798 II, 12, fols. 103b-133b, not dated (XIIIth cent. according to Renaud<sup>55</sup>), *Maghribī* script, 27 l. a page. It has a long lacuna from *bi-akhdh al-shay' al-ma'qūl* (101) to *idh kāna min aqbah* (125).

It appears immediately from the variant readings of the text that (1) and (2)-(7) form two distinct families; within the second of those, (2) again occupies a separate and somewhat intermediate position, agreeing sometimes with (1) and sometimes with (3)-(7), and also having a number of readings of its own. Thus there is a long lacuna in (3), (4), (5), (6) and (7) from *al-juz' alladhi* (42) to *mawāḍi' ukhar* (46) (to *an takūna al-ḥaraka wāḥida* (47) in (7)). In the second group, (3), (4) and (6) again agree among themselves more consistently than with (7).

### *Principles of the edition*

I have not attempted to restore consistently one or the other of the two recensions. The degree of contamination between mss. of the two families is too great for this to be feasible. I have only aimed at being pragmatic and producing as full and as intelligible a text as possible. The apparatus is as often as possible negative; this means that a reading which is not followed by a ms. siglum is that of all mss. except the one(s) which is being singled out in the other part of the note.

In order not to overcrowd an already abundant *apparatus criticus*, I have abided by the following rules:

- 1) A number of minor and insignificant variants (*e.g. dhāka/dhālīka*), inaccuracies and omissions have not been recorded.
- 2) I have tacitly supplied diacritical points which are missing in the great majority of cases and, when present, have little authority.

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<sup>55</sup> in H. Derenbourg and H.P.J. Renaud, *Les mss. arabes* 10-12.

3) I have followed spelling rules in use today, particularly in the case of *hamza*.

### Version B

1) ١٥ (Th<sup>1</sup>) Tehran, Dāneshgāh 258/10, fols. 82b-86a, 18 ll. a page; clear pointed *ta'liq*. Title: *Maqāla al-Iskandar al-Afrīdūsī (sic!) fī 'l-Qawl fī Mabādi' al-Kull 'alā ra'y Aristūṭālīs*.

2) ٢٥ (Th<sup>2</sup>) Tehran, Dāneshgāh 5028/15, fols. 224a-229a, 17 ll. a page; clear pointed *ta'liq*. Title as above.

3) ٣٥ (Th<sup>3</sup>) Tehran, Dāneshgāh 339/21, fols. 75b-78a, unpointed *shekasteh* written diagonally. No title.

4) ٤٥ (Th<sup>4</sup>) Tehran, Dāneshgāh 2451/53, fols. 398-401, pointed *shekasteh*, each page being divided either into three columns written diagonally or into four triangular or trapezoidal sections, each one written in a different direction. Title as above (but *Aristūṭālīs*).

These four mss. probably date from the 16th-17th cent.

5) ع (O) Osmania University Library, acq. 1407, fols. 2b-4a, date 992/1584, clear pointed *naskhī*, 23 ll. a page. It has a long lacuna from *dawarāni-hā* (16) to *idhā kāna mawjūdan* (38). Title: *Maqāla al-Iskandar al-Afrīdūsī fī 'l-Qawl fī Mabādi' al-Kull 'ala Ra'y Aristūṭālīs*. See Daiber, "New Manuscript Findings" 34, n° 84.

6) ب (P) Patna 2641, 24a-26b, clear pointed *ta'liq*, 21 ll. a page. See Daiber, *ibid.* 30, n° 30.

7) ر (R) Rampur 2906, fols 15a-26a, 19th cent. copy, see Daiber, *ibid.*

8) بر (Pr) Princeton ELS, n° 605, 121a-127b, 14 ll. a page, 1052/<sup>56</sup>.

All these mss. except P (in the case of O it cannot be decided because of the lacuna) must go back to the same archetype in which one folio had been misplaced so that the passage *nafsu-hū yanālu* (20)...*al-shay'ayn* (29) appears after *al-basīṭayn* (29)...*bi 'l-'adad wa 'l-mutaharrik* (38). Because of this there are much fewer variants in this version than in A; as they are mostly of a trivial nature, omissions or obvious slips, I have refrained from procuring a detailed *apparatus criticus*.

<sup>56</sup> See Mach, *Catalogue* p. 255, n° 2993.

## VE 35

This is the short treatise (see below pp. 136-143) contained in the ms. Princeton ELS 308 174a-175a dated 677/1278-9<sup>57</sup>. As indicated by Mach, folio 176a is badly stained by ink, hence the numerous gaps at the beginning.

## 2. The translators

Version A is ascribed in the mss. to various translators: in 3, 4, 6 and 7 to Ishāq b. Hunayn; in 2 to Hunayn b. Ishāq (but with the unusual term *istikhrāj* instead of *tarjama* or *naql*), and in 1 alone to Ibrāhīm b. ‘Abdallāh al-Naṣrānī al-Kātib, with the additional remark that he translated it from a Syriac version by Hunayn b. Ishāq.

This Ibrāhīm is mentioned in the *Fihrist* (305,8 ff.), in a list of translators which seems to follow a roughly chronological order, after Ishāq and Ḥubaysh, but before Yaḥyā b. ‘Adī (d. 374/984). It is not specified from which language he translated, Greek or Syriac. The *Fihrist* (309 ult.) ascribes to him the version of the *Topics* VIII (an indication corroborated by the mss. of that work) and of the *Rhetoric*, and Ibn al-Nadīm informs us in the notice on Alexander of Aphrodisias (313,11 ff.) that he saw the latter’s commentaries on the *Physics* and *Posterior Analytics* (*Burhān*) in the legacy of Ibrāhīm b. ‘Abdallāh; this, if taken strictly, would suggest that he was somehow present at the time of the latter’s death which could thus not have occurred much before 340/951<sup>58</sup>. This remark is also interesting in view of the fact that a fragment of Alexander’s commentary on the *Physics* appears to have been interpolated in the text of the *Mabādi’* (89-91). It also appears from the same passage of the *Fihrist* that Ibrāhīm possessed a number of translations by Ishāq. The two men are further associated in connexion with the translation of the *Rhetoric* (*Fihrist* 310,13). It may thus be concluded that the relationship between them must have been a close one and that Ibrāhīm was certainly the younger of the two, Ishāq having died in 298/910-1 according to the *Fihrist* (356).

There is nothing inherently improbable about any of these as-

<sup>57</sup> See Kritzeck, “Une Majmū‘a”, and Mach, *Catalogue* n° 2994.

<sup>58</sup> The date of Ibn al-Nadīm’s birth is unknown, but he died in 385/995.



criptions, nor is it possible on purely linguistic grounds to decide in favour of one of the putative authors rather than the other. The mention of Ḥunayn in the colophon of the Carullah ms. might be due either to a confusion with his son, or to the fact that he was actually responsible for the translation from Greek into Syriac. But the term by which his work is designated, *istikhrāj*, might be taken to indicate some editorial task rather than mere translation. It could refer to the possibly composite nature of the *Mabādī*' (see above pp. 11;17).<sup>59</sup>

It is not easy either to decide between Ishāq and Ibrāhīm. It would perhaps appear more natural to suppose that the work of the little-known Ibrāhīm was ascribed to the more famous Ishāq, but maybe we do not have to choose. As noted above, the only ms. which ascribes the translation to Ibrāhīm (Z) differs in a great many places from the text found in the others mss., not only on points which may be regarded as mere variants due to the mss. tradition, but in terminological matters as well (see below pp. 35-39). It is therefore probable that they represent two distinct versions, one being a revision of the other, or personal copies, or "editions", or "Bearbeitungen", of a translation produced in collaboration by two or more translators. This supposition is confirmed by the fact that one of the glosses in the *Mabādī*', ascribed to Ishāq in the mss. of the Ishāq tradition, is anonymous in Z (100). Before attempting to determine more precisely the relationship between the two, a word must be said concerning the other translation.

With version B, unanimously ascribed in the mss. to Abū 'Uthmān Sa'īd b. Ya'qūb al-Dimashqī, we seem to be on firmer ground. A large proportion of the Arabic translations of Alexander's treatises is ascribed to him, and this ascription, though rightly challenged in some cases, is generally accepted in the case of the *Mabādī*'.<sup>60</sup> What remains to be ascertained is the chronological sequence of the two translations. That one must depend on the other is obvious: the structure of many sentences is so similar as to exclude coincidence. On balance, and although the evidence is not altogether unequivocal, I believe B to be the earlier for two main reasons:

<sup>59</sup> See F.W. Zimmermann, "Proclus Arabus rides again" 33 ff.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. for instance G. Endress, *Proclus Arabus* 190.

a) B is incomplete and the note at the end of all mss. makes it clear that this is not due to an accident in the transmission of the Arabic, but to the fact that the author of this version had only a fragmentary copy of the (Greek or Syriac) original at his disposal. A more complete text will subsequently have been discovered and translated.

b) The *Fihrist* (309 apu.) reports that al-Dimashqī translated Aristotle's *Topics* I-VII and Ibrāhīm the eighth and last book of the same work. The simplest inference to be drawn from this is that Ibrāhīm completed a task left unfinished by his teacher or colleague. Similarly in the case of the *Mabādi'* he (or Ishāq) will have completed the work of al-Dimashqī on the basis of a fuller text, though relying heavily on the former translation as far as it went.

It must be conceded, however, that this view entails two difficulties; firstly, according to Ibn Abī Uṣaybi'a (I 231), al-Dimashqī died in 307/920, that is after Ishāq. We would thus have to suppose that al-Dimashqī had other cares when the fuller text of the *Mabādi'* was discovered and that Ishāq completed the task. The second difficulty consists in that the vocabulary of A appears to be in some respects more archaic than that of B and its style more convoluted and less lucid, and that these features are generally regarded as a sign of greater antiquity. But obscurity may also result in some cases from the translator's desire to stick closely to the wording of his source, a tendency also present in late authors such as Abū Bishr Mattā. It might be, of course, that an translation older than B had been in existence and influenced A, or that the reviser of that early translation overlooked some of the old-fashioned expressions of the text he was correcting, but this seems rather unlikely. A similar assumption has been made by Ruland concerning the treatise on providence<sup>61</sup>, but his reasons do not carry conviction. Purely linguistic criteria should only be used with great caution in dating translations. Too many particulars are still unclear in the evolution of Arabic philosophical terminology, and much seems to depend on individual idiosyncrasies.

These, then, are the two (or three if one reckons Ishāq's and Ibrāhīm's as distinct) versions whose reality is established. The "ancient translation" alluded to by Pines owes its shadowy existence

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<sup>61</sup> See H.J. Ruland, *Vorsehung* 107, 123.

to his misunderstanding of a remark in Badawī's introduction to *Aristū 'inda al-'Arab*.<sup>62</sup>

Beside these versions, there is in the Princeton ms. ELS 308, 174a-175a a short treatise (VE 35) bearing a close resemblance to a passage of the *Mabādī'* (32 ff.), but which should nevertheless be regarded as the translation of another text setting forth the same ideas in a shorter form and a different order rather than as another translation of the same original. This text is edited below.

An important witness to the history of the text is a short Syriac treatise by Sergius of Rēsh 'Aynā bearing the title: *Memrā d-'al 'ellāteh d-hānā kull a(y)k tar'ītheh d-Aristutālīs fīlāsūfā*. It corresponds very closely to the Arabic version, particularly at the beginning (1-70), and has the same conclusion (147-151). But it is noteworthy that the whole section on the intellect and the self-thought of the First is missing, which reinforces the suspicion that this part may not have belonged to the original text of Alexander. Besides, as it is evident that Sergius has taken great liberties with his model, his work is of little help in establishing the Arabic text. In a recent study, Dana R. Miller has sought to contrast Sergius' position on the subject of providence with that of Alexander as represented by the Arabic text. Following Badawī's text, she translates the fifth question at (3): "are the things that are in the sublunary regions caused by the motions of these bodies, or do they come to be by volition or by knowledge?" The Syriac version, on the other hand, by omitting the first "or", raises a different issue, namely that of the stars' volition and knowledge.<sup>63</sup> But in fact the majority of the Arabic mss. agrees with the Syriac (see *app. crit.* and note *ad loc.*), so that the discrepancy which Miller thought to detect between the two texts can easily be removed. Moreover, when she says that "Alexander is not known to have ever addressed" the issue of the stars' knowledge of sublunary processes, she is clearly wrong: Alexander's view of providence, although obscure in many particulars, is undoubtedly based on such a notion.<sup>64</sup> Her further suppositions as to Sergius' Harranian connections rest on equally flimsy ground.

<sup>62</sup> S. Pines, "Refutation" 43 n. 85, referring to A. Badawī, *Aristū*, Introd. p. 52. Badawī's remark actually concerns the *Rhetoric*, not the *Mabādī'*.

<sup>63</sup> Miller, "Sargis" 223.

<sup>64</sup> See Sharples, "Alex. on divine Providence" and "Alex. of A.: scholasticism" 1217 and above p. 17.

### 3. The language of the translations

As noted above, A and B differ markedly, among other things, in their technical vocabulary. It seems clear that the different translators or revisors were consciously striving to forge a philosophical language as accurate and faithful to the Greek as possible. Key concepts are thus rendered in a number of ways and may provide clues as to the authorship of the various translations. In what follows, I shall present some observations pertaining to this theme. Comparative material is drawn mainly from other works by Alexander, in particular those for which two different versions are available, and from texts ascribed to the same translators as the *Mabādi'* (the *Topics*).

#### D-B-R

The dual expression *tadbīr wa-siyāsa* is characteristic of A as well as of the older version of the treatise on providence (D 15), whereas D 18 normally has *'ināya* (Ruland, *Vorsehung* 168). For this use see Daiber, *Aetius* 12. It may correspond to διοίκησις as well as to πρόνοια. In the translation of Nemesius' *de Natura Homini*, some mss. have *tadbīr* and others *siyāsa*, or even *siyāsa wa-'ināya*, as equivalents of πρόνοια (Thillet).

#### D-W-R

Generally the forms *mustadīr* and *istidāra* would appear to have preceded *dawran* and *dawrī* (Endress, *de Caelo* 57;131;135); *mustadīr* is also used in the older version of the treatise on providence as against *dā'ir*, *dawran* in the later one. (Ruland, *Vorsehung* 73; 117; 161). The situation in the *Mabādi'* is unclear: in (4), A has *'alā al-istidāra* and B *dawran*, but the reverse in (16) (A *dawriyya*, B *mustadīr*). In (24), B's *mustadīra* correspond to A's *kurī* (apparently = σφαιροειδής, not κυκλοφορητικός). Ishāq in the *Physics* uses *dā'irī*. Ustāth and Mattā have *istidāra* (Ibn Rushd, *Tafsīr* 1582,4). Al-Kindī uses the expression *ḥaraka mustadīra* (*Rasā'il* I 258-9).

#### H-W-L

*Muḥāl* (A) corresponds to *mumtani'* (B) which however is also used by A in the latter part of the text missing in al-Dimashqī's trans-

lation. In one place (39), A has *mimmā lā yumkin*=*mumtani'* (B). The *Refutation of Galen* (Dimashqī) only uses negative phrases (*ghayr mumkin*, *laysa yumkin*, etc.). In the Proclus texts, *mumtani'* occurs only once, otherwise *muḥāl* (Endress, *Proclus*, index s.v.); once also in Nazīf's (probably late) translation of the *Metaphysics* (124,9), which otherwise uses various periphrastic turns.

## R-W-D

On *irāda* see n. ad 6. It is not at all clear why *ikhtiyār* should ever have been preferred to *irāda* as a translation of βούλησις. The Arabic translation of Themistius' *de Anima* ascribed to Ishāq uses various terms (mostly *mashī'a*), but neither *ikhtiyār*, nor *irāda* (once for ὁρμή). *Ikhtiyār*=βουλευτική in Arist., *de Anima* 434a 7 (a translation ascribed in the mss. to Ishāq but shown by Frank, *Some fragments*, to be older), and the use of this word as equivalent of βούλησις may be due in part to a confusion between βουλεύομαι and βούλομαι. But normally *ikhtiyār* = προαίρεσις and *irāda* = βούλησις (so al-Dimashqī's *Topics* 673,10; 675 pu.) see *Fī al-Istīṭā'a* (Dietrich 25) in Ruland, *Vorsehung* 213. Dual transl. *ikhtiyār wa-irāda* in Nemesius (Thillet).

## S-W-Y

B appears to prefer the VIIIth form (*mustawin*) and A the IIIId/VIth (*musāwin/mutasāwin*). In the translations of the *de Caelo* the VIIIth form is typical of B and the IIIId/VIth of A/C. In Alexander's *Ināya*, the VIIIth form occurs mostly in the older version (D15) and the VIth in D18.

## SH-B-H

The central concept of ὁμοίωσις or μίμησις (the two are not clearly distinguished in Alexander, cf. above pp. 8-9) is normally rendered by *tashabbuh*; but A has the rarer term *iqtidā'*, replaced by *tashabbuh* in the latter part of the text. *Iqtidā'* seems to be older and would be more suitable for μίμησις than for ὁμοίωσις; it is however used in that last sense in a Platonic text (Linley, *Ibn al-Ṭayyib* 6,9), and B has *muqtadiyan* in (23). *Tashabbaha* renders μιμεῖσθαι in *Theol. Arist.* (cf. Endress, *Proclus* 125); it may be therefore that *iqtidā'* was an

attempt at devising a distinctive translation for ὁμοιοῦσθαι.

### SH-W-Q

For the three kinds of desire corresponding to the three parts of the soul, A uses *shawq* = ἐπιθυμία, *ghaḍab* = θυμός and *irāda* = βούλησις, whereas B has *shahwa* instead of *shawq*. B's terminology is that more frequently found in Platonic or Platonizing texts, e.g. al-Kindī, *Fī al-Nafs*; Galen, *Akhlāq*. It is also used in other translations ascribed to Dimashqī, e.g. *Topics* 110b 38; 152b 9. The three transl. of *Soph. El.* all have *shawq* = ὄρεξις and *shahwa* = ἐπιθυμία. Similarly, Uṣṭāth's *Metaph.* has ὄρεξις = *shawq* (Ibn Rushd, *Tafsīr* 1149,10) and ἐπιθυμησις = *ishtahā* (1150,4). Ishāq in Themistius' *de Anima* (see Lyons' index) mostly follows the same rule, although he sometimes uses *shahwa* for ὄρεξις (Them., *de An.* 219,2; Arist., *Phys.* 253a 17), which also occurs once in both Uṣṭāth's and Mattā's transl. of the *Metaph.* (*Tafsīr* 1531,8). Qusṭā b. Lūqā also appears to prefer *shahwa* as equivalent of ὄρεξις, but ἐπιθυμία and words from the same root are generally rendered in Arabic with dual expressions using words from both roots *sh-h-w* and *sh-w-q* (see Daiber, *Aetius* 593). There is thus a general preference for B's terminology, but no set rules. It may be significant that some notable exceptions occur in translations ascribed to Ishāq who is also named as author of A in most mss. On the other hand, B's terminology is found to correspond closely to that of translations ascribed to al-Dimashqī, including the rare *tawaqān* (*Topics* 146b 2 = Ar. transl. 673). Inconsistently, the Damascus ms. of A has *yatūq* (28), while B has *yatashawwaq* and the other mss. of A *yashtāq*. In (76) again, A has *shawq* and *tawaqān* which properly belong to the vocabulary of B. It is difficult to account for this mass of confusing facts. Possibly B (if it is, as I think, the older transl.) kept the terms *ghaḍab* and *shahwa*, already current for the two lower parts of the soul, and *shawq* for ὄρεξις; having then to fall back on a different word for ὄρεξις, it opted for *tawaqān*, very rare in philosophical texts. It is presumably in order to replace it with a more common word that A altered the translation in the way it did, admittedly a rather unfortunate choice. A good idea of the terminological incoherence prevailing in this area may be gained from Walzer, *al-Fārābī* 391.

## D-R-R

*Idṭirār* (A) sometimes corresponds to *ḍarūra* (B), but not always; in (17) both have *idṭirār*. This fact is nevertheless interesting insofar as the same happens in the treatise *On the Universals*, in which the version ascribed to al-Dimashqī (D3) has *ḍarūra* as opposed to *idṭirār* in the older version (D17; cf. Ruland, *Zwei arabische Fassungen* 251). In *‘Ināya* too the older version exhibits a preference for *idṭirār* as against *ḍarūra*, as well as Uṣṭāth’s *Metaphysics*. But both forms are found side by side in *Topics* VIII.

## K-W-N

A’s *kā’in* corresponds to B’s *mutakawwin*, a change also found in the *de Caelo* (Endress 49). Sometimes, however, it is *ḥadatha* which seems to be used for γίγνεσθαι.

## HAYŪLĀ

It is the most common term for matter, but it is noteworthy that *mādda* is also used, even in the same passage (112), without any appearance of a difference in meaning. In the treatise on Providence, *hayūlā* is used in the older version as against *mādda* in the other. More surprising is the occurrence of *‘unṣur*, which is archaic in that sense (Endress, *de Caelo* 61), but common in Uṣṭāth’s translation of the *Metaphysics* and Qusṭā b. Lūqā’s Aetius (Daiber, *Aetius*, 284; 615).

## W-J-H

B exhibits a preference for *wajh*, *jiha* (occasionally *ṣanf*, 3,49) as against *naḥw* in A. Here again the interesting point is that (28), the Damascus ms. alone has *naḥw* while all others (including B) have *wajh*. According to Ruland (*Vorsehung* 120), the older version of the treatise on providence never uses *wajh/jiha*.


## W-D-‘

Both *mawḍi‘* and *makān* appear in A, *mawḍi‘* only in B (though this may be due to the latter’s brevity). It is significant, in view of the

fact that *makān* seems to be preferred in the works of Ishāq (Endress, *de Caelo* 135) that in (3) the Damascus ms. alone has *mawāḏīʿ* (with *amākin* as a variant, see *app. crit.*), and all other mss. *amākin*. The older transl. of ‘*Ināya* (D 15) uses only *mawḏīʿ*, never *makān*. In the *Quaestio* II 3, οἰκείους τόπους (48,11) is rendered as *mawāḏīʿ mulāʿima*.







## TEXT A

مقالة الاسكندر الافروديسي في القول في مبادئ الكل بحسب رأي ٢٥٣  
أرسطاطالس الفيلسوف

(١) قال الاسكندر: لما تأملت الفحص الذي مُخرجه مخرج التوبيخ الجميل عن الأشياء التي كنت<sup>١</sup> كتبت بها اليك جواباً عما سألته إذ كانت معرفتك بصعوبة الأمر فيها ليست مقصورة عن معرفة غيرك لم أثاقل<sup>٢</sup> عن كشف رأيي فيها لك إذ كنت أهلاً له<sup>٣</sup> وأن أضمن في ذلك بحسب ما يمكن كتاباً اكتبه اقصد فيه لتثبيت<sup>٤</sup> القول في المبادئ بحسب رأي أرسطوطالس<sup>٥</sup> (٢) فأقول إن أفضل ما تثبت به أمثال هذه الأشياء بحسب رأيي<sup>٦</sup> هو أن أبين<sup>٧</sup> أن المبادئ التي توطأ لها توافق وتلزم الأشياء البينة الظاهرة المعروفة إذ ليس يمكن أن يستعمل فيها الأقاويل البرهانية إذ كان البرهان إنما يكون من الأشياء التي هي أشدّ تقدماً<sup>٨</sup> ومن الأسباب وكانت المبادئ الأولى لا شيء يتقدمها ولا لها علة أصلاً<sup>٩</sup> (٣) والأشياء المطلوبة هي<sup>١٠</sup> أن يعلم ما العلة الأولى وأي الأفعال فعلها وأي نحو من أنحاء الحركة يتحرك الجسم المتحرك عنها ومن أجل ماذا<sup>١١</sup> صارت حركات هذا الجسم الكري كثيرة مختلفة وهل الأشياء التي تتكون في الأماكن<sup>١٢</sup>

<sup>١</sup> كنت ته

<sup>٢</sup> أثاقل: أثاقل ته

<sup>٣</sup> في: ناقص في ظ

<sup>٤</sup> لتثبيت ته: ليشب م ط ظ

<sup>٥</sup> بحسب رأي أرسطوطالس ظ

<sup>٦</sup> رأيي ظ: رأي هذا الرجل أعني أرسطوطالس

<sup>٧</sup> أبين: يبين ظ

<sup>٨</sup> و ظ

<sup>٩</sup> أصلاً: أيضاً ظ

<sup>١٠</sup> هي: ناقص في ج

<sup>١١</sup> ماذا: ما ج: هذا ته

<sup>١٢</sup> الأماكن ج م ته ط ظ: المواضع ظ

## TRANSLATION

Alexander of Aphrodisias' treatise on the theory concerning the Principles of the Universe according to the philosopher Aristotle's opinion.

(1) Alexander says: having considered the investigation, the starting point of which was the fair criticism of the matters concerning which I had written to you an answer to the question you had asked, as you know as well as anyone else the difficulty involved in this, I did not defer uncovering to you my own opinion about them, as you deserve it, nor to include in this, as far as possible, a tract of mine in which I should aim at ascertaining the theory concerning the principles according to Aristotle's opinion. (2) Therefore I say: the best way to ascertain such things is in my opinion to show that the principles that lead up to them are in necessary agreement with the things that are evident, manifest and well-known. For it is not possible concerning them to use demonstrative reasonings, since demonstration proceeds from prior things and from the causes, whereas there is nothing prior to the first principles, nor do they have any cause. (3) The things we are seeking consist in knowing: (a) what is the First Cause? (b) What is its action? (c) Of what kind is the motion of the body moved by it? (d) Why does the spherical body have many different motions? (e) As for the things that are generated in the places below the

التي دون<sup>١٣</sup> فلك القمر من أجل حركات هذه الأجسام إنما<sup>١٤</sup> تتكون عن اختيار ما<sup>١٥</sup> او معرفة فالأقاويل التي أظن<sup>١٦</sup> أنها يمكن أن تقال في ذلك بحسب رأي أرسطوطالس<sup>١٧</sup> تكون على هذا النحو:

( ٤ ) لما كان كل جسم طبيعي يتحرك بالطبع بذاته و ذلك أن الذي له في ذاته مبدءاً و<sup>١٨</sup> سبب الحركة هو متحرك بذاته و كل جسم طبيعي<sup>١٩</sup> فله في ذاته مبدءاً الحركة أعني بذلك الطبيعة و كل ما يتحرك بذاته بالطبع متنفساً كان أو غير متنفس فإنما يتحرك بالاشتياق إلى شيء و ذلك هو<sup>٢٠</sup> أن يكون ٢٥٤ المتحرك حافظاً لكماله الخاص به إذ<sup>٢١</sup> ليس شيء من الأشياء التي تتحرك بالطبع يحدث باطلاً و كان أيضاً هذا الجسم المتحرك على الاستدارة الذي قد تبين من أمره بالأقاويل التي وُضعت فيه أنه إلهي و أنه غير كائن و لا فاسد هو<sup>٢٢</sup> أيضاً جسم طبيعي وأن الحركة التي يتحركها إنما يتحركها بطبعه فلننزل أن هذا الجسم أيضاً<sup>٢٣</sup> إنما يتحرك على هذه الجهة بالاشتياق إلى شيء ما<sup>٢٤</sup> ( ٥ ) فأما الأجسام غير المتنفسة فإن اشتياقها إنما هو من أجل الشيء الذي من أجله تكون لها<sup>٢٥</sup> الحركة بالطبع<sup>٢٦</sup> و هذا الاشتياق

<sup>١٣</sup> دون: تحت ج: تحت دورته

<sup>١٤</sup> إنما ته م ج: أو إنما ظ ط

<sup>١٥</sup> اختيار ما: اختيارها ته

<sup>١٦</sup> أظن: تظن ج

<sup>١٧</sup> أرسطوطالس: الفيلسوف أرسطو ج

<sup>١٨</sup> و ته: أو ج م ظ ط

<sup>١٩</sup> وذلك أن....طبيعي: وكل جسم طبيعي يتحرك بالطبع ج

<sup>٢٠</sup> وذلك هو أن: وذلك أن ج

<sup>٢١</sup> الخاص به إذ ط: الخاص به إذا ته م: الخاص إذ ظ ج

<sup>٢٢</sup> هو: فهو ج

<sup>٢٣</sup> أيضاً ج ته ط

<sup>٢٤</sup> شيء ما ج ته ط: شيء م ظ

<sup>٢٥</sup> لها: فيه ته

<sup>٢٦</sup> بالطبع: ناقص في ج

sphere of the moon because of the motions of these bodies, are they generated by choice and knowledge? The theories which I think can be formulated about this according to Aristotle's opinion are as follows:

(4) Since every natural body is naturally moved by itself (for that which has in itself a principle and cause of motion is moved by itself and every natural body has in itself a principle of motion, viz. nature), and <since> everything which moves by itself naturally, be it ensouled or not, only moves by an impulse towards something and does so in order to preserve its proper perfection (for none of the things moved by nature is in vain); <since moreover> this body moving in a circle, of which it has been shown by the reasonings laid down concerning it that it is divine, ungenerated and imperishable, is also a natural body and its motion is due to its nature, therefore we must assume that this body too moves in this way by an impulse towards something. (5) The impulse of the bodies that are not ensouled is towards that because of which their natural motion arises in them, and this impulse

الصادر عن التهيؤ الطبيعي هو الميل إلى الشيء الذي كان<sup>٢٧</sup> ملائماً و سبباً<sup>٢٨</sup> لفعلها الطبيعي الذي يخصها وذلك أنه على هذه الجهة يكون مصير كل واحد من الأجسام إلى الموضع<sup>٢٩</sup> الطبيعي الذي يخصه وإذا استقر فيه بلغ كماله الذي يخصه (٦) و أما الأجسام الطبيعية التي هي أكمل من هذه أعني التي لها أنفس<sup>٣٠</sup> فإنها إنما تتحرك في المكان بالنفس التي لها و الحركة التي لهذه الأجسام على جهة الاشتياق إنما تكون مع شهوة ما و من هذه الشهوة ما يسمّى شوقاً و منها ما يسمّى غضباً و منها ما يسمّى إرادة<sup>٣١</sup> و ذلك أنه بواحد من هذه الأشياء بعينها يكون ابتداء الحركة للأشياء المتنفسة التي تتحرك في المكان (٧) والجسم الإلهي بأسره متنفس إذ كان الجسم الإلهي أفضل الأجسام و ما كان أفضل الأجسام فليس جسم أفضل منه وقد يوجد جسم ما أفضل<sup>٣٢</sup> من جميع الأجسام غير المتنفسة و ذلك هو الجسم المتنفس لئلا يكون الأفضل هو الجسم غير المتنفس (٨) فيجب إذن أن يكون المتنفس هو الأفضل إذ<sup>٣٣</sup> كان كل جسم إما أن يكون متنفساً أو<sup>٣٤</sup> غير متنفس و الدليل على أن الجسم الكري أفضل الأجسام كلها أنه غير<sup>٣٥</sup> فاسد وأنه يتحرك الحركة المتقدمة لجميع الحركات و يتحركها أيضاً دائماً و<sup>٣٦</sup> على نظام<sup>٣٧</sup> مساوٍ<sup>٣٨</sup> (٩)

<sup>٢٧</sup> كان ته ط: كانه ج م ظ

<sup>٢٨</sup> ملائماً وسبباً صح: ملائم وسبب

<sup>٢٩</sup> الموضع: موضعه ج

<sup>٣٠</sup> لها أنفس: نفس ظ

<sup>٣١</sup> إرادة ظ: اختيار ج م ته ط ظ<sup>٢</sup>

<sup>٣٢</sup> أفضل ج ظ: هو أفضل م ته ط

<sup>٣٣</sup> إذ ج ته ط: إن م ظ

<sup>٣٤</sup> أو م ته ط: وإما ظ: وإما أن يكون ج

<sup>٣٥</sup> غير: ناقص في ظ

<sup>٣٦</sup> و: ناقص في ج

<sup>٣٧</sup> نظام ج ظ: ترتيب م ته ط

<sup>٣٨</sup> مساوٍ م ته ط: متشابه ج ظ

originating from their natural disposition is the inclination towards the thing which is appropriate to them and the cause of the natural act proper to them. For this is how every body tends towards the natural place proper to it, and once it has settled in it, it has reached the perfection proper to itself. (6) But the natural bodies which are more perfect than those, I mean the bodies which have souls, are moved in place by their soul, and the motion belonging to these bodies through an impulse can only arise with a certain desire, and this desire is divided into what is called appetite, what is called passion and what is called will. For it is precisely through one of these things that motion arises in ensouled things which move in space. (7) The divine body in its entirety is ensouled since the divine body is the best of bodies and there is no body better than the best of bodies, and there exists a body which is better than all the soulless bodies, namely the ensouled body, so that the soulless body will not be the best. (8) It is therefore necessary that the ensouled should be the best since every body must be either ensouled or soulless. What shows that the spherical body is the best of all bodies is the fact that it does not perish and that it moves with the motion which precedes all motions, and also that it moves with it eternally and regularly. (9) The cause, then, of the motion of this



فسبب حركة هذا الجسم إذن هو شهوة مَّا لكن الشوق و الغضب مباينان لطبيعة هذا الجسم و ذلك أن الجسم الإلهي غير منفعل والشوق والغضب انفعالات<sup>٣٩</sup> ولذلك صارت أنفس الأجسام الإلهية غير مساوية<sup>٤٠</sup> في<sup>٤١</sup> النوع لواحدة<sup>٤٢</sup> من الأنفس الكائنة في الأشياء المادية<sup>٤٣</sup> إذ كان يلزم<sup>٤٤</sup> في هذه من الإضطراب أن يكون ما توجد له فيها القوى<sup>٤٥</sup> التي هي أكمل أن تكون له قبل ذلك<sup>٤٦</sup> القوى التي هي دونها في الكمال<sup>٤٧</sup> لأنه ليس يمكن دون هذه القوى أن<sup>٤٨</sup> يتكون<sup>٤٩</sup> واحد<sup>٥٠</sup> منها و يسلم<sup>٥١</sup> ( ١٠ ) ولذلك ما<sup>٥٢</sup> ٢٥٥ كان منها له<sup>٥٣</sup> اختيار فإن له أيضاً بعينه<sup>٥٤</sup> غضباً و شوقاً فأما أنفس الأشياء الإلهية فليست لها في هذه<sup>٥٥</sup> مشاركة بقوة من القوى التي هي أقل كمالاً من قبل أن الأشياء ذوات<sup>٥٦</sup> هذه الأنفس لم تكن محتاجة في بدء الأمر إلى ما<sup>٥٧</sup> يكون<sup>٥٨</sup> معيّناً على ما يوجب<sup>٥٩</sup> لها السلامة التي من أجلها و بسببها

<sup>٣٩</sup> انفعالات ج: انفعالات

<sup>٤٠</sup> مساوية ظ ته<sup>١</sup>: متساوية

<sup>٤١</sup> في: ناقص في ج

<sup>٤٢</sup> لواحدة: الواحد ج: الواحدة م

<sup>٤٣</sup> المادية ته<sup>١</sup>: المائنة

<sup>٤٤</sup> يلزم: قد يلزم م ط

<sup>٤٥</sup> القوى ظ: من القوى م ته ط

<sup>٤٦</sup> القوى... قبل ذلك: ناقص في ج

<sup>٤٧</sup> دونها في الكمال: أقل كمالاً ط<sup>٢</sup>: دونها أقل كمالاً في الكمال ته

<sup>٤٨</sup> أن ج ته ط: بأن م ط

<sup>٤٩</sup> يتكون ته: تكون

<sup>٥٠</sup> واحد م ظ: واحدة ته ط: واحداً ج

<sup>٥١</sup> ويسلم: ناقص في ج

<sup>٥٢</sup> لذلك ما: لذلك صار ما ج

<sup>٥٣</sup> له: ناقص في ته

<sup>٥٤</sup> بعينه: في نفسه ته

<sup>٥٥</sup> لها في هذه ته

<sup>٥٦</sup> ذوات ظ: التي لها م ته ط

<sup>٥٧</sup> ما ظ: أن م ط ته

<sup>٥٨</sup> يكون لها ته ط: يكون ظ م

<sup>٥٩</sup> يوجب م ته ط: و جب ظ

body is a certain desire, but appetite and passion are absent from the nature of this body. For the divine body cannot be affected, and appetite and passion are affections; this is why the souls of the divine bodies are not specifically the same as any of the souls that exist in material things, since it is necessary in the case of the latter that those which have the more perfect faculties should also have before that the faculties that are less perfect, because it is not possible that any of them should be generated without the latter faculties and be preserved. (10) Therefore, those among them which have will also have in themselves passion and appetite. But the souls of the divine things do not share in any of the less perfect faculties because the things which possess these souls have no need at all of that which is designed to ensure their preservation for the sake of which

كانت تلك القوى ( ١١ ) فيحصل إذن مما قلنا أن تكون الشهوة التي في هذه إنما تكون بالاختيار<sup>٦٠</sup> والاختيار الحقيقي الفاضل هو محبة الخير و ذلك أن الاختيار على الإطلاق إنما هو محبة الخير أو ما يُظن<sup>٦١</sup> أنه خير و الاختيار الحقيقي الذي هو محبة الخير إنما هو موجود في الله عز و جل وحده ( ١٢ ) وذلك أن الشيء المتشوق بحسب رأي أرسطوطالس<sup>٦٢</sup> هو الشيء الذي يُظن<sup>٦٣</sup> أنه خير و المختار المرتضى من الأشياء هو الخير الأول فسبب حركة هذا الجسم الإلهي الطبيعية<sup>٦٤</sup> إذن هو الاشتياق إلى الخير الحقيقي ( ١٣ ) و الشهوة في هذه الأشياء إنما تكون بالعقل و ذلك أن الاختيار<sup>٦٥</sup> فيها ليس يكون بقوة من القوى المنفعلة من قبل أنه ليس فيها منذ<sup>٦٦</sup> أول الأمر شيء منها لكنها من حيث يتصور بالعقل يتشوق إلى الشيء المتصور بالعقل و المتوهم ( ١٤ ) وذلك أن الاشتياق إلى الشيء الأفضل<sup>٦٨</sup> تابع لما يتصور منه بالعقل<sup>٦٩</sup> في الأشياء التي قد اقتنت الشيء الملائم له الخاص به فهو<sup>٧٠</sup> من قبل هذا الشوق بعينه يتحرك على هذه الجهة لا من حيث يتصور بالعقل و ذلك أن التصور بالعقل لشيء<sup>٧١</sup> ليس هو

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<sup>٦٠</sup> بالاختيار: بالإرادة ظ<sup>٢</sup>

<sup>٦١</sup> يظن ظ: يرى

<sup>٦٢</sup> أرسطوطالس: ناقص في ته ط

<sup>٦٣</sup> يظن ظ: يرى

<sup>٦٤</sup> الطبيعية ط ظ: الطبيعي م ته

<sup>٦٥</sup> الاختيار: الإرادة ظ<sup>٢</sup>

<sup>٦٦</sup> فيها: منها ظ

<sup>٦٧</sup> منذ ته ط: مبدا م: منه ظ

<sup>٦٨</sup> إلى الشيء الأفضل ظ: إلى الأفضل ته ط: الأفضل م

<sup>٦٩</sup> والموجود من هذه المقالة ما لفظه أن يكون هذا الواحد الأزلي الذي هو أقدم بالعقل

ج.....

<sup>٧٠</sup> فهو: و ظ

<sup>٧١</sup> لشيء: ناقص في ته ظ

these faculties exist. (11) It follows from what we have said that the desire which is in these is by will, and the true and excellent will is the love of the good. For will in an absolute sense is love of the good or of that which is thought to be good, and true will which is love of the good exists in God alone. (12) For the desired thing according to Aristotle's opinion is the thing which is thought to be good, and the thing which is willed and preferred from among things is the first good. The cause of the natural motion of this divine body, then, is the impulse towards the true good. (13) Desire in these things only exists through the intellect, for will in them does not exist by virtue of one of the passive faculties, because they have absolutely none of these, but it is insofar as they perceive by their intellect that they desire the thing perceived by the intellect and represented. (14) For the impulse towards the best thing follows that part of it which perceives by the intellect in the things which have acquired that which is appropriate and proper to it, and because of this very appetite it moves in this way, not because it perceives by the intellect. For perceiving something by the intellect is not

حركة أصلاً كما قد تبين ( ١٥ ) وقد يكون هذا المعنى أيضاً أكثر وضوحاً في الأشياء التي تتصور بالعقل دائماً أشياء واحدة بأعينها فإنها ليست تتحرك في حال تصورها بالعقل ( ١٦ ) وهذا هو السبب في الحركة الدورية التي تتحركها الأجسام الالهية بالطبع الذي<sup>٧٢</sup> يخصها والمتولي لتدبيرها و سياستها ذلك الجسم<sup>٧٣</sup> الذي له صورة كهذه<sup>٧٤</sup> الصورة من قبل الميل الطبيعي إلى الحركة الدورية كما ذكرنا<sup>٧٥</sup> ( ١٧ ) وإنما يتحرك اضطراراً هذه الحركة بالنفس والعقل وذلك أن هذه النفس منذ<sup>٧٦</sup> بدء<sup>٧٧</sup> الأمر صورة لهذا الجسم فإنه ليس يجب أن يُعتقد أن طبيعته شيء آخر غير النفس ( ١٨ ) وكذلك أيضاً لا يجب أن يعتقد في الحيوان و الأجسام المركبة أن طبيعتها من طريق ما هي حيوان شيء آخر غير النفس إلا أن لهذه الأشياء من طريق ما هي مركبة حركة أخرى طبيعية بحسب الأجسام التي ليست<sup>٢٥٦</sup> بمتنفسه غير الحركة التي تتحركها بالنفس إلا أنها واحدة فقط بحسب الغالب في الجسم المركب من الأجسام<sup>٧٨</sup> الأخر و ذلك أنه قد يوجد لكل واحد منها قبل أن يختلط بعضها ببعض اختلاطاً يصير بها الكل متنفساً حركة ما طبيعية ( ١٩ ) فأما الجسم الالهى فإنه لما كان بسيطاً و ذلك أنه ما كان ليكون أزلياً لو كان مركباً و كانت الحركة التي يتحركها أيضاً حركة واحدة بسيطة فإنه ليست<sup>٧٩</sup> له أصلاً طبيعة أخرى غير النفس و لا له أيضاً حركة طبيعية غير الحركة النفسانية وإنما يفضل<sup>٨٠</sup> الجسم الالهى غيره من

<sup>٧٢</sup> الذي: التي ظ

<sup>٧٣</sup> الجسم: الجرم ج<sup>٢</sup>

<sup>٧٤</sup> يعني جسماني ظ<sup>٢</sup>

<sup>٧٥</sup> كما ذكرنا: ناقص في ظ

<sup>٧٦</sup> النفس منذ ظ: النفس هي منذ ته: النفس هي مبدأ ج م: النفس هي مثلاً ترسي

(؟) ج<sup>٢</sup>

<sup>٧٧</sup> بدء ظ: أول ظ<sup>٢</sup>: أول بدء ج م ط ته

<sup>٧٨</sup> يعني الأسطقسات ظ<sup>٢</sup>

<sup>٧٩</sup> ليست ته: ليس

<sup>٨٠</sup> يفضل ج: يفصل ظ: انفصل ته: الفضل ط

a motion at all, as has been explained. (15) This idea too may be clearer in the things which perceive by the intellect the same things eternally: they do not move while perceiving by means of the intellect. (16) This is the cause of the circular motion which is that of the divine bodies according to the nature which is proper to them; that which is in charge of their direction and government is this body which has a form like this form by virtue of the natural inclination towards circular motion, as we have said. (17) It necessarily moves with this motion through soul and intellect because this soul is from the beginning the form of this body, and one must not believe that its nature is something different from its soul. (18) Likewise one must not believe that the nature of animals and composite bodies, insofar as they are animals, is something different from the soul; but insofar as these things are composite, they have a natural motion corresponding to the bodies that are not ensouled, other than the motion with which they are moved by the soul, but which is unique and in accordance with the prevailing <element> in the body composed of the other bodies. For each one of them has a certain natural motion before they become mixed with one another in a way that makes the whole ensouled. (19) As for the divine body, since it is simple—because it could not be eternal if it were composite—and its motion is also one and simple, it does not have any nature at all other than the soul, nor any natural motion other than the motion caused by the soul. The divine body surpasses all

سائر الأجسام البسيطة من قبل أن طبيعته وإن كانت جسمًا بسيطًا هي نفس وطبيعة في غاية الكمال ( ٢٠ ) ولذلك صارت هذه النفس ليست صورة لجسم<sup>٨١</sup> من قبل أن هذا الجسم لم يكن محتاجًا إلى الحركات المختلفة التي تكون في النفس لأنه لم يحتج فيما يوجب له السلامة إلى معونة<sup>٨٢</sup> ما من خارج ولما كانت الحركة<sup>٨٣</sup> التي يتحركها بنفسه وطبيعته التي تخصه حركة بسيطة صار بهذا الفعل بعينه<sup>٨٤</sup> يقبل كماله الخاص به ( ٢١ ) وذلك أن جميع الأشياء التي قوامها<sup>٨٥</sup> بالطبيعة قد يوجد لها في نفس طبيعتها الملائمة<sup>٨٦</sup> لها الاشتياق إلى الشيء الذي هو أول الأسباب و أفضل من جميع الأشياء إذ كانت الطبيعة<sup>٨٧</sup> وجميع الأشياء التي قوامها بها إنما تفعل ما تفعل بحسب طبيعتها التي تخصها شوقًا منها<sup>٨٨</sup> إلى الاقتداء بذلك الشيء الذي عنه تكونت على القصد الأول ( ٢٢ ) وما يناله كل واحد منها<sup>٨٩</sup> بمبلغ طاقته منه<sup>٩٠</sup> فإنما<sup>٩١</sup> يناله بسبب الكمال الذي يخصه في نفس طبيعته وعلى هذه الجهة يوجد للجسم<sup>٩٢</sup> الطبيعي الذي هو أقدم من جميع الأجسام الطبيعية الاشتياق بالطبع إلى الاقتداء بالعلة الأولى ( ٢٣ ) والغرض<sup>٩٣</sup> في الفعل الذي يوجد له في طبيعته التي تخصه وهو حركته الدورية التي بها يتحرك الجسم بطاقته حركة أزلية هو

<sup>٨١</sup> صورة لجسم: صورة لجسم التي ظ: صورة م ته ط: صورة لجسم إلا ج

<sup>٨٢</sup> معونة: معرفة ظ

<sup>٨٣</sup> الحركة ج: حركته ته ط: ناقص في م ظ

<sup>٨٤</sup> بعينه: ناقص في ج م ته ط

<sup>٨٥</sup> قوامها: قواها ظ

<sup>٨٦</sup> الملائمة ظ: الذاتية ظ: الملائمة الذاتية ج: الملائمة الذات م: الملائمة الذات ط

<sup>٨٧</sup> إذ كانت الطبيعة ج م ط: أو كامل لطبيعته ظ: الملائمة.... الطبيعة ناقص في ته

<sup>٨٨</sup> منها: منه ظ

<sup>٨٩</sup> منها: منهما ظ

<sup>٩٠</sup> منه ظ: منها م ته ط: ناقص في ج

<sup>٩١</sup> فإنما ج ته: وإنما ظ م ط

<sup>٩٢</sup> للجسم: الجسم ظ

<sup>٩٣</sup> الغرض ظ: القصد ظ: العدم ته ط: القوم م

simple bodies in that its nature, although it is a simple body, is soul and nature in utmost perfection. (20) Therefore this soul is not the form of a body, because this body did not need the different motions which are in the soul; for it did not need, in order to ensure its own preservation, any help from outside. Since the motion with which it is moved by its proper soul and nature is a simple motion, it will receive by this very act its proper perfection. (21) For all things existing by nature have in the very nature appropriate to them an impulse towards the thing which is the First Cause and better than all things, since nature and all things existing by it do what they do according to the nature proper to them out of desire to imitate that thing from which they were generated primarily. (22) Each one of them achieves what it does according to its ability because of the perfection proper to itself in its very nature; thus, the natural body which is prior to all natural bodies has a natural impulse to imitate the First Cause. (23) The aim of the act existing in the nature proper to it, namely the circular motion with which the <heavenly> body moves eternally insofar as it can, is



الافتداء بالجواهر الذي ليس بجسم ولا متحرك وإن تشبه اتصال<sup>٩٤</sup> الحركة الملائمة له فبأزلية ذلك من حيث هو غير متحرك ( ٢٤ ) فليكن المحرك للجسم الكري الذي إليه يتشوق<sup>٩٥</sup> هو ذلك الشيء الذي<sup>٩٦</sup> هو بالحقيقة الغاية في الجود<sup>٩٧</sup> وأفضل وإذ كان بهذه الحال فيجب أن يكون أعلى وأشرف من جميع الحيوانات<sup>٩٨</sup> والأجسام الالهية وذلك أن ما كان سبباً ٢٥٧ لكل واحد من الأشياء في ما يوجد له من الكمال الذي يخصه في طبيعته فهو أحق منه بالعلو والشرف ( ٢٥ ) فيجب أن يكون سبب حركة الجسم الالهي إنما هو اشتياقه إلى الشيء الذي هو الغاية في الجود وإياه ينحو ويؤم<sup>٩٩</sup> ولما كانت هذه حال هذا الشيء المتشوق وجب من ذلك أن يكون أفضل من جميع الأشياء الموجودة وليس يمكن أن يكون جسمًا ( ٢٦ ) وذلك أن الجسم الالهي المتحرك عنه أفضل من جميع الأجسام إذ كان جسمًا بسيطًا غير منفعل<sup>١٠٠</sup> وكانت الحركة التي يتحركها ذاتية له و<sup>١٠١</sup> كان إنما يمكن فيها وحدها من بين سائر الحركات أن تكون متصلة أزلية وإنما يمكن أن تكون بهذه الحال من الحركات بحسب ما بينناه في مواضع كثيرة أخرى الحركة<sup>١٠٢</sup> الدورية فقط ( ٢٧ ) ونقول أيضًا<sup>١٠٣</sup> إنه

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<sup>٩٤</sup> تشبه اتصال الحركة الملائمة له فبأزلية ذلك : تشبه باتصال أزلية الحركة الملائمة له بأزلية ذلك ج : نسبته أيضًا إلى الحركة الملائمة له بأزلية ذلك ج ٢ : نسبته أيضًا أزلية الحركة الملائمة له بأزلية ذلك م : نسبة اتصال الحركة الملائمة له بأزلية ذلك ط : تشبه اتصال أزلية الحركة الملائمة له فبأزلية ذلك ته

<sup>٩٥</sup> الذي إليه يتشوق : إياه يتشوق ظ

<sup>٩٦</sup> الذي ظ : ناقص في ج م ته ط

<sup>٩٧</sup> الجود ظ : الخير ظ<sup>٢</sup> : الحق والفضل ج م ته ط

<sup>٩٨</sup> الحيوانات : الموجودات ج<sup>٢</sup>

<sup>٩٩</sup> ينحو ويؤم : ينحو آخر ج : ينهى ويأمر ج<sup>٢</sup>

<sup>١٠٠</sup> منفعل ظ<sup>٢</sup> ته ط : منفصل ظ م

<sup>١٠١</sup> و : وإن ظ

<sup>١٠٢</sup> الحركة : الحركات ظ

<sup>١٠٣</sup> أيضًا : ناقص في ج ظ

an imitation of the substance which is not in a body and not moving; and the continuity of the motion appropriate to it is an assimilation to the eternity of that <First Cause> insofar as it is unmoved. (24) The mover of the spherical body which the latter desires must therefore be that thing which is truly supreme in generosity and the best. Since it is in that state, it must be more exalted and nobler than all living beings and divine bodies. For that which is the cause, for all things, of such perfection as exists in them, which is proper to them by nature, is more deserving of <being defined by> exaltedness and nobleness. (25) The cause of the motion of the divine body must be its impulse towards the thing which is supremely generous: it turns to it and follows it. As this is the state of the desired thing, it follows that it is better than all existing things and cannot be a body. (26) For the divine body moved by it is better than all bodies since it is a simple, impassive body and the motion with which it is moved is essential to it; it is possible for it alone of all motions to be continuous and eternal, and, as we have shown in many other places, only circular motion can be in that state. (27) We also say: if

إن<sup>١٠٤</sup> كان جسماً فظاهر أنه طبيعي لأن الأجسام الطبيعية أقدم وأفضل مما ليس كذلك وإن كان طبيعياً فهو أيضاً متحرك ومتى كان متحركاً فله في ذاته سبب الحركة<sup>١٠٥</sup> الطبيعية من قبل أن جميع الحركات التي بالطبع إنما تكون بالاشتياق إلى شيء<sup>١٠٦</sup> ( ٢٨ ) وهذا السبب إن قال فيه<sup>١٠٧</sup> قائل إنه جسم خرج الأمر في الأجسام الالهية إلى ما لا نهاية له فيبقى إذن أن يكون الشيء الذي إليه يشترك<sup>١٠٨</sup> الجسم الالهي جوهرًا ما ليس بجسم ولا متحرك وذلك أنه على هذا الوجه<sup>١٠٩</sup> فقط يكون مستغنياً عن شيء آخر إذ كان كل ما يتحرك حركة طبيعية فإنما يتحرك بالاشتياق إلى شيء ( ٢٩ ) ولإنسان أن يبين أن المحرك الأول هو غير متحرك من أجل أن<sup>١١٠</sup> الذي يحرك ويتحرك هو مركب مما يتحرك ويحرك وقد يجب لذلك أن يكون متى وُجد واحد من الأشياء البسيطة التي اجتمع عنها هذا المركب بحال ما أن يكون الآخر أيضاً على مثلها ( ٣٠ ) وأعني بهذا القول أنه متى كان أحدهما إنما يفارق الآخر بالقول<sup>١١١</sup> أن يكون الآخر أيضاً<sup>١١٢</sup> يفارقه بمثل ما فارقه ذلك به أعني بالقول<sup>١١٣</sup> وإن كانت مفارقتها إياه ليست بالقول فقط بل قد يتهياً أيضاً مع ذلك أن يكون موجوداً دون الآخر كانت سبيل الآخر أيضاً تلك السبيل بعينها ( ٣١ ) والشيء المتحرك ليس إنما يفارق المحرك بالقول<sup>١١٤</sup> فقط بل قد يوجد في أشياء كثيرة مفارقاً له بالذات

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<sup>١٠٤</sup> إن: إذا ج

<sup>١٠٥</sup> الحركة: للحركة ته

<sup>١٠٦</sup> إلى شيء: ناقص في ظ: إلى الشيء ته

<sup>١٠٧</sup> فيه: فيه أيضاً ظ

<sup>١٠٨</sup> إليه يشترك م ته ط: إليه اشتاق ج: يتوق إليه ظ

<sup>١٠٩</sup> الوجه: النحو ظ

<sup>١١٠</sup> من أجل أن ته ط: من أن

<sup>١١١</sup> بالقول: بالحد ظ<sup>٢</sup>

<sup>١١٢</sup> أيضاً ج ته ط: إنما م ظ

<sup>١١٣</sup> أعني بالقول: ناقص في ج

<sup>١١٤</sup> بالقول: بالقوة ته

it is a body, then clearly it is natural because natural bodies are prior to and better than what is not so, and if it is natural, it is also moved, and if it is moved, it has in its essence the cause of its natural motion insofar as all motions which are natural are due to an impulse towards something. (28) And if somebody said that this cause is a body, the question of the divine bodies would entail an infinite regress. Consequently, the thing towards which the divine body is impelled must be a substance which is not a body and not moved, for it is only in this way that it will not be in need of anything else, since everything that has a natural motion moves according to an impulse towards something. (29) One can show that the First Mover is unmoved on the basis that what imparts motion and is moved is composed of what is moved and of what imparts motion; therefore, when one of the simple things of which the compound is formed exists in a certain state, the other must be in the same state. (30) I mean by this that when one of the two can be distinguished from the other in definition, the latter too can be distinguished from the former in the same manner, i.e. in definition. And if it can be distinguished from the other not only in definition, but has the capacity to exist without it as well, then the latter will also be in the same condition. (31) The thing moved is not only distinct from the mover in definition, but also exists essentially distinct in many things.

وذلك أنه قد يوجد بعض الأشياء يتحرك عن شيء من غير أن يكون محرّكاً لشيء آخر أصلاً فيجب إذن أن نُنزل أوائل محرّكة لشيء من الأشياء ٢٥٨ من غير أن تكون متحركة (٣٢) فإن قال قائل إن كل محرّك فإنما يحرك بأن<sup>١١٥</sup> يتحرك ولهذا السبب يجب أن يكون المحرك الأول متحرّكاً<sup>١١٦</sup> أيضاً قلنا له إنه ليس يجوز أن يكون الذي يحركه خارجاً عنه<sup>١١٧</sup> وذلك أنه يقع في الوهم أن الذي هو الأول هو الذي يحرك<sup>١١٨</sup> ومتى كان متحرّكاً أما من خارج فلا يكون ذلك المحرك<sup>١١٩</sup> فيجب أن يكون هو يحرك نفسه وأن يكون ذاتي الحركة وأن يكون هو أيضاً متحرّكاً عن نفسه (٣٣) وقد يلزم أن نبحت كيف يمكن أن يكون ذاتي الحركة وأن يكون هو يحرك نفسه و ما يلتبس الوقوف عليه من ذلك يتبين على هذا الوجه وقد يلزم من الاضطرار من يقول أن شيئاً ذاتي الحركة أن يقول إما أن كله يتحرك عن كله حتى يكون كله يحرك وهو من كله يتحرك في حال واحدة معاً ويكون من حيث يحرك من هناك بعينه يتحرك أو يقول إن كله يتحرك من جزء ما منه<sup>١٢٠</sup> حتى يكون الجزء الذي يحرك داخلاً في جملة المتحرك أو يقول إن كله محرّك وجزءه متحرك أو يقول إن أجزاء الكل إذا حركت<sup>١٢١</sup> بعضها بعضاً تعود أيضاً فتتحرك عن الأشياء التي كانت متحركة عنها أو يقول إن جزءاً من الكل محرّك وجزءاً آخر متحرك فإن هذا القسم أيضاً داخل فيما يقال إنه ذاتي الحركة إذ كان قد يوجد له في ذاته شيء محرّك وشيء متحرك (٣٤) فإن كانت جهات الشيء الذاتي الحركة

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<sup>١١٥</sup> بأن ظ: ٢: إذا

<sup>١١٦</sup> متحرّكاً: يتحرك ظ

<sup>١١٧</sup> قلنا له . . خارجاً عنه ظ: فإنه ليس يتهياً على هذا الوجه أن يكون المحرك خارجاً عن

المتحرك

<sup>١١٨</sup> يحرك م: يتحرك

<sup>١١٩</sup> أما من خارج . . . المحرك ظ: ناقص في ج م ته ط

<sup>١٢٠</sup> منه ج ته ط: فيه م ظ

<sup>١٢١</sup> حركت ج ظ: ركب م ته ط

For some things are moved by something without imparting motion to anything else. Therefore, we must posit principles that impart motion to something without themselves being in motion. (32) If somebody should object that every mover only imparts motion by being in motion and that therefore the First Mover must also be in motion, we would reply that it is impossible for that which moves it to be outside it, for it is intuitively known that the First is that which imparts motion, and if it is moved from outside, then it is not the mover; it must impart motion to itself and be self-moved, and also be moved by itself.

(33) We must investigate how it is possible that it should be self-moved and impart motion to itself. What we want to know about this will become clear in the following way: of necessity, whoever says that something is self-moved must say either (a) that the whole is moved by the whole so that the whole imparts motion while being moved by the whole at the same time, and insofar as it imparts motion, for that very reason it is moved; or (b) he says that the whole is moved by a part of it so that the part and that which imparts motion are inside the totality of the moved; or (c) he says that the whole imparts motion and a part of it is moved; or (d) he says that the parts of the whole, when they impart motion to one another, are also set in motion by the things which are moved by them; or (e) he says that a part of the whole imparts motion and another part is moved; but this subdivision too belongs to that which is said to be self-moved since there is in its essence a thing which imparts motion and a thing moved. (34) If this is the total number of the modes of the self-moved thing,

هذا مبلغ عددها فإن الجهة الأولى منها وهي أن كل الشيء<sup>١٢٢</sup> يتحرك من كله حتى أنه يحرك ويتحرك من جهة واحدة بعينها هي محال وذلك أن الحركة التي بها يحرك المحرك بها بعينها يكون متحركاً وهذا ما لا يمكن وذلك أنه كيف يمكن في الشيء من حيث يحرك شيئاً من الأشياء حركة ما أن يتحرك هو عنه تلك الحركة بعينها في حال واحدة ( ٣٥ ) وإلا كيف يمكن أن يكون شيء ينقل شيئاً ما منتقلاً<sup>١٢٣</sup> وينتقل معاً ذاك الانتقال بعينه الذي ينتقل به المنتقل ( ٣٦ ) أو<sup>١٢٤</sup> يكون المفيد للصحة في حال ما من حيث هو مفيد لها يصح تلك الصحة بعينها في تلك الحال إلا على جهة العرض ( ٣٧ ) أو يكون الشيء المنمي تنمي في تلك الحال التي هو فيها منمي من غير أن يكون ذلك النمو ورد من خارج ( ٣٨ ) أو يكون المعلم يتعلم من المتعلم تلك الأشياء التي يعلمه إياها بعينها على أن ٢٥٩ المعلم والمتعلم يكونان واحداً بالعدد وكذلك<sup>١٢٥</sup> المحرك والمتحرك والنامي والمنمي وذلك أنه إن كان المحرك إنما يحرك إذا كان موجوداً بالفعل والشيء الذي يتحرك إنما هو موجود بالقوة وخروجه إلى الفعل إنما يكون بتوسط الحركة فإنه يعرض أن يكون هو بعينه موجوداً بالقوة والفعل معاً ( ٣٩ ) وذلك أن المحرك من حيث هو محرك وقبل أن يكون التحريك بعد قد صار موجوداً له بالفعل يوجد متحركاً في تلك الحال بعينها ويكون أيضاً الإنسان من حيث يعلم يتعلم<sup>١٢٦</sup> لا من حيث يتعلم والشيء من حيث يسخن ويحرك في حال تسخينه يسخن ويتحرك لا من حيث يتحرك ويسخن فإذا كان ذلك مما لا يمكن فليس ممكناً أيضاً أن يكون كل الشيء يحرك كله بالنحو الذي ذكرناه ( ٤٠ ) ومثل<sup>١٢٧</sup> ذلك بعينه يلزم قائلاً لو قال<sup>١٢٨</sup> في

<sup>١٢٢</sup> الشيء ته : شيء

<sup>١٢٣</sup> شيء ينقل شيئاً ما منتقلاً صح بدوي : شيئاً ينقل شيء ما منتقل ظ

<sup>١٢٤</sup> إلا كيف يمكن... المنتقل أو : ناقص في ج م ته ط

<sup>١٢٥</sup> كذلك : لذلك ظ

<sup>١٢٦</sup> يتعلم : ناقص في ج م ته ط

<sup>١٢٧</sup> مثل ظ : أمثال ج : مثال م ته ط

<sup>١٢٨</sup> بعينه... قال ج ظ : يلزم نفسه م ته ط

then the first mode, i.e. that the whole thing is moved by the whole so that it imparts motion and is moved at the same time, is impossible, because the motion which the mover imparts is the very motion with which it is moved, and this is not possible; for how is it possible for something which imparts a certain motion to a certain thing to receive this very motion from it at the same time? (35) In other words, how is it possible for something to carry something which is carried and to be carried at the same time exactly in the same way in which the carried thing is carried? (36) Or that he who provides health in a certain state, insofar as he provides health, should possess this very health in that state, unless it should be by accident? (37) Or that the thing causing growth should grow in the same way in which it causes grow unless this growth should come from outside? (38) Or that he who teaches should learn from him who is taught the very things he is teaching him, so that teacher and pupil should be the same in number? Likewise mover and moved, growing and cause of growth: for if the mover only imparts motion when it is in actuality and the thing moved only exists in potentiality and its becoming actuality only occurs through motion, then it would be the case that it is simultaneously in potentiality and in actuality. (39) For the mover as mover and before the imparting of motion is actually present in it would be in motion in this very state. In the same way, man would learn because he knows, not because he is taught, and because something heats and imparts motion when it heats, it would be hot and moved, not because it is set in motion and heated. Since this is not possible, it is not possible either that the whole of something should move the whole in the way we have mentioned. (40) The same consequence would follow if somebody said, concerning



الشيء الذي حركته ذاتية أن الكل يتحرك من جزء واحد من أجزائه وذلك أن الجزء الذي يحرك الكل هو أيضاً يحرك نفسه من قبل أنه موجود أيضاً في الكل الذي يتحرك عنه ويكون أيضاً على هذه الجهة شيئاً واحداً بعينه في العدد يحرك ويتحرك معاً بحركة واحدة بعينها (٤١) وكذلك يلزم أيضاً قائلاً لو قال في الشيء الذي حركته ذاتية أن الجزء يتحرك عن الكل أن يكون أيضاً الجزء المتحرك يتحرك من نفسه وذلك أن الجزء المتحرك موجود أيضاً في الكل المحرك<sup>١٢٩</sup> الذي عنه يتحرك (٤٢) ومثل<sup>١٣٠</sup> ذلك بعينه يلزم قائلاً إن قال أن أجزاء الكل تعود فيتحرك بعضها عن بعض تلك الحركة بعينها وذلك أنه يلزم بحسب هذا الرأي أيضاً أن يكون كل واحد من أجزاء الكل يحرك نفسه إن كان لا يتبين فرق ما<sup>١٣١</sup> بين الشيء الذي يحرك بمتوسط ما وبين الشيء الذي يحرك بغير متوسط وهو الذي إذا حرك حرك نفسه وكان كل واحد من الأجزاء يعود فيحرك الجزء الذي عنه تحرك حتى يكون كل واحد من هذه الأجزاء يحرك نفسه بمتوسط ما (٤٣) فبقي إذن أن يكون الشيء الذاتي الحركة على هذه الجهة فقط يمكن أن يوجد وهي أن يكون واحد من أجزائه محركاً<sup>١٣٢</sup> فقط غير متحرك ويكون الجزء الآخر متحركاً عن الآخر والمحرك<sup>١٣٣</sup> هذا الضرب من الحركة (٤٤) فيلزم إذن من ذلك أن يكون المحرك الأول وهو واحد من الأشياء الذاتية الحركة غير متحرك إن كان كل ما يتحرك إنما يتحرك بنحو ما من الأنحاء التي وصفت<sup>١٣٤</sup> من قبل أن<sup>١٣٥</sup> الحيوانات وهي بحسب ما يظهر من أمرهم ٢٦٠ من الأشياء التي حركتها ذاتية فإن مبدأ<sup>١٣٦</sup> هذه الحركة فيها إنما هو لها من

<sup>١٢٩</sup> المحرك ج: المتحرك

<sup>١٣٠</sup> مثل: مثال ج م ته ط

<sup>١٣١</sup> لا يتبين فرق ما ته ط: لا كثير فرق ج م ظ

<sup>١٣٢</sup> واحد من أجزائه متحركاً صح بدوي: واحداً من أجزائه متحرك ج ظ

<sup>١٣٣</sup> الآخر والمحرك ظ: الجزء المحرك ج

<sup>١٣٤</sup> وصفت ظ: وضعت ج

<sup>١٣٥</sup> أن ج: ناقص في ظ

<sup>١٣٦</sup> مبدأ ج: مثل (?) ظ بدوي

the self-moved thing, that the whole is moved by one of its parts. For the part which moves the whole also moves itself insofar as it is also present in the whole which is moved by it, and thus it is one and the same thing in number, imparting and receiving at the same time the very same motion. (41) Likewise, if somebody said, concerning the self-moved thing, that the part is moved by the whole, it would follow that the moved part would then also be moved by itself, for the moved part is also present in the moving whole by which it is moved. (42) The same consequence would follow if somebody said that the parts of the whole exert reciprocal motion and are moved by one another with the very same motion; for according to this opinion too it would follow that each one of the parts of the whole moves itself, if there does not appear to be any difference between the thing which imparts motion through an intermediary and the thing which imparts motion without intermediary, for the latter is that which, when it imparts motion, moves itself; <in this case too> each one of the parts imparts a reciprocal motion to the part by which it is moved, so that each one of these parts moves itself through an intermediary. (43) It remains, then, that the self-moving thing can only exist in this way, i.e. that one of its parts should only impart motion without being moved and the other part be moved by the former part imparting that kind of motion. (44) It follows, then, from this that the First Mover, which is one of the self-moving things, is unmoved, if everything that is moved can only be moved in one of the ways which have been described; for animals, as it appears, belong to the things which are self-moved, but the principle of this motion in them

خارج إن كانت إنما تتحرك هذا الضرب من الحركة بالشوق إلى شيء أو الهرب من شيء لئلا يكون واحد منها على الإطلاق ذاتي الحركة إن كانت أسباب الحركة على القصد الأول غير موجودة في نفس ذواتها (٤٥) فإذا<sup>١٣٧</sup> كان المحرك للجسم الإلهي هو بهذه الحال فقد يلزم من الاضطرار أن يكون أزلياً إذ كان أفضل من جميع الموجودات وكان الأزلي أفضل كثيراً من غير الأزلي وذلك أن الشيء الذي ليس بموجود ليس يمكن أن يكون موصوفاً بالفضيلة (٤٦) وقد تبين أن الجسم الإلهي أزلي مما قد وقع الإقرار به من أن الحركة المتصلة هي واحدة بالحقيقة وأنها<sup>١٣٨</sup> مع اتصالها متساوية إذ كان قد تبين في مواضع أخر أن حركة الجسم الإلهي هي بهذه<sup>١٣٩</sup> الحال حتى تكون واحدة بالحقيقة (٤٧) إلا أنه ما كان يجوز أن تكون الحركة واحدة بهذه الحال لو لم يكن المحرك واحداً في العدد بمنزلة المتحرك عند الشيء الذي عنه يتحرك هذا الضرب من الحركة وذلك أنه لو لم يكن المتحرك شيئاً بعينه واحداً بالعدد لم تكن الحركة حينئذ تبقى واحدة ومتصلة بل كانت تتشتت وتنقطع<sup>١٤٠</sup> لاختلاف الأشياء المتحركة (٤٨) وكذلك يلزم متى كان المحرك<sup>١٤١</sup> كثيراً لا واحداً لأنه إن كان المتحرك واحداً والمحرك ليس بواحد<sup>١٤٢</sup> فإن الحركة على هذه الجهة أيضاً لا تكون حينئذ واحدة متصلة بل كثيرة متشتتة<sup>١٤٣</sup> إذ<sup>١٤٤</sup> كان التلاؤم<sup>١٤٥</sup> والاتصال

<sup>١٣٧</sup> فإذا ظ: فإن ج

<sup>١٣٨</sup> أنها ظ: إنما ج

<sup>١٣٩</sup> بهذه ج ته ط: هذه ظ

<sup>١٤٠</sup> تشتت وتنقطع ته: تشتت ظ: تنقطع ظ<sup>٢</sup>: تكون وتنقطع ج: سثبت

وتنقطع م

<sup>١٤١</sup> المحرك: الأشياء المتحركة ج

<sup>١٤٢</sup> بواحد ظ: كذلك ظ<sup>٢</sup> ج م ته ط

<sup>١٤٣</sup> متشتتة ظ: مختلفة ظ<sup>٢</sup> ج م ته ط

<sup>١٤٤</sup> إذ: إن ج م ته ط

<sup>١٤٥</sup> التلاؤم: الالتيام ج م ته ط

is external if they move in this way by desire for something or to flee from something, so that none of them is absolutely self-moved if the primary causes of motion are not in their own essences. (45) Since the mover of the divine body is in this state, it follows necessarily that it is eternal since it is better than all beings and the eternal is much superior to the non-eternal. For the thing which does not exist cannot be described as good. (46) It is clear, then, that the divine body is eternal in consequence of what has been ascertained, viz. that continuous motion is truly one and that furthermore it is regular, since it has been shown elsewhere that the motion of the divine body is in this state, so that it is truly one. (47) But motion could not be one in this state if the mover were not one in number, like the object moved in the case of the thing moved by it with this kind of motion. For if the mover were not itself something one in number, motion would then not remain one and continuous, but would become manifold and discontinuous because of the difference between the things moved. (48) The same consequence follows when the mover is multiple, not one, because if the moved is one and the mover is not one, then motion in this case too will not be one and continuous, but multiple and manifold, since homogeneity and continuity become manifold

يتشتتان<sup>١٤٦</sup> لاختلاف الأشياء المتحركة ( ٤٩ ) فالحرك إذن للجسم الإلهي هو واحد في العدد فإن كان إنما يحرك حركة أزلية لأنه واحد بالعدد فقد يلزم من الاضطرار أن يكون هو أيضاً أزلياً وذلك أنه إنما كان<sup>١٤٧</sup> المحرك للحركة الأزلية حينئذ غير موجود لو كان المتحرك بالحركة الأزلية يوجد متحركاً بها في حال فقد بل<sup>١٤٨</sup> ينبغي أن يفهم من خارج بل لو كان غير موجود لما<sup>١٤٩</sup> كانت<sup>١٥٠</sup> حركة الجسم الإلهي حينئذ تلبث واحدة متصلة<sup>١٥١</sup> وذلك أن الحركة التي كانت تحدث عن المحرك الآخر بعد فساد المحرك الأول ما كانت تكون حينئذ متصلة بالتي قبلها ( ٥٠ ) فقد يلزم من الاضطرار مع وضوح الأمر في أن المحرك للحركة التي بهذه الحال أزلي أن يكون متقدماً لجميع الأشياء المتشوقة لمعشوقه وأن يكون محركاً على هذه الجهة<sup>١٥٢</sup> إذ كانت الحركة المتقدمة لجميع الحركات هي الحركة الدورية<sup>٢٦١</sup> التي للجسم الإلهي وكان واجباً أيضاً أن تكون هي أولى الحركات المتحركة عن المحرك الأول ( ٥١ ) فيجب إذن أن يكون هذا<sup>١٥٣</sup> هو المحرك لسائر الأشياء الأخر التي تتحرك وتتكون بالطبع إذ كان الجسم الإلهي وحركته الدورية هما السبب الأول لتكوّن الموجودات وأن تكون متحركة بالطبع الحركة التي<sup>١٥٤</sup> تخصها ( ٥٢ ) وكان المحرك الأول هو مبدأ وسبب هذه الحركة الأزلية التي لهذه الأشياء أعني أزلية<sup>١٥٥</sup> المحرك الأول والمتحرك الأول

<sup>١٤٦</sup> يتشتتان ظ: متشتتين م ته ط: السببين ج

<sup>١٤٧</sup> كان ظ: كان يكون ج: يكون م ته ط

<sup>١٤٨</sup> بل ينبغي ظ: بل ما كانت أيضاً ينبغي م ته ط

<sup>١٤٩</sup> ينبغي... لما ظ: ناقص في ج

<sup>١٥٠</sup> خارج... كانت ظ: ناقص في م ته ط

<sup>١٥١</sup> حينئذ... متصلة ظ: خارج بل لو كانت حينئذ فلبث غير موجودة واحدة ومتصلة

لما كانت م ط ته

<sup>١٥٢</sup> يعني بهذه الجهة أي على أنه متشوق ظ<sup>٢</sup>

<sup>١٥٣</sup> يعني الجسم الإلهي ظ<sup>٢</sup>

<sup>١٥٤</sup> الحركة التي ج: الذي ظ م ته ط

<sup>١٥٥</sup> أعني أزلية ظ: الأزلية أعني ج م ته ط

because of the difference between the things moved.(49) The mover of the divine body, therefore, is one in number, and if it imparts an eternal motion because it is one in number, then it must necessarily be itself eternal too. For the mover imparting the eternal motion would not exist if the thing moved with the eternal motion were so moved while <the mover> did not exist; on the contrary, <motion> must be understood to come from outside, and if <the mover> did not exist, the motion of the divine body would then not remain one and continuous; for the motion originating from the other mover after the destruction of the former mover would then not be connected with <the motion> preceding it. (50) As it is clear that the mover imparting such a motion is eternal, it follows necessarily that it is prior to all the things that desire the object of their love and that it moves in this way, since the motion prior to all motions is the circular motion of the divine body; it must also be the first of the motions produced by the First Mover. (51) Therefore, this must be the mover of all the other things which are moved and generated by nature, since the divine body and its circular motion are the first cause of the generation of the existents and of their being moved by nature with the motion proper to them. (52) The First Mover is the principle and the cause of this eternal motion belonging to these things, I mean that the eternity of the First Mover and of the first object moved is the cause

هي<sup>١٥٦</sup> سبب لأزلية جميع<sup>١٥٧</sup> العالم أيضاً (٥٣) فالحرك الأول إذن هو من جميع الجهات غير متحرك أصلاً وذلك أنه ليس يتحرك بوجه من الوجوه ولا<sup>١٥٨</sup> بطريق العرض أيضاً من قبل أنه جوهر غير مجسم<sup>١٥٩</sup> مجرد مفرد<sup>١٦٠</sup> بنفسه وصورة ما مفارقة للهيولى من جميع الجهات (٥٤) وذلك أن ما كان من الأشياء غير مجسم<sup>١٦١</sup> مثل الأنواع أو الملكات أو الأنساب<sup>١٦٢</sup> أو الانفعالات أو الآثار<sup>١٦٣</sup> فقد يتحرك بالعرض في حال حركة غيره لأنه قد يلزم ضرورة أن يتحرك في حال<sup>١٦٤</sup> حركة الأشياء التي هو<sup>١٦٥</sup> فيها ولما كان غير متحرك بوجه من الوجوه صار سبباً للحركة<sup>١٦٦</sup> الواحدة البسيطة التي لذلك الشيء المتحرك نحوه وذلك أن الاقتداء بذلك البسيط أعني المحرك الأول<sup>١٦٧</sup> هو أيضاً واحد بسيط (٥٥) فأما المتحرك الأول عن هذا المحرك فإنه يحرك بحركته الذاتية له<sup>١٦٨</sup> جميع الأشياء التي تتلوه معاً إذ كان الجسم الإلهي هو السبب في أن تتحرك الأشياء المتحركة عنه التي لها بذاتها حركة أخرى دورية تتحرك بها<sup>١٦٩</sup> الحركة المختلفة الموجودة لأكثر

<sup>١٥٦</sup> هي ج ته ط: هو م ظ

<sup>١٥٧</sup> جميع: كل ظ<sup>٢</sup>

<sup>١٥٨</sup> ولا: لا ظ

<sup>١٥٩</sup> مجسم ج م ته ط: جسم ظ

<sup>١٦٠</sup> مفرد ظ م: منفرد ج ط: متقوم ته

<sup>١٦١</sup> مجسم م ته ط: جسم ج ظ

<sup>١٦٢</sup> أو الأنساب: ناقص في ط

<sup>١٦٣</sup> أو الانفعالات أو الآثار م ته ط ظ: خرق في ج

<sup>١٦٤</sup> في حال م ته ط ظ<sup>٢</sup>: عند ظ: خرق في ج

<sup>١٦٥</sup> هو م ط ته: ناقص في ظ: خرق في ج

<sup>١٦٦</sup> سبباً للحركة: سبب الحركة ظ

<sup>١٦٧</sup> البسيط أعني المحرك الأول ج: أعني المتحرك الأول هو البسيط م ته ط: ناقص

في ظ

<sup>١٦٨</sup> الذاتية له ج ظ: الثابتة ته<sup>١</sup> ط: الثانية ته<sup>٢</sup>

<sup>١٦٩</sup> بها ج ظ: فيها م ته ط

of the eternity of the whole world as well. (53) The First Mover, then, is absolutely unmoved in every respect, that is to say it does not move in any way, not even accidentally, because it is an incorporeal, immaterial and unique substance, a form separate from matter in every respect. (54) For whatever is incorporeal, such as species, dispositions, relations, affections or effects, moves by accident when something else is moved, because they are necessarily moved with the motion of the things in which they are. Since <the First Mover> is not moved in any way at all, it is the cause of the unique and simple motion of that thing which moves towards it, for the imitation of that simple <thing>, i.e. the First Mover, is also one and simple. (55) As for the first thing moved by this mover, it is by virtue of its own essential motion that it imparts motion simultaneously to all things that follow it, since the divine body is the cause of the motion of the things moved by it which possess essentially another circular motion with which they move with the different motions belonging to most other eternal



الأجسام الأزلية الإلهية التالية<sup>١٧٠</sup> لكرة الكواكب الثابتة التي هي أول المتحركات (٥٦) وإضافاتها<sup>١٧١</sup> المختلفة التي لها إلى الأجسام الهولانية التي في الكون هي سبب استحالتها وتغيرها بحسب ما يمكن من ذلك فيها وهذه الأشياء تشترك في الترتيب وفي أزلية الاستحالة التي تكون لبعضها إلى بعض التي بهذه الحال (٥٧) ولذلك ليس ينبغي أن يخاف<sup>١٧٢</sup> أصلاً على العالم أن يكون عساه أن يفسد إذ<sup>١٧٣</sup> كان إنما اقتنى الثبات والقوام من مبادئ هذه حالها وذلك أنه قد يلزم ويتصل بعدم فساد<sup>١٧٤</sup> الجسم الإلهي وحركته الدورية الجارية على اتصال<sup>١٧٥</sup> اختلافها أزلية الأجسام ٢٦٢ الهولانية التي في الكون في النوع<sup>١٧٦</sup> (٥٨) وذلك أنه<sup>١٧٧</sup> قد ينبغي أن يكون للجسم المتحرك دوراً شيئاً ما في الوسط ليتحرك حواليه<sup>١٧٨</sup> لأن كل ما كان متحركاً في المكان فهو محتاج إلى شيء ساكن تكون<sup>١٧٩</sup> حركته إما منه وإما حواليه ومما يجري هذا المجرى<sup>١٨٠</sup> الأرض فإنها جسم ساكن ثابت في الوسط من قبل أنه غير ممكن أن تكون الأزلية موجودة في العدد وإنما يمكن أن تكون الأزلية في النوع فقط فهي<sup>١٨١</sup> محفوظة بالجسم الذي هو كالطبيعة لجميع الأجسام الخالية من جميع المتضادات بتوسط الأشياء المتحركة حوالى الأرض دوراً (٥٩) ولما كانت الأزلية فيها تجري على هذا

<sup>١٧٠</sup> التالية ج ته ط ظ: الثابتة م: الثابتة (أو الثانية) في هامش ته

<sup>١٧١</sup> إضافات ته ط: إضافتها ج م ظ: سببها ط<sup>٢</sup>

<sup>١٧٢</sup> يخاف: يتخوف ط

<sup>١٧٣</sup> إذ: و ظ

<sup>١٧٤</sup> بعدم فساد ط: ببقاء ج: ويبغي من فساد م: وينفى من فساد ته: ويبقى من

فساد ط

<sup>١٧٥</sup> اتصال ج ط ظ: اتصال على م ته

<sup>١٧٦</sup> في الكون في النوع ج م ط: في الكون وفي النوع ته: في الكون ط: في النوع ط<sup>٢</sup>

<sup>١٧٧</sup> ذلك أنه: ناقص في ج ته ط

<sup>١٧٨</sup> حواليه ج ط: عليه م ته ط

<sup>١٧٩</sup> تكون: لتكون ته ط

<sup>١٨٠</sup> يجري هذا المجرى: هذه حاله ط<sup>٢</sup>

<sup>١٨١</sup> فهي ته ط

and divine bodies, following the sphere of the fixed stars which is the first of the <things> moved. (56) Their different relations with the material bodies which are in generation is the cause of <the latter's> alteration and change according to their possibilities; these things share in the order and in the eternity of change from one <thing> into another which is in this state. (57) Therefore, it is not at all to be feared that the world might perish, since it has acquired stability and duration from such principles. For it originates from and is connected with the non-perishability of the divine body and its circular motion, and the eternity in species of the material bodies which are in generation follows its course according to the continuity of their variation. (58) For the body moved in a circle must have something at the centre around which it moves; for everything that moves in space needs something immobile in relation to or around which it moves, and one of the things which are in this state is the earth: it is an immobile and stable body at the centre, because eternity cannot exist in number, but only in species, preserved by the body which is like the nature of all bodies devoid of all opposites, through the intermediacy of the things moved in a circle around the earth. (59) Since eternity in them is of this kind, it follows necessarily

الوجه لزم من الاضطرار في كل واحد من الأجسام الأخر التي فيها وإليها تكون استحالة الأرض بسبب التضاد أن يبقى أزلياً على ذلك المثال ( ٦٠ ) وذلك أنه إن كان كل ما يتكون إذا ما تكون شيئاً ما صار ذالِبث فقد يلزم من الاضطرار أن تكون الأشياء التي تكون<sup>١٨٢</sup> عنها لابثة أيضاً ومتى كانت هذه الأشياء لابثة حافظة لذلك النظام بعينه فإنه يتبع ذلك أن يكون كل واحد من تلك الأشياء الأخر لابثاً ( ٦١ ) وكذلك<sup>١٨٣</sup> أيضاً تكون استحالة هذه الأشياء بعضها إلى بعض تجري على نظام وترتيب<sup>١٨٤</sup> فإن كان الجسم الحيواني الإلهي يسوس الأمور ويدبرها هذا الضرب من السياسة والتدبير ففعله ذلك إنما هو بحركته الباقية على الحال<sup>١٨٥</sup> التي تقدم وصفها ( ٦٢ ) فإن كان المحرك للجسم الإلهي بهذه الحال فيجب أن يكون جوهراً وذلك أنه غير ممكن أن يكون الشيء المتقدم قبل الجوهر لا جوهر والمحرك للجسم الإلهي متقدم لجميع الموجودات أما للأشياء الكائنة الفاسدة فبالزمان وأما للجسم الإلهي فبالرتبة<sup>١٨٦</sup> لا بالزمان بمنزلة الأشياء الموجودة معاً أعني العلة والمعلول ( ٦٣ ) وهو أيضاً جوهر بسيط وذلك أن البسيط من جميع الجهات أقدم من المركب وهذه حال الجوهر الذي نحن بسبيله<sup>١٨٧</sup> ٢٦٣ ( ٦٤ ) وقد كان تبين أيضاً أنه ليس بجسم وأنه غير متحرك وأنه أيضاً أزلي إذ كان فعلاً محضاً<sup>١٨٨</sup> مجرداً من القوة وذلك أنه إن كان الجوهر<sup>١٨٩</sup> أقدم من جميع الموجودات فاسداً إذ<sup>١٩٠</sup> كان جميع الموجودات المتكونة

<sup>١٨٢</sup> تكون: تتكون ج

<sup>١٨٣</sup> كذلك: لذلك ظ<sup>٢</sup>

<sup>١٨٤</sup> ترتيب: رتبة ظ<sup>٢</sup>

<sup>١٨٥</sup> الباقية على الحال ظ: الثابتة عن الحال م ط: الثابتة له على الحال ته: الذاتية

بحركة الباقية ( ؟ ) ظ<sup>٢</sup>

<sup>١٨٦</sup> بالرتبة ج ظ: بالروية ته ط ظ<sup>٢</sup>

<sup>١٨٧</sup> بسبيله ظ: في وصف سبيله ج: في صفة سبيله ته ط: في وصفه ظ<sup>٢</sup>

<sup>١٨٨</sup> محضاً ته ط: لحظاً ج: ما ظ

<sup>١٨٩</sup> الجوهر ته: الجواهر

<sup>١٩٠</sup> فاسداً إذ كان ته: فاسدة إذ كانت ج: فاسدة إذ كان ط: وكان ظ

that all other bodies in which and into which change occurs on earth on account of contrariety remain eternally in this state. (60) For if everything that is generated, whenever it has become something, is enduring, it necessarily follows that the things from which they are generated are enduring too; and if these things are enduring and preserve this same order, it follows from that that every one of those other things is enduring. (61) Likewise the changing of these things into one another occurs with regularity and order. If the divine animal body rules and governs things in this way, it does it by its motion remaining in the state described above.

(62) If the mover of the divine body is in this state, it must be a substance, because it is impossible that the thing prior to substance should not be a substance, and the mover of the divine body is prior to all the existents: temporally prior to the things that are generated and perish, and prior in rank, not temporally, to the divine body, as is the case of things existing simultaneously, I mean the cause and the effect. (63) It is also a simple substance, because what is simple in every respect is prior to the composite, and this is the case of the substance we are dealing with. (64) It has already become clear that it is not a body and that it is not moved; it is also eternal, since it is pure actuality free from potentiality. For if the substance prior to all beings is perishable, then all beings that are generated

فاسدة ومتى كان جميعها فاسداً وجب لذلك أن تكون الحركة أيضاً كائنة فاسدة وذلك مما <sup>١٩١</sup> لا يمكن وذلك أنه يجب من الاضطراب في الحركة أن تكون أزلية (٦٥) لأنه إن أنزل مُنزل أن الحركة متكونة ولأن <sup>١٩٢</sup> الحركة هي استحالة المتحرك بما هو متحرك فإني أقول إن هذا المتحرك إما أن يكون كان أزلياً ثم ابتداءً في هذا الوقت بالحركة بعد أن قد كان قبل ذلك غير متحرك فإما أنه <sup>١٩٣</sup> لم يكن كان موجوداً في بدء الأمر بعد <sup>١٩٤</sup> ولذلك كان غير متحرك <sup>١٩٥</sup> فأني هذين الأمرين <sup>١٩٦</sup> أنزله مُنزل فإنه يلزم أن تكون الحركة موجودة قبل كون الحركة وهو أمر متى كان غير ممكن كان الأصل الموضوع له الذي يلزم عنه <sup>١٩٧</sup> ذلك غير ممكن وهو أن الحركة متكونة <sup>١٩٨</sup> (٦٦) وذلك أنه إن كان المتحرك متكوناً فظاهر أنه قد تقدم كونه وعلى هذا الوجه <sup>١٩٩</sup> تكون الحركة متكونة لأن كل تكون <sup>٢٠٠</sup> إنما يكون بحركة ويلزم من ذلك أن تكون الحركة قد كانت <sup>٢٠١</sup> موجودة قبل أن تكون موجودة <sup>٢٠٢</sup> وأن يكون الأمر المزمع بالابتداء بالحركة محتاجاً إلى الحركة (٦٧) فإن قال قائل إن المتحرك أزلي إلا أنه قد كان أولاً زماناً بلا نهاية غير

<sup>١٩١</sup> مما صح: لما ط ته: ما ج ظ

<sup>١٩٢</sup> لأن ظ: فإن ته ط: فليس ج

<sup>١٩٣</sup> أنه ج: لأنه

<sup>١٩٤</sup> بعد ج: بعد ذلك

<sup>١٩٥</sup> كان غير متحرك: لم يكن متحركاً ج

<sup>١٩٦</sup> فأني هذين الأمرين ته ط: وأي هذين ظ: وأي الأمرين ج

<sup>١٩٧</sup> له الذي يلزم عنه ج: الذي لزم عنه ته ط: له الذي لزمه عنه أيضاً ظ

<sup>١٩٨</sup> متكونة: غير متكونة ظ

<sup>١٩٩</sup> هذا الوجه: هذه الجهة ج

<sup>٢٠٠</sup> قد تقدم.... كل تكون ظ:.... كل ما يكون ج: قد تكون الحركة من بعد ذلك

تحرك إلا أن كل متحرك ته ط

<sup>٢٠١</sup> قد كانت ظ: ناقص في ج ته ط

<sup>٢٠٢</sup> قبل أن تكون موجودة ج ظ: ناقص في ته ط

<sup>٢٠٣</sup> كان ظ: فإن ج ته ط

are perishable, and if all beings are perishable, then motion too must be generated and perishable. But this is not possible, because motion necessarily must be eternal. (65) For if somebody should assume motion to be generated, and since motion is the alteration of the object moved insofar as it is moved, I would reply: this object moved either was eternal and then began to move at such a time after having been unmoved before that; or it did not yet exist in the first place and therefore was unmoved. Whichever of the two one should assume, motion must have existed before the generation of motion, and since this is impossible, the underlying principle from which it follows, namely that motion is generated, is also impossible. (66) For if the object moved were generated, <motion> would evidently have pre-existed, and in this way motion would be generated, because everything that is generated is generated through motion. It follows from this that motion would have existed before it existed and that the thing that was about to initiate motion needed motion. (67) If somebody should say that the object moved is eternal, but that it was “at first” unmoved for an infinite time and then

متحرك ثم ابتداء بالحركة الآن كان <sup>٢٠٣</sup> قوله ذلك أولاً يجري مجرى الأفاويل  
المبتدعة التي لا محصول لها ولا فائدة فيها وذلك أنه كيف يتهياً لأحد أن  
يؤدي السبب الواجب في أنه إنما ابتداء الآن بالحركة بعد أن كان ساكناً  
زماناً غير متناه <sup>٢٠٤</sup> ( ٦٨ ) فإن القول بأنه قد كان المتحرك موجوداً إلا أنه  
مكث زماناً غير متناه لم يتحرك مما لا وجه له <sup>٢٠٥</sup> لأنه إن كان فيما تقدم  
غير متحرك وإنما ابتداء بالحركة في هذا الوقت فقد ينبغي أن يكون المحرك له  
إما كان فيما تقدم غير موجود ثم وجد في هذا الوقت أو تكون النسبة  
التي له بإضافته إلى المتحرك لم تكن كانت موجودة له وإنما صارت له في  
هذا الوقت فإنه متى أنزل مُنزل واحداً من هذه الأشياء فقد استعمل <sup>٢٠٦</sup>  
الحركة في طريقه وذلك أنه إن كان موجوداً إلا أنه بعد غير متحرك فإنه  
يحتاج في أن يكون الآن متحركاً <sup>٢٠٧</sup> إلى حركة أيضاً ( ٦٩ ) ويلزم على  
هذا الوجه أن تكون الحركة موجودة قبل تكونها وذلك أنه قد يحتاج في <sup>٢٦٤</sup>  
كون الحركة إلى الحركة وأيضاً فإنه ليس يمكن أن يكون متى ما لم يكن  
زمان وذلك أن قول القائل إنه قد يتهياً أن يكون متى «ما» لم يكن زمان <sup>٢٠٨</sup>  
مساوٍ لقوله <sup>٢٠٩</sup> إنه قد كان زمان في حال ما لم يكن زمان إذ كانت لفظة  
متى دالة على الزمان وليس يمكن أن يكون زمان الحركة فيه غير موجودة  
إن كان الزمان إما مقداراً للحركة <sup>٢١٠</sup> أو عدداً لها بحسب ما قد تبين في  
القول في الزمان ( ٧٠ ) وأيضاً فإنه إن كان الآن ابتداء الزمان ونهايته وكان  
غير ممكن أن يكون الآن إلا بعد أن يتقدمه زمان ويتلوه زمان وكان لنا

<sup>٢٠٤</sup> غير متناه: طويلاً ج

<sup>٢٠٥</sup> لا وجه له: لا يعياً به ظ

<sup>٢٠٦</sup> استعمل: حد ظ

<sup>٢٠٧</sup> في أن يكون الآن متحركاً ج ته ط: الآن في آن متحركاً ظ

<sup>٢٠٨</sup> قد يتهياً أن يكون متى لم يكن زمان ج ظ: قد كان شيء والزمان غير موجود م

ته ط

<sup>٢٠٩</sup> لقوله ج ظ: لقوله لو قال م ته ط

<sup>٢١٠</sup> للحركة: الحركة ج

began to move “now”, his saying “at first” is comparable with invented expressions which have no purpose and no use: how could anyone adduce the necessary cause why this should begin to move “now” after having been at rest an infinite time? (68) To say that the object moved was existing, but remained unmoved for an infinite time is absurd, because if it was previously unmoved and began to move “at this moment”, then it follows either that its mover was previously non-existent and then became existent “at this moment”, or that its relation with the object moved did not previously exist for it and only came to be for it “at this moment”. If somebody assumes one of these things, he has used motion in his demonstration, because if <the object moved> existed but was still unmoved, then it also needed motion in order to be moved “now”. (69) Thus it follows that motion existed before it was generated, because motion is needed for motion to come into being. Nor is it possible that there should be a “when” so long as there is no time, for to say that it is possible that there should be a “when” when there is no time is equivalent to saying that there was time in a state in which there was no time, since the term “when” denotes time; there cannot be a time in which there was no motion if time is either the measure or the number of motion, as has already been shown when we discussed time. (70) Also if “now” is the beginning and the end of time, and there can only be “now” after some previous time and <if> time follows it; and if we can assume, in the present state



دائماً في الحال الحاضرة وفي كل وقت أن نأخذ الآن موجوداً وجب في كل  
 آن يوجد <sup>٢١١</sup> أن يكون قبله دائماً زمان وبعده زمان ( ٧١ ) ولزم على هذه  
 الجهة أن يكون الزمان غير كائن ولا فاسد وإذ كان الأمر في الزمان جارياً <sup>٢١٢</sup>  
 على ما وصفنا فقد يلزم <sup>٢١٣</sup> من الاضطرار أن تكون أيضاً الحركة التي وجود  
 الزمان تابع لها على أي الأقوال <sup>٢١٤</sup> كان ذلك وعلى أي الأشياء كان <sup>٢١٥</sup> غير  
 كائنة ولا فاسدة ( ٧٢ ) فينبغي إذن أن يكون المتحرك بالحركة الأزلية  
 المتصلة جوهرًا <sup>٢١٦</sup> غير فاسد وإذ كان ذلك كذلك فقد يلزم أيضاً أن تكون  
 هذه حال المحرك <sup>٢١٧</sup> له بحسب ما قيل فيما تقدم وإنما يكونان كذلك إذا  
 كانا فاعلين وذلك أنه إن كان بهذا الوجه توجد أزلية الحركة وهو أن يكون  
 ذلك متحركاً وهذا محركاً فمن الاضطرار أن يكون هذان الجوهريان  
 فاعلين <sup>٢١٨</sup> دائماً أما ذلك فبأن يتحرك وأما هذا فبأن يحرك ( ٧٣ ) وذلك  
 أنه ما كانت الحركة لتكون أزلية لو كان في وقت من الأوقات ذلك يحرك  
 وهذا يتحرك بالقوة فكما أن الوجود لهما إنما هو أن يكون أحدهما محركاً  
 والآخر متحركاً فعلى مثل هذه الحال <sup>٢١٩</sup> يجب أن يكونا للدهر <sup>٢٢٠</sup> كله  
 ( ٧٤ ) فالحرك للحركة الأزلية إذن هو من الاضطرار جوهر أزلي بهذا <sup>٢٢١</sup>

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<sup>٢١١</sup> في كل آن يوجد ظ ته <sup>٢</sup> : في كل الآن يوجد ته <sup>١</sup> ط : في ذلك في كل الآن أن يوجد ج : في كل وقت الآن يوجد م :

<sup>٢١٢</sup> في الزمان جارياً : جارياً في الزمان ظ

<sup>٢١٣</sup> يلزم ظ : وجب

<sup>٢١٤</sup> الأقوال : الأحوال ظ <sup>٢</sup>

<sup>٢١٥</sup> ذلك وعلى أي الأشياء كان : ناقص في ظ

<sup>٢١٦</sup> جوهرًا : طبيعة ظ <sup>٢</sup>

<sup>٢١٧</sup> المحرك ج ظ : المتحرك م ته ط

<sup>٢١٨</sup> أن يكون هذان الجوهريان فاعلين : أن يكون جوهريين فاعلين ظ

<sup>٢١٩</sup> على مثل هذه الحال : على هذا المثال ج

<sup>٢٢٠</sup> للدهر ظ : الدهر

<sup>٢٢١</sup> و بهذا ج : وهذا

and in every instant, that “now” exists, there must always be, for every existing “now”, a time before it and a time after it. (71) Thus, time must be ungenerated and imperishable. If time is such as we have described it, it follows necessarily that motion, which is the condition of the existence of time, must in any theory and in whatever thing be ungenerated and imperishable. (72) Therefore, the thing that is moved with the eternal continuous motion must be an imperishable substance and, if so, this must also be the state of the mover, as has been said before; these two can only be like this if both are active, for if the eternity of motion can only exist in this way, i.e. so that the former is moved and the latter mover, then both must necessarily be eternally active substances, the former insofar as it is moved and the latter insofar as it imparts motion. (73) For motion could not be eternal if the former should at any time impart motion and the latter be moved in potentiality. Just as existence consists for one of them in imparting motion and for the other in being moved, so they must be for all eternity. (74) The mover imparting the eternal motion must therefore itself be an eternal substance, and by this kind

الضرب من الفعل يوجد دائماً يحرك ويغير ذلك المتحرك<sup>٢٢٢</sup> نحوه فهو إذن صورة ما مجردة مفردة ليس بجسم أزلي غير فاسد يفعل دائماً فعله الخاص به (٧٥) وذلك أن المحرك للحركة الأولى على هذه الجهة يوجد كاملاً في جميع الأحوال ويكون نوعاً<sup>٢٢٣</sup> عادماً حينئذٍ لجميع الحركات وأفضل من جميع الموجودات (٧٦) ويكون الجسم الالهي إنما يتحرك حركته الطبيعية التي تخصه في ذاته بشوقه<sup>٢٢٤</sup> إلى ذلك المحرك وتوقانه إلى الاقتداء به وبهذه الحركة يكون مقتدياً بذلك الجوهر الذي ليس بمتحرك وذلك أن أزلية<sup>٢٢٥</sup> الحركة الغريزية في الجسم الالهي وملازمتها<sup>٢٢٥</sup> وثباتها على حال واحدة بعينها شبيهة<sup>٢٢٦</sup> بمدة حياة<sup>٢٢٧</sup> ذلك وبقائه (٧٧) وذلك أنه لما لم يكن ممكناً أن يكون جسم ما طبعي غير متحرك وكانت هذه حالة الجسم الالهي تشبه تساوي<sup>٢٢٨</sup> حركته الطبيعية وتلاؤمها بعدم الحركة في ذلك الشيء المحرك له وذلك باشتياقه إلى<sup>٢٢٩</sup> الاقتداء به (٧٨) فإذا تصور الجسم الالهي بالعقل<sup>٢٣٠</sup> المحرك<sup>٢٣١</sup> الذي هذه حاله واشتاق إلى الاقتداء به وحصل له<sup>٢٣٢</sup> من ذلك بحركته الطبيعية حسب ما في طاقته من قبوله منه أمكن بهذا الضرب من السياسة أن يكون اقتداءه بالمحرك<sup>٢٣٣</sup> ثابتاً على حال واحد وأن يفعل مع ذلك أفعاله الذاتية له (٧٩) ولذلك<sup>٢٣٤</sup> إذا تحرك الجسم

<sup>٢٢٢</sup> ذلك المتحرك ظ: ذلك الشيء المتحرك ج: ذلك الأشياء المتحرك (!) م ته ط

<sup>٢٢٣</sup> نوعاً م ظ: ناقص في ج ته ط

<sup>٢٢٤</sup> بشوقه ج ته ط: بتشوقه م ظ

<sup>٢٢٥</sup> ملازمتها م ته ط: تلازمها ج: تلاؤمها ظ

<sup>٢٢٦</sup> شبيهة ته: شبيه ج م ط: مشبهة ظ

<sup>٢٢٧</sup> بمدة حياة ظ: بثبات

<sup>٢٢٨</sup> تساوي ته ط ظ: تساوي سائر ج م

<sup>٢٢٩</sup> الشيء المحرك له وذلك باشتياق إلى: ناقص في ظ

<sup>٢٣٠</sup> بالعقل: بالفعل م ته

<sup>٢٣١</sup> المحرك: المتحرك ظ

<sup>٢٣٢</sup> له: ناقص في ظ

<sup>٢٣٣</sup> بالمحرك: بالمحرك إنما يتحرك المحرك ظ

<sup>٢٣٤</sup> لذلك ظ: كذلك

of actuality it eternally imparts motion and change to that which is moved towards it. It is therefore an immaterial and unique form which is not a body, eternal, imperishable, eternally performing the act proper to it. (75) The mover imparting the first motion in this way is perfect in all respects; it is, then, a species devoid of all motion and better than all beings. (76) The divine body is moved with the eternal motion essentially proper to it by its desire for this mover and its longing to imitate it. By this motion it imitates this substance which is unmoved, for the eternity of the motion inborn in the divine body, its continuity and permanence in one and the same state, are similar to the life-span of that <mover> and its duration. (77) For since it is not possible that a natural body should be immovable, and this is the state of the divine body, the regularity and continuity of its natural motion resemble the absence of motion of that thing which imparts motion to it by its <=the divine body's> impulse to imitate it <=the mover>. (78) When the divine body perceives by the intellect the mover which is in this state, strives to imitate it and achieves this through its natural motion according to its capacity to receive it from <the mover>, it is possible by this kind of governing that its imitation of the mover should endure in the same state and that it should thus perform its own essential acts. (79) Therefore, when the body

الذي هو أعلى من جميع الأجسام الالهية والمحيط بسائرهما الحركة الشرقية<sup>٢٣٥</sup> حرك في حال تحركه جميع تلك الأجسام الأخر أيضاً معه<sup>٢٣٦</sup> وكل واحد من هذه فهو أيضاً لتصوره المحرك الأول بالعقل يتحرك<sup>٢٣٧</sup> حركة ما دورية تخصه في ذاته تقابل حركة ذلك<sup>٢٣٨</sup> (٨٠) وذلك أن الأمر في جميعها يجب أن يكون جارياً على هذه الحال إذ كانت حركتها حركة أزلية متصلة متساوية<sup>٢٣٩</sup> وكذلك يجري الأمر أيضاً في الأجسام الكائنة الفاسدة فإن ثباتها وبقائها<sup>٢٤٠</sup> إنما يكون أزلياً في النوع الملائم لأزلية تلك في العدد<sup>٢٤١</sup> وذلك أنه لم يكن ممكناً في تلك<sup>٢٤٢</sup> أن تكون أزلية في العدد لو لم تكن كذلك في النوع ولا كان ممكناً في هذه أيضاً أن تكون أزلية في النوع دون أزلية تلك التي في العدد وحركتها الدورية المتصلة الجارية هذا المجرى (٨١) وذلك أن صنعة هذا الكل واللفظ الطبيعي الذي جعله الخالق فيه وما<sup>٢٤٣</sup> عليه أجزاء بعضها عند بعض من الاتفاق والتلاؤم<sup>٢٤٤</sup> والتهيؤ بحسب نسبتها إلى الكل هي على حال من النظام والالتئام متى أخطرت ببالك أن واحداً منها قد ارتفع فهدماً لم يمكن في واحد من الأشياء الباقية<sup>٢٤٥</sup> أن يبقى لاثناً على حاله (٨٢) وذلك أن

<sup>٢٣٥</sup> الشرقية ظ: ذات اليمين ظ<sup>٢</sup>: المشرقية ج: المستوية م ته ط

<sup>٢٣٦</sup> معه: معاً ظ

<sup>٢٣٧</sup> لتصوره المحرك الأول بالعقل ج: يتصور المحرك الأول بالفعل و ظ: له صورة فالمحرك

الأول بالفعل ته ط

<sup>٢٣٨</sup> حركة ذلك: حركته ظ

<sup>٢٣٩</sup> متساوية: متلائمة ظ<sup>٢</sup>

<sup>٢٤٠</sup> بقاءها: قوامها ج

<sup>٢٤١</sup> لأزلية تلك في العدد ظ: يعني الالهية ظ<sup>٢</sup>: للأزلية يعني الأجسام الالهية بتلك

في العدد ج م ته ط

<sup>٢٤٢</sup> في تلك ج ظ: يعني الأجسام الالهية ظ<sup>٢</sup>: في تلك الحال م ته ط

<sup>٢٤٣</sup> وما م ته ط: ما ج ظ

<sup>٢٤٤</sup> التلاؤم ج ظ: الملاءمة م ته ط

<sup>٢٤٥</sup> الباقية: الثانية م ته ط

which is above all the divine bodies and encompasses them all moves with the motion from the East, it also imparts motion, while moving, to all these other bodies together, and every one of them, because of its perceiving the First Mover by the intellect, also moves with a circular motion proper to it and opposite to the motion of that <body>. (80) This is the state in which all <these bodies> must be, since their motion is an eternal, continuous and regular motion. Such is also the case with the bodies that are generated and perish: their permanence and duration are only eternal in species, corresponding to the eternity in number of the others; for it would not have been possible for the former to be numerically eternal if they had not been such specifically, nor would it have been possible for the latter to be specifically eternal without the former's numerical eternity and this continuous circular motion following this course. (81) For the make-up of this universe and the natural bounty which the creator put into it, and the mutual agreement, harmony and conformity of its parts with one another according to their relation with the whole, evince such an order and harmony that, if you should assume one of them to be abolished by hypothesis, none of the remaining things could possibly remain in its state. (82) For

الأشياء الالهية<sup>٢٤٦</sup> الموجودة لها في ذاتها جميع ما كانت محتاجة إليه في أفعالها الذاتية لها فقد<sup>٢٤٧</sup> يلزم من الاضطرار أن تفعل أفعالها التي تخصها ولذلك لا سبيل أصلاً لمن ينزل على طريق الوضع أن شيئاً من تلك قد<sup>٢٤٨</sup> فسد أن يقول في هذه أنها لم تفسد (٨٣) وذلك أن الذي ينزل أنه ليس شيء من تلك موجوداً هو<sup>٢٤٩</sup> بمنزلة من ينزل على طريق الوضع أن أفعال تلك الأشياء التي طبيعتها<sup>٢٥٠</sup> هذه تابعة لها معدومة وذلك مساوٍ في القول بأن يقتضي<sup>٢٥١</sup> على طريق الوضع أنه ليس واحد من هذه الأشياء أزلياً (٨٤) ولما كان هذا الوضع ممتنعاً وذلك أنه من الممتنع أن ينزل على طريق الوضع أن الأول<sup>٢٥٢</sup> ليس بأزلي وجب أيضاً أن يكون الوضع الذي يبطل واحداً من هذه الأشياء أعني التي تتبع اضطراراً أفعال تلك الأشياء الأزلية محالاً غير ممكن إذ كان شنعاً<sup>٢٥٣</sup> أن يكون الوضع من الأشياء الممكنة والأمر اللازم عن ذلك الوضع من الأمور الممتنعة (٨٥) ولذلك<sup>٢٥٤</sup> لا ينبغي أن يعتقد في تحريك كرة الكواكب الثابتة لأكر المتحيرة أنه قسراً<sup>٢٥٥</sup> ولا في هذه أيضاً أنها غير عالمة بما يحدث<sup>٢٥٦</sup> في الأجسام التي قلنا<sup>٢٥٦</sup> من الكون والفساد والاستحالة

(٨٦) وخليق ألا يكون القول بكثرة المحركين للجسم الالهي وإن كنا قد

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<sup>٢٤٦</sup> الالهية: الأزلية الالهية م ته ط

<sup>٢٤٧</sup> لها فقد: قد ظ

<sup>٢٤٨</sup> هو ته

<sup>٢٤٩</sup> التي طبيعتها صح: التي طبيعته ظ: التي لها طبيعة م ته ط

<sup>٢٥٠</sup> يقتضي صح: ينتصب م ته ط: يقتضب (?) ظ: يفترض بدوي

<sup>٢٥١</sup> الأول ظ: الأزلي م ته ط

<sup>٢٥٢</sup> شنعاً ظ: ممتنعاً

<sup>٢٥٣</sup> لذلك ظ: ذلك أنه

<sup>٢٥٤</sup> قسراً: قسر ظ

<sup>٢٥٥</sup> يحدث: يجري ظ

<sup>٢٥٦</sup> قلنا ظ: قبلنا

the divine things which possess in their essence all that they need in order to perform their essential acts must necessarily perform the acts proper to them. Therefore, there is no way at all for someone who should assume by hypothesis that one of those <eternal> things has perished to say that these have not perished. (83) For he who assumes that none of those things exists is in the same situation as he who assumes by hypothesis that the acts of those things, which their nature entails, do not exist, which is equivalent to saying by hypothesis that none of these things is eternal. (84) Since this hypothesis is untenable (because it is impossible to assume by hypothesis that the First is not eternal), the hypothesis which negates one of these things (I mean these which necessarily result from the acts of those eternal things) must be absolutely impossible; for it is absurd that the hypothesis should belong to the possible things and that the necessary consequence of it should be impossible. (85) Therefore, one must not believe that the motion imparted by the sphere of the fixed stars to the spheres of the planets is by compulsion, nor that the latter do not know the generation, destruction and change which are in the bodies which we have mentioned.

(86) But to assume a plurality of movers for the divine body, even though we may



نعترف<sup>٢٥٧</sup> بأن لكل<sup>٢٥٨</sup> واحد من الأكر<sup>٢٥٩</sup> محرّكاً ومتشوّقاً<sup>٢٦٠</sup> يخصّانه<sup>٢٦١</sup> قولاً صواباً وذلك أنه إن كانت الأسباب المحركة كثيرة وجب أن يكون بعضها إنما يخالف بعضاً في النوع إذ ليس يتهيأ أن تكون متفقة فيه وذلك أن المتفقة في النوع إنما يكسبها الخلاف الهيولي فإذا فارقت الهيولي صارت شيئاً واحداً (٨٧) والعلة الأولى غير ذات مادة فإن كانت اختلافها إنما هو في النوع فليست إذن جواهر أول بسيطة وذلك أن اختلافها في النوع يكون إذا ما أضيف إلى ما يعم جميعها فصول ما وعلى هذه الجهة تكون مركبة إذ كان الأمر العام بجميعها قد قبل زيادة ما (٨٨) أو يكون اختلافها في النوع إنما هو من جهة التقدم والتأخر والزيادة والنقصان وذلك بمشاركة ضد من الأضداد إذ كان الأزيد والأنقص<sup>٢٦٢</sup> في كل واحد من الأجناس كذلك<sup>٢٦٣</sup> بمشاركة ضد من الأضداد إلا أنه ليس واحد من هذه الأشياء مركباً إذ كانت أوائل ولا يوجد أيضاً للطبيعة التي تجري هذا المجرى شيء مضاد (٨٩) وقد تبين أن أرسطوطاليس يرى هذا الرأي أيضاً من الأقاويل التي اقتصرها في المقالة الأخيرة من السماع الطبيعي قال فمتى كانت الحركة أزلية فإن المحرك الأول إن كان واحداً فهو أيضاً أزلي وإن كان المحركون<sup>٢٦٤</sup> ٢٦٧ كثيراً فالأشياء الأزلية أيضاً كثيرة وقد ينبغي أن يظن أن<sup>٢٦٥</sup> المحرك الأول واحد لا كثير وأنها متناهية لا غير المتناهية وذلك أنه لما كانت الأشياء التي تعرض أشياء واحدة بأعيانها دائماً فإن الأولى والأوجب<sup>٢٦٦</sup> أن يرى أنه

<sup>٢٥٧</sup> نعترف ظ: نعرف

<sup>٢٥٨</sup> لكل: الكل ظ

<sup>٢٥٩</sup> الأكر ظ: الأماكن

<sup>٢٦٠</sup> متشوّقاً ظ ته: مشوّقاً م ط

<sup>٢٦١</sup> يخصّانه ظ: بخاصته

<sup>٢٦٢</sup> الأزيد والأنقص ظ: الأكثر والأقل

<sup>٢٦٣</sup> كذلك: إنما يكون ذلك ظ

<sup>٢٦٤</sup> المحركون: المحرك ظ

<sup>٢٦٥</sup> يظن أن ظ: يكون

<sup>٢٦٦</sup> الأوجب: الأحب ظ

admit that each one of the spheres has a mover and a desiring element proper to it, is probably not a correct proposition; for if the moving causes are many, they must be specifically different from one another, since they cannot agree in species; for those which agree in species can only acquire difference through matter, but when they are separate from matter, they are the same thing. (87) The First Cause is free from matter, so that if their diversity resides only in species, they will not be simple first substances, because their diversity in species will only exist if certain specific differences are added to what is common to all of them, and thus they will be composite, since the element common to all of them will have received some addition. (88) Alternatively, their diversity in species might be according to priority and posteriority, increase and diminution, that is by sharing in one of the opposites, since more and less in all genera are such by sharing in one of the opposites. But none of these things is composite, since they are principles and the nature which is in that state has no opposite. (89) It is clear that this is also Aristotle's opinion from the statements which he makes in the last book of the *Physics*. He says: "since motion is eternal, the First Mover, if it is one, is also eternal; and if the movers are many, the eternal things will also be many. One must consider that the First Mover is one, not multiple, and that they are finite, not infinite, for since the things that happen are always the same things, it is more appropriate and more compelling to regard it

متناهٍ لأنه [ لا ] ينبغي أن يكون الشيء المتناهي في الأمور التي بالطبع أولى بالترفض إن كان ذلك ممكناً<sup>٢٦٧</sup> مما ليس متناهٍ وقد يكتفي بأن يكون<sup>٢٦٨</sup> ذلك الواحد الأزلي الذي هو أقدم من جميع الأشياء غير المتحرك<sup>٢٦٩</sup> مبدأ حركة سائر الأشياء وأن يكون سبب الحركة الأزلية واحداً أيضاً ( ٩٠ ) قال الاسكندر<sup>٢٧٠</sup> وقد نجد أرسطوطالس<sup>٢٧١</sup> فيما يتلو قد أتى على هذا القول ببرهان وذلك أنه يقول وقد تبين مما<sup>٢٧٢</sup> أقول أنه يلزم من الاضطراب أن يكون المحرك الأول شيئاً<sup>٢٧٣</sup> واحداً أزلياً وذلك أنه قد تبين أنه يجب ضرورة أن تكون الحركة سرمدية ومتى كانت سرمدية فقد يلزم ضرورة أن تكون متصلة لأن السرمدية هي متصلة وأما التي تكون شيئاً بعد شيء فليست متصلة إلا أنها إن<sup>٢٧٤</sup> كانت متصلة فهي واحدة بأضافتها إلى الواحد المحرك والواحد المتحرك ( ٩١ ) قال الاسكندر<sup>٢٧٥</sup> فإن كان المحرك<sup>٢٧٦</sup> من طريق ما هو متشوق<sup>٢٧٧</sup> واحداً فإن<sup>٢٧٨</sup> جميع الجسم الالهي المتحرك حركة دورية متصلة متساوية<sup>٢٧٩</sup> ليس إنما يتحرك بهذه الأشياء فليكن السبب في ذلك هو العناية بالأشياء التي دون فلك القمر باختيارها لذلك وتهيئها له ( ٩٢ ) وذلك أنه على هذا الوجه يكون من شأن الشيء الذي يكون حركة الأجسام حواليه دوراً بأن يبقى أزلياً في النوع إذ كان

<sup>٢٦٧</sup> ممكناً ظ: مبطلاً

<sup>٢٦٨</sup> يكتفي بأن يكون ظ: ينبغي بأن يكون ته: ينبغي أن يكون م: ينبغي ط

<sup>٢٦٩</sup> غير المتحرك ظ: غير المتحركة

<sup>٢٧٠</sup> قال الاسكندر ظ: ناقص في ج م ته ط

<sup>٢٧١</sup> نجد أرسطوطالس ظ: نجده

<sup>٢٧٢</sup> مما ته: بما

<sup>٢٧٣</sup> شيئاً: سبباً م

<sup>٢٧٤</sup> إن: وإن ظ

<sup>٢٧٥</sup> قال الاسكندر ظ

<sup>٢٧٦</sup> المحرك ظ: المتحرك

<sup>٢٧٧</sup> متشوق ظ: يتشوق ج م: تشوق ته ط

<sup>٢٧٨</sup> واحداً فإن ج ظ: وإذا كان م ته ط

<sup>٢٧٩</sup> متصلة متساوية ظ: مستوية م ته ط: خرم في ج

as finite, because the finite thing among the objects that are by nature should be preferred, if it is possible, to that which is infinite. It is enough that this single eternal <thing> which is prior to all things and unmoved should be the principle of the motion of all other things”, and that the cause of the eternal motion should be one too. (90) Alexander says: in what follows, we find that Aristotle gives a demonstration of this statement, saying: “it is clear from what I say that the First Mover must necessarily be a single eternal thing, because it is clear that motion must be eternal, and if it is eternal, it must necessarily be continuous, because eternal motion is continuous. But that which is one thing after another is not continuous. But if it is continuous, it is one in relation to one mover and one object moved”. (91) Alexander says: if the mover, insofar as it is desired, is one, the whole divine body moving with a circular, continuous and regular motion does not move only according to these things. The cause of this must be providence for the things which are below the sphere of the moon through their choice and disposition for this. (92) For in this way the thing around which the bodies move in a circle may endure eternally in species, since

قد يمكن أن تكون <sup>٢٨٠</sup> صور المحركين <sup>٢٨١</sup> كثيرة في العدد ويكون بعضها إنما يخالف بعضاً في النوع خلافاً ليس بالمباين كل المباينة لكنه بالتقدم في الجوهرية والشرف كما بين ذلك أرسطوطاليس في كتابه فيما بعد الطبيعة إذ كان لا شيء أصلاً يتقدم هذه الجواهر وقد يوجد فيما بين هذه الجواهر بأعيانها التي هي أعلى وأشرف من سائر الجواهر الأخر اختلاف في زيادة بعضها على بعض في الشرف وتقدم بعضها بعضاً فيه (٩٣) وخليق أن يكون ليس <sup>٢٨٢</sup> كل ما هو أخس <sup>٢٨٣</sup> من شيء فإنما هو كذلك <sup>٢٨٤</sup> بمشاركة الشيء <sup>٢٨٥</sup> المضاد له فإن لهيب النار إن كان أقل <sup>٢٨٦</sup> حرارة من الحديد الحمى <sup>٢٦٨</sup> فليس إنما هو كذلك بممازجة البرودة إياه ولا الجسم أيضاً الذي <sup>٢٨٧</sup> هو أقل خصباً <sup>٢٨٨</sup> إنما هو كذلك <sup>٢٨٩</sup> لا محالة بمشاركة ملكة ما رديئة <sup>٢٩٠</sup> إياه (٩٤) فلتنزل أن أشرف هذه الأشياء وأولاًها <sup>٢٩١</sup> بأن يكون أولاً هو المحرك <sup>٢٩٢</sup> للكرة فلك <sup>٢٩٣</sup> الكواكب الثابتة وأنه بتوسطها <sup>٢٩٤</sup> يتحرك أيضاً الأشياء المتحركة عنها ثم الثاني بعده <sup>٢٩٥</sup> المحرك للكرة الثانية <sup>٢٩٦</sup> والثالث بعده المحرك للكرة

<sup>٢٨٠</sup> أن تكون: ناقص في ط

<sup>٢٨١</sup> المحركين ط ظ: المتحركين ج ته: الحركة م

<sup>٢٨٢</sup> ليس ج ظ: ناقص في م ته ط

<sup>٢٨٣</sup> أخس ج: أحسن ظ: ناقص في م ته ط

<sup>٢٨٤</sup> كذلك ج: لذلك ظ

<sup>٢٨٥</sup> فإنما... الشيء ج ظ: حركة بمضا (!) م: بمضاد حركة ته: امضاد حركة ط

<sup>٢٨٦</sup> أقل ظ: أنقص

<sup>٢٨٧</sup> الذي: ناقص في ط

<sup>٢٨٨</sup> خصباً ج ظ: جسماً م ته ط

<sup>٢٨٩</sup> كذلك: لذلك ظ

<sup>٢٩٠</sup> ما رديئة ظ: مذمومة ط<sup>٢</sup>: مادة م: مادة رديئة ج: مادة باردة ته ط

<sup>٢٩١</sup> أولاًها ظ: أحقها ج م ته ط ظ<sup>٢</sup>

<sup>٢٩٢</sup> أولاً هو المحرك: هو أولاً المحرك ظ

<sup>٢٩٣</sup> فلك: ناقص في ج

<sup>٢٩٤</sup> بتوسطها ظ<sup>٢</sup>: بسببها

<sup>٢٩٥</sup> الثاني بعده: التالي له ظ

<sup>٢٩٦</sup> الثانية: الثابتة ظ

the forms of the movers may be many in number and differ from one another in species in a way that is not complete dissimilarity, but according to priority in substantiality and nobleness, as Aristotle has shown in his book of the *Metaphysics*, since nothing at all precedes these substances. Among these same substances which are higher and nobler than all other substances, there may be diversity by superiority and priority in nobleness in relation with one another. (93) It is fitting that not everything that is lower than something else should be so merely by sharing in the thing opposite to it; the flame of the fire, though it is less hot than red-hot iron, is not so by being mixed with coldness, and the body that is less fertile is not necessarily so by sharing in some lowly disposition. (94) Let us posit that the noblest of these things and the most deserving to be the first is the mover of the sphere of the fixed stars; through the latter it also moves the things moved by it; the following is the mover of the second sphere, and after it the mover of the third sphere,

الثالثة وكذلك يجري الأمر في سائر الأشياء الآخر ليكون سبب الاختلاف الموجود بين بعض الأكر<sup>٢٩٧</sup> وبين بعضها<sup>٢٩٨</sup> من إبطاء حركتها الدورية وسرعتها إنما هو اختلاف الأسباب المحركة وقد وصفنا الحال في هذا الاختلاف فيما تقدم من قولنا ( ٩٥ ) فأما الاختلاف بين الأشياء التي ليست أجساماً فليس ذلك من قبل جسم ما كما ظن قوم<sup>٢٩٩</sup> من الناس وذلك أنه ليس يجوز<sup>٣٠٠</sup> أن يقال<sup>٣٠١</sup> إن ما ليس بجسم لا يخالف ما ليس بجسم لأنه غير جسم من قبل أن طبيعة الأشياء التي ليست أجساماً ليست واحدة كما قد نجد الأمر جارياً عليه في طبيعة الأجسام والدليل على ذلك في<sup>٣٠٢</sup> الأجناس التي هي مقولة على<sup>٣٠٣</sup> الجوهر ( ٩٦ ) وقد ينبغي لنا أن نعتقد في جميع الأكر<sup>٣٠٤</sup> أنها ذوات أنفس وأن كل واحدة منها لها نفس تخصصها وأنها إنما تتحرك بحركتها<sup>٣٠٥</sup> الطبيعية بالاشتياق الذي يخصها في طبيعتها<sup>٣٠٦</sup> وذلك أن طبيعة هذه الأشياء هي النفس إذ كانت صورة الجسم الإلهي أكمل الصور وكانت أنفس الأجسام الإلهية غير محتاجة أصلاً في الأفعال التي تصدر عنها إلى الأجسام الآلية<sup>٣٠٧</sup> المختلفة

( ٩٧ ) فالحرك الأول وهو المتصور<sup>٣٠٨</sup> بالعقل المتشوق إنما<sup>٣٠٩</sup> يحرك الشيء

<sup>٢٩٧</sup> الأكر: الكرات ج

<sup>٢٩٨</sup> وبين بعضها: وبعض ظ

<sup>٢٩٩</sup> قوم: كثير ظ

<sup>٣٠٠</sup> يجوز: يحق ظ

<sup>٣٠١</sup> يقال ج ظ: تقول

<sup>٣٠٢</sup> في: ناقص في ظ

<sup>٣٠٣</sup> هي مقولة على: م ته ط: في مقولة ج ظ

<sup>٣٠٤</sup> الأكر: الكرات ج

<sup>٣٠٥</sup> بحركتها م ته ط: حركتها ج ظ

<sup>٣٠٦</sup> طبيعتها ظ: طبعها ج م ط ته

<sup>٣٠٧</sup> الآلية ته ظ: الأزلية ج م ط: الإلهية ظ

<sup>٣٠٨</sup> المتصور بالعقل: المعقول ظ<sup>٢</sup>

<sup>٣٠٩</sup> إنما ج ظ: أيضاً م ته ط

and so on with all the other things, so that the diversity existing between the spheres with regard to the slowness and velocity of their circular motion is due to the diversity of their moving causes. We have already described the situation concerning this diversity in the earlier part of our treatise. (95) As for the diversity among things which are incorporeal, it is not due to a body, as some people have thought; for one cannot say that what is not a body is not different from what is not a body because it is not a body, insofar as the nature of the things which are not bodies is not one, just as we find it to be the case with the nature of bodies. This is shown by the genera which are predicated of substance. (96) We must consider that all the spheres possess souls and that each one of them has a soul proper to itself and moves with its natural motion through the impulse proper to it in its nature. For the nature of these things is the soul, since the form of the divine body is the most perfect of forms and the souls of the divine bodies do not at all need different organic bodies in order to perform the acts that proceed from them.

(97) The First Mover which is object of thought and desire moves



المتحرك نحوه من حيث هو متصور بالعقل <sup>٣١٠</sup> كما يحرك المعشوق العاشق <sup>٣١١</sup> من غير أن يتحرك هو إذ كان ليس بجسم وكان مجرداً من العنصر مفارقاً له من جميع الجهات وذلك أنه إن كان المعشوق هو سبب حركة العاشق <sup>٣١٢</sup> فإن الشيء الذي ذاته متشوقة <sup>٣١٣</sup> هو يحرك ذاته والشيء الذي ذاته متشوقة <sup>٣١٤</sup> هو الشيء الذي هو خير <sup>٣١٥</sup> وهذه الحال بعينها حال ذلك الشيء <sup>٣١٦</sup> ( ٩٨ ) فيجب إذن أن يكون يحرك ذاته إن كان قد يمكنه أن يعقل ذاته ويعلمها وهذا المحرك ليس إنما هو سبباً فقط لحركة الجسم ٢٦٩ الالهي <sup>٣١٧</sup> الملائم له والكمال الذي يخصه بل هو أيضاً سبب للناس في سكنى الأرض والسعادة العظمى المشتملة على جميع المحامد إنما هو تصور <sup>٣١٨</sup> ذلك الشيء بالعقل إذ كان الكمال الحقيقي للناس إنما هو في <sup>٣١٩</sup> النظر الفلسفي بحسب ما قد تبين <sup>٣٢٠</sup> في مواضع أخرى ( ٩٩ ) وذلك أن مبدأ النظر وما يحويه <sup>٣٢١</sup> هو التصور بالعقل للأشياء الالهية وذلك أن جميع الأشياء التي تشترك في النظر إنما يصير لها الكمال الملائم لها وهو الذي يصفه الإنسان بأنه كمال بالحقيقة من قبل الأفعال الصادرة عن هذه الأشياء من قبل الشيء المعقول لأنه ولا واحد من الأشياء التي عدت

<sup>٣١٠</sup> متصور بالعقل ظ: معقول ج م ط: متصور معقول ته

<sup>٣١١</sup> المعشوق العاشق م ته ط: العاشق المعشوق ظ: العاشق للمعشوق ج

<sup>٣١٢</sup> العاشق ظ: المتشوق

<sup>٣١٣</sup> متشوقة ظ: مشوقة م ته ط: تشوقه ج: تتسوق ظ<sup>٢</sup>

<sup>٣١٤</sup> متشوقة ظ: تشوقه ج ته ط: ناقص في م

<sup>٣١٥</sup> الذي هو خير ج ظ: ناقص في م ته ط: أي المحرك الأول ظ<sup>٢</sup>

<sup>٣١٦</sup> حال ذلك الشيء: حال المحرك الأول للشيء ج

<sup>٣١٧</sup> حركة الجسم الالهي ظ: لفعل الجسم الالهي الحيواني ج: لفعل الجسم الحيواني

الالهي م ته ط

<sup>٣١٨</sup> تصور: كون ظ

<sup>٣١٩</sup> في ظ: ناقص في ج م ته ط

<sup>٣٢٠</sup> تبين: بين ظ

<sup>٣٢١</sup> وما يحويه صح: ماتحته م ته ط: ما بحيه ج: فاتحته ظ

the thing moved towards itself insofar as it is object of thought, as the beloved moves the lover without himself being moved, since it is not a body and is free from matter and separate from it in every respect. For if the beloved is the cause of the motion of the lover, the thing whose essence feels desire moves itself, and the thing whose essence is desired is the thing which is good, and this is precisely the state of that thing. (98) Therefore, it must move itself if it can think itself and know itself. This mover is not only the cause of the motion of the divine body appropriate to it and of the perfection proper to it, but it is also the cause why men inhabit the earth, and the highest bliss which encompasses all praiseworthy things is to think that thing, since true perfection for men resides in philosophical contemplation as has been shown elsewhere. (99) For the principle of contemplation, and what it contains, is to think divine things, for all things which have a share in contemplation only receive the perfection appropriate to them (which is what man describes as truly perfection) on account of the acts originating from these things because of the intelligible thing; for none of the things devoid of

التصور<sup>٣٢٢</sup> بالعقل يكون قابلاً للخيرات التي هي خيرات بالحقيقة على<sup>٣٢٣</sup> الإطلاق إذ كان الكمال الحقيقي إنما هو موجود في هذه الأشياء<sup>٣٢٤</sup> ( ١٠٠ ) فإذا كان المحرك الأول جوهرًا أزليًا غير متحرك وغير جسم وأفضل من جميع الموجودات<sup>٣٢٥</sup> وكان هو<sup>٣٢٦</sup> المحرك للحركة الأولى الأزلية فإن المتحرك بهذه<sup>٣٢٧</sup> الحركة إنما صار متحركًا بها من طريق ما هو متصور بالعقل لذلك الشيء الذي هو بالحقيقة وبالفعل<sup>٣٢٨</sup> معقول ( ١٠١ ) لأن المعقول بالفعل هو بعينه عقل بالفعل من قبل أن التصور بالعقل إنما يكون بأخذ الشيء المعقول والذي إذا أخذه العقل في حال تصوره تشبه به وصار هو عند ذلك بعينه ولذلك<sup>٣٢٩</sup> يقال إن المتصور بالعقل في حال تصوره بالعقل إنما يعقل ذاته لأنه يصير في تلك الحال هو هو بعينه ( ١٠٢ ) فالمحرك الأول أيضًا هو بالحقيقة والفعل متصور بالعقل ومتى وُصف بأنه بالحقيقة والفعل كان موجودًا كذلك وذلك أنه عقل أفضل من المعقول والشيء المعقول بالفعل<sup>٣٣٠</sup> هو العقل إذ كان هو بعينه العقل الذي بالفعل أعني بذلك أن العقل في حال ما يعقل هو المعقول بعينه ويكون حينئذ العقل من قبل الشيء المعقول عاقلًا بالفعل إذ كان العقل الذي بالفعل بإضافته إلى المعقول الذي بالفعل هو بعينه الفعل الذي يحدث عن العقل<sup>٣٣١</sup> ( ١٠٣ ) فأما

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<sup>٣٢٢</sup> عدمت التصور ج: عدمت بالتصور ظ: نحوها الصور بالعقل م ط: تحويها الصور بالعقل ته

<sup>٣٢٣</sup> على: وعلى ظ

<sup>٣٢٤</sup> يعني الأشياء تتصور بالعقل ط<sup>٢</sup>

<sup>٣٢٥</sup> قال اسحاق يعني الأشياء التي تتصور بالعقل ج م ته ط: اسحاق ناقص في ج

<sup>٣٢٦</sup> هو: هذا ج

<sup>٣٢٧</sup> المتحرك بهذه م ته ط: المحرك بهذه ج ظ

<sup>٣٢٨</sup> وبالفعل ظ: والعقل

<sup>٣٢٩</sup> لأن: أن ظ

<sup>٣٣٠</sup> لذلك: كذلك ج

<sup>٣٣١</sup> بالفعل ته: بالعقل

<sup>٣٣٢</sup> الفعل الذي يحدث عن العقل ط ته: العقل الذي يحدث عن الفعل

thought can receive the goods which are truly and absolutely good, since true perfection exists only in these things. (100) Since the First Mover is an eternal, unmoved and incorporeal substance, better than all beings, and it is the mover imparting the first eternal motion, then that which is moved with that motion does so through thinking that thing which is truly and actually intelligible. (101) For that which is actually intelligible is itself actually intellect, because perceiving by the intellect occurs by grasping the intelligible thing to which an intellect is assimilated when it grasps it by thinking it and thereby becomes that itself. Therefore, it is said that that which thinks, in the state of thinking, thinks itself, because in that state it becomes one and the same with itself. (102) The First Mover too is truly and actually thinking, and when it is described as truly and actually <being>, it is so. For it is an intellect better than the intelligible, and the thing thought in actuality is the intellect, since it is itself the intellect which is in actuality, by which I mean that the intellect in the state of thinking is the intelligible itself. The intellect, then, is actually thinking because of the intelligible thing, since the intellect which is in actuality, by its relation with the actually intelligible, is itself the actuality proceeding from the intellect. (103) As for

الأشياء المعقولة التي الوجود لها إنما هو مع المادة فليس واحد منها على الإطلاق في طبعه الذي يخصّه معقولاً بالفعل لكنه إذا صار معقولاً وفارق ما هو معقول المادة التي الوجود له معها حينئذ يكون عقلاً ومعقولاً بالفعل فلذلك لما<sup>٣٣٣</sup> لم يكن على الإطلاق عقلاً ولا هو أيضاً ذلك الشيء الذي يعقله بعينه صار في حال ما يُعقل هو والعقل شيئاً واحداً بعينه (١٠٤) ٢٧٠  
 فالصورة<sup>٣٣٤</sup> المفارقة للمادة<sup>٣٣٥</sup> والقوة مفارقة تامة إذ كانت معقولة بطبيعتها الخاص<sup>٣٣٦</sup> بها فهي<sup>٣٣٧</sup> لذلك<sup>٣٣٨</sup> موجودة دائماً بالفعل فلتوصف بأنها عقل في ذاتها لا من قبل أن شيئاً آخر سواها يعقلها<sup>٣٣٩</sup> لكن من قبل أن لها بذاتها أن تكون<sup>٣٤٠</sup> عقلاً بالفعل ولأن<sup>٣٤١</sup> العقل الذي هو بالفعل إنما يكون كذلك من جهة ما يعقل فلتكن الصورة التي تجري هذا المجرى وهي دائماً بالفعل هي العقل (١٠٥) ولما كانت الجواهر الفاضلة أفعالها أيضاً كذلك فالأفعال الفاضلة<sup>٣٤٢</sup> إنما توجد في الأشياء الفاضلة فلتنزل أن فعل هذا العقل أعني تصوره بالعقل إنما هو للشيء الذي هو أفضل من جميع الموجودات والعقل الأول أفضل من جميع الأشياء الموجودة فيجب إذن لأنه يعقل ذاته أن يكون معقوله أفضل من جميع الموجودات (١٠٦) وذلك أنه إن<sup>٣٤٣</sup> انتقل إلى معقول غير ذاته لزم من ذلك أمر شنع وهو أن

<sup>٣٣٣</sup> لما ج ظ: ما ته ط

<sup>٣٣٤</sup> فإنه صورة لكل مادة و ظ<sup>٢</sup>

<sup>٣٣٥</sup> للمادة ج ظ: ناقص في ته ط

<sup>٣٣٦</sup> بطبيعتها الخاص: بطبيعتها الخاصة ظ

<sup>٣٣٧</sup> فهي ظ: وهي

<sup>٣٣٨</sup> لذلك ظ: كذلك

<sup>٣٣٩</sup> يعقلها ظ: يتصورها ظ<sup>٢</sup>: تصورها بالفعل ج: يعقلها فصورها بالفعل ته:

يعقلها مصورها بالعقل ط

<sup>٣٤٠</sup> تكون: تعقل ته

<sup>٣٤١</sup> ولأن: لأن ته

<sup>٣٤٢</sup> أفعالها أيضاً كذلك فالأفعال الفاضلة: ناقص في ظ

<sup>٣٤٣</sup> إن: ناقص في ظ

the objects of thought which only have existence with matter, none of them is absolutely intelligible in actuality by its proper nature, but when it becomes intelligible and that which is intelligible is separated from the matter with which it has its existence, then it becomes intellect and intelligible in actuality. Therefore, as it is not absolutely intellect, nor that very thing which it thinks, it is in the state of being thought that it becomes the same thing as the intellect. (104) But the form totally separate from matter and potentiality, since it is intelligible by virtue of its own proper nature, is always actually existing. Let it then be described as intellect in its essence, not insofar as something else, distinct from it, thinks it, but insofar as it belongs to its essence to be intellect in actuality and because the intellect which is in actuality is so only insofar as it thinks. Let then the form which is in this state and is always in actuality be the intellect. (105) Since excellent substances also have excellent acts, excellent acts exist only in excellent things. Let us assume, then, that the act of this intellect, I mean its thinking, only pertains to the thing which is better than all existents; now the first intellect is better than all existing things, so that its object of thought must be better than all existents, because it thinks itself. (106) For if it shifted to an intelligible <thing> other than itself, something shameful would result from this, viz.

انتقاله يكون مع حركة ما وليس الشيء<sup>٣٤٤</sup> الذي يتصور بالعقل أشياء كثيرة هو الفاضل لكن الذي يتصور بالعقل أشياء فاضلة تصوراً متصلاً هو كذلك (١٠٧) فيجب إذن أن يكون العقل إنما يعقل دائماً ذاته وذلك أنه على هذا الوجه<sup>٣٤٥</sup> يكون بسيطاً غير متحرك باقياً على حال واحدة الزمان كله والفعل<sup>٣٤٦</sup> الأفضل إنما هو للشيء الأفضل الذي فعله جارٍ على الاتصال<sup>٣٤٧</sup> (١٠٨) فالعقل إذن الذي هو بالفعل وعلى الإطلاق معقول هو واحد بعينه في العدد إذ كان الأولى والأوجب في فعل ذلك الشيء الذي هو أفضل الأشياء كلها وأشرفها<sup>٣٤٨</sup> أن يكون عقلاً مجرداً من القوة والحركة أصلاً وأن يكون في الشيء الذي هو أفضل من جميع الموجودات (١٠٩) وذلك أن التصور بالعقل على التحقيق والانفراد<sup>٣٤٩</sup> والتحديد هو كما قال أرسطوطالس أولى بأن يكون لذلك الشيء الذي هو فاضل في<sup>٣٥٠</sup> نفسه فإن الشيء الأفضل أولى بأن يكون للشيء الأفضل من قبل أن الأشياء التي فيها العقل والمعقول موجودان بالقوة متى أخذ كل واحد منهما على أنه بالقوة دون الفعل فإنهما يكونان مختلفين مبايناً<sup>٣٥١</sup> أحدهما للآخر أعني العقل والمعقول فإذا<sup>٣٥٢</sup> انتقل كل واحد منهما من القوة إلى الفعل صارا جميعاً شيئاً واحداً من قبل التشابه الذي بينهما لأنهما يكونان بالفعل<sup>٣٥٣</sup> الشيء المعقول بعينه إذ كان العقل إنما هو صورة الشيء المعقول مجرداً من الهيولى بعينها (١١٠) وفي هذه الحال يكون العقل والمعقول

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<sup>٣٤٤</sup> الشيء ظ: للشيء

<sup>٣٤٥</sup> هذا الوجه: هذه الجهة ظ

<sup>٣٤٦</sup> الفعل ته: العقل ج ظ

<sup>٣٤٧</sup> الاتصال ظ: اتصال

<sup>٣٤٨</sup> كلها وأشرفها: وأشرفها كلها ظ

<sup>٣٤٩</sup> والانفراد: والانفراد والتجزئة ظ

<sup>٣٥٠</sup> في: من ج

<sup>٣٥١</sup> مبايناً ظ: مباين ته ط: متباينين ج

<sup>٣٥٢</sup> فإذا: وإذا ظ

<sup>٣٥٣</sup> بالفعل ج: بالعقل

this shift would be accompanied by a certain motion. The thing which thinks many things is not excellent, but that which thinks excellent things continuously is so. (107) The intellect, then, must always think itself, for in this way it will be simple, unmoved and remaining for all time in the same state. The best act pertains to the best thing whose act is continuous. (108) The intellect, then, which is actually and absolutely intelligible, is one in number, since it is more fitting and more compelling, concerning the act of that thing which is the best and noblest of all things, that it should be an intellect absolutely free from potentiality and motion and that it should pertain to the thing which is better than all existents. (109) For it is more fitting that thinking with exactness, on its own, separately and definitely, as Aristotle said, should belong to that thing which is excellent in itself; for it is more fitting that the best thing should belong to the best thing, because the things in which intellect and intelligible exist in potentiality, when each one of the two is conceived of in potentiality without actuality, are each different and distinct from the other (I mean the intellect and the intelligible), and when both of them pass from potentiality into actuality, they both become the same thing on account of the assimilation taking place between them, because they are in actuality the intelligible thing itself, since the intellect is merely the very form of the intelligible free from matter. (110) In this state,



شيئاً واحداً بعينه من قبل أنه إذا عقل<sup>٣٥٤</sup> تشبّه بالشيء المعقول فأما في<sup>٣٥٥</sup> الأشياء التي العقل فيها موجود بالفعل وهذه حال العقل الالهي فإن ٢٧١ العاقل والمعقول هما دائماً معاً بمنزلة شيء واحد إذ<sup>٣٥٦</sup> كان العقل الذي بالفعل هو المعقول بعينه والعقل الالهي هو موجود بهذه الحال دائماً (١١١) فأما أن العقل الذي بالفعل هو والمعقول<sup>٣٥٧</sup> شيء واحد بعينه ولذلك صار يعقل نفسه فذلك شيء يعمّ كل عقل بمعزل<sup>٣٥٨</sup> الهیولی ولا سيما العقل الالهي فإنه في حال ما هو معقول على الحقيقة هو عاقل على الحقيقة (١١٢) والمعقول بالحقيقة هو الجوهر البسيط المجرد من الهیولی وهذه حال العقل الالهي إذ كان هو الصورة المفارقة للمادة ولما كان عقلاً بالحقيقة ومعقولاً بالحقيقة وجب من ذلك أن يكون عاقلاً لذاته ومعقولاً لها وكل ما وُصف من الأشياء بأنه عقل بالحقيقة فإنه عند ذلك يصير هو بعينه معقولاً بالحقيقة (١١٣) وذلك أن كل واحد من هذين لما كان في طبعه الخاص به موجوداً بالفعل محضاً صار له بالواجب في نفس طبعه أن يكون إنما يعقل ذاته فقط من قبل أن العقل الذي بالفعل ليس يعقل شيئاً من الأشياء التي ليست بطبعها الخاص بها معقولة البتة<sup>٣٥٩</sup> لأن الشيء الأفضل ليس هو واحداً منها<sup>٣٦٠</sup> والشيء الذي هو عاقل بذاته فقط هو الصورة المجردة من المادة أعني العقل الالهي (١١٤) وذلك أنه قبيح بنا أن نقول في العقل الالهي الذي هو أشرف من جميع الموجودات أنه يعقل أي شيء اتفق<sup>٣٦١</sup> بأي الأحوال كان كما أنه قبيح بنا أن نقول فيه أيضاً أنه

<sup>٣٥٤</sup> عقل ظ: تصور بالعقل

<sup>٣٥٥</sup> فأما في: فأما ظ

<sup>٣٥٦</sup> إذ ج: ط: إن ظ: ناقص في ته

<sup>٣٥٧</sup> هو والمعقول ج: هو المعقول

<sup>٣٥٨</sup> بمعزل صح: بمنزلة

<sup>٣٥٩</sup> البتة: ناقص في ظ

<sup>٣٦٠</sup> منها: منهما ظ

<sup>٣٦١</sup> أي شيء اتفق ظ: أي الأشياء اتفق ج: من الأشياء اتفق ته: في الأشياء اتفق ط

intellect and intelligible are one and the same thing, because when <the intellect> thinks, it becomes assimilated to the intelligible <thing>. With regard to things in which the intellect exists in actuality, which is the case of the divine intellect, the thinking <subject> and the object of thought are always together as one and the same thing, since the intellect in actuality is the intelligible <thing> itself; the divine intellect is always in that state. (111) As for the fact that the intellect which is in actuality is the same thing as the intelligible <thing> and that therefore it thinks itself, this is something common to all intellects free from matter and particularly the divine intellect: being truly intelligible, it is truly thinking. (112) What is truly intelligible is the simple substance free from matter, and this is the state of the divine intellect, since it is the form separate from matter. Since it is truly intellect and truly intelligible, it must think itself and be intelligible for itself. Everything described as truly intellect becomes thereby truly intelligible itself. (113) For when each one of the two exists in actuality in the nature proper to it and is pure, then necessarily and by its own nature <the intellect> will only think itself, because the intellect which is in actuality does not think any of the things which are not intelligible by the nature proper to them; for the best thing is not one of those, and the thing which thinks only by itself is the form free from matter, I mean the divine intellect. (114) For it would be shameful for us to say that the divine intellect which is nobler than all beings thinks any thing whatever in any state whatever, just as it would also be shameful for us to say that it

لا يعقل بعض الأشياء ولا يعلمها وذلك أن بعض الأشياء ليس إنما لا يليق به أن لا يعقله بل أن لا يراه أيضاً<sup>٣٦٢</sup> (١١٥) وذلك أنه إن كان الذي يعقل يصير في حال ما يعقل والمعقول<sup>٣٦٣</sup> شيئاً واحداً بعينه فكيف لا يكون قبيحاً بنا أن نقول في العقل الالهي والجوهر الالهي الذي هو أشرف من جميع الأشياء أنه يتشبه بالأشياء الخسيسة (١١٦) فيجب إذن أن يكون إنما يتصور بالعقل ذلك الشيء الالهي الذي هو أفضل من جميع الموجودات من غير أن ينتقل في حال من الأحوال إلى تصور شيء سواه وذلك أنه متى انتقل عنه إلى غيره لزم أن يكون انتقاله إلى الشيء الأخر<sup>٣٦٤</sup> كما قلنا آنفاً وأن يكون انتقاله أيضاً مع حركة ما (١١٧) بل لا يكون حينئذ موجوداً بالفعل على الإطلاق بحسب ما تقدم من القول ومع هذا أيضاً فإنه يلزم متى كان يتصور بالعقل<sup>٣٦٥</sup> شيئاً آخر غيره أن يكون مشاركاً لما بالقوة وذلك أن التغير الذي يحدث له بانتقاله من الأشياء التي عقلها إلى الأشياء التي لم يعقلها بعد إنما يكون من قوة ما متقدمة للعقل (١١٨) إلا أنه قد يجب كما أن من الأشياء الموجودة ما هو بالقوة ٢٧٢ فقط وهي التي يمكن فيها أن تنقسم إلى ما لا نهاية له ومنها ما هو مشترك في الفعل والقوة<sup>٣٦٦</sup> وهي التي توجد فيها القوة متقدمة في الزمان بمنزلة الأشياء التي تلحقها الاستحالة بوجه ما كذلك يجب أيضاً أن يكون شيء ما موجوداً بالفعل فقط مجرداً من كل قوة هيولانية (١١٩) وعلى<sup>٣٦٧</sup> هذا الوجه فقط يمكن أن يكون الأمر جارياً عليه في ذلك الجوهر الذي ليس بمتحرك والعقل<sup>٣٦٨</sup> الالهي الأزلي إذ كان والشيء الذي يعقله شيئاً

<sup>٣٦٢</sup> وذلك... أيضاً ظ: ناقص في ج ته ط

<sup>٣٦٣</sup> يصير في حال ما يعقل والمعقول: ناقص في ظ

<sup>٣٦٤</sup> الأخر ج ظ<sup>٢</sup>: الآخر ظ

<sup>٣٦٥</sup> وذلك الشيء الالهي (١١٦)... يتصور بالعقل: ناقص في ج ته ط

<sup>٣٦٦</sup> في الفعل والقوة: بالفعل ظ

<sup>٣٦٧</sup> وعلى ج: على

<sup>٣٦٨</sup> والعقل: هو العقل ظ

does not think and does not know certain things. For certain things are not worthy that it should not think them, but even that it should not see them either. (115) For if that which thinks becomes, in the act of thinking, the same thing as the intelligible, how should it not be shameful to say that the divine intellect and the divine substance which is nobler than all things becomes similar to lowly things? (116) Therefore, it must only think that divine thing which is better than all beings without shifting in any way to think something else; for when it shifts from it to something else, this shifting must be towards something lower, as we said before, and this shifting must be accompanied by motion. (117) What is more, it will then not exist absolutely in actuality, according to what has been said before; when it thinks something other than itself, it will then share in that which is in potentiality. For the change occurring in it by its proceeding from the things which it has thought to the things which it has not yet thought must start from a potentiality pre-existing in the intellect. (118) However, just as some of the existing things are only in potentiality, i.e. those which can be divided *ad infinitum*, and some share in actuality and potentiality, i.e. those in which there is a potentiality preceding in time, such as the things which are affected by change, in the same way something must also exist in actuality only, free from all material potentiality. (119) This is the only possible state for this substance which is unmoved and is the eternal divine intellect, since it and the thing which it thinks are the same thing.

واحدًا بعينه من قبل أنه لو كان متصورًا<sup>٣٦٩</sup> بالعقل غير ذاته لكان ذلك لا محالة صورة جسمية وكان تصوره إياها لا يكون إلا مع حركة ( ١٢٠ )  
ولسنا نقول مع ذلك إنه غير متصور بالعقل للأشياء التي تلزم حركة الجسم  
الالهي الذي هو أول المتحركات<sup>٣٧٠</sup> عنه فإن قيل إنه يتحرك بالعرض فقد  
حالت نفسه في الجوهر فأما العقل الذي فينا<sup>٣٧١</sup> فليس هو من جميع  
الجهات والشيء الذي يعقله هو<sup>٣٧٢</sup> إذ كان صورة لجسم بحال<sup>٣٧٣</sup> كذا  
واحدًا بعينه ( ١٢١ ) وما يطابق ويوافق الأشياء التي وُصف بها الجوهر  
الأول ما<sup>٣٧٤</sup> وصف الله به أفلاطن فإنه قال إن الاتحاد شيء يخصه دائمًا<sup>٣٧٥</sup>  
في ذاته وإنما يعني<sup>٣٧٦</sup> بقوله الاتحاد الذي يخصه تصوره بالعقل لما  
يتصوره<sup>٣٧٧</sup> وليس إنما يعقل ذاته من حيث هو عقل لكن من حيث يقصد  
لأن يكون معقولاً ( ١٢٢ ) وذلك أن الشيء الذي هو واحد بعينه في  
العدد لا شيء يمنع<sup>٣٧٨</sup> بحسب الآراء<sup>٣٧٩</sup> المختلفة أن يوصف بصفات مختلفة  
وأن يكون هو بعينه أيضاً يقبل صورة القول وقول الحركة بل ليس يمنع  
أيضاً مانع بحسب الآراء<sup>٣٨٠</sup> المختلفة أن يكون مبدأ ونهاية لا من واحد  
بعينه ( ١٢٣ ) وما يوصف به من العلو والدنو بحسب النسب المختلفة  
التي لنا إليه هما أيضاً شيء واحد بعينه فعلى هذه الجهة يوجد الأمر جاريًا

<sup>٣٦٩</sup> متصورًا: يتصور ظ

<sup>٣٧٠</sup> المتحركات: المحركات ظ

<sup>٣٧١</sup> يتحرك بالعرض... فينا ج: يتحرك بالعرض... قلنا ظ: قابل العقل الذي فيها

ته ط

<sup>٣٧٢</sup> هو ظ: ناقص في ج ته ط

<sup>٣٧٣</sup> صورة لجسم بحال ج ط ظ: تصوره الجسم محال ته

<sup>٣٧٤</sup> ما ظ: مما ج: إذ ته ط

<sup>٣٧٥</sup> دائمًا ظ: ناقص في ج ته ط

<sup>٣٧٦</sup> وإنما يعني: يعني ظ

<sup>٣٧٧</sup> تصوره بالعقل لما يتصوره ج ته ط: تصوره لما يتصوره بالعقل ظ

<sup>٣٧٨</sup> يمنع ظ: يمتنع

<sup>٣٧٩</sup> الآراء: الاعتقادات ظ

<sup>٣٨٠</sup> الآراء: الاعتقادات ظ

For if it thought something other than itself, this would inevitably be a corporeal form and its thinking it would not take place without motion. (120) Nevertheless, we are not saying that it does not think the things which result from the motion of the divine body which is the first thing moved by it. If one said that it is moved accidentally, its soul would change in its essence. As for the intellect which is in us, it is never in every respect the same thing as the thing which it thinks, since it is the form of a body in a certain state. (121) Among what applies to and agrees with the things by which the first substance is characterized there is the definition which Plato gave of God. He said that unity is something always proper to Him in Himself, meaning by “unity” proper to Him, His thinking what He thinks. He does not only think Himself insofar as He is intellect, but insofar as He aims at being intelligible. (122) For nothing prevents the thing which is numerically one in itself, according to different opinions, from being characterized by different attributes and remaining the same, receiving the form of the definition and the definition of motion. What is more, nothing prevents it either, according to different opinions, from being principle and end of more than one thing. (123) The exaltedness and lowliness by which it is characterized according to the different relationships between ourselves and it are also the same thing. This is the state of the First Cause,

في العلة الأولى أيضاً<sup>٣٨١</sup> أعني أن<sup>٣٨٢</sup> تكون هي بعينها عقلاً ومعقولاً معاً وذلك أنه إن كان كل عقل يعقل قد يوجد له هذا المعنى وهو أن يكون يعقل نفسه كما تبين فذلك الشيء الذي يعقل دائماً أولى كثيراً بأن يكون هذه الحال موجودة له (١٢٤) وذلك أن تلك الأشياء التي تعقل ربما كانت مفارقة للأشياء التي تعقل<sup>٣٨٣</sup> وربما كانت أيضاً غير معقولة<sup>٢٧٣</sup> وذلك متى ما لم تكن هي بعينها شيئاً من الأشياء التي يتهيأ أن تعقل فأما هذا<sup>٣٨٤</sup> فلأنه يعقل دائماً وجب أن يكون إنما يعقل ذاته دائماً وأن يكون دائماً ذلك<sup>٣٨٥</sup> الشيء الذي يعقله بعينه (١٢٥) وأيضاً فلو<sup>٣٨٦</sup> كان تصويره بالعقل إنما يكون مع انفعال ما لكان منكرًا أن يقال في العاقل والمعقول إنهما في جميع الوجوه شيء واحد بعينه إذ كان من أقبح الأمور وأشنعها أن يكون شيء واحد بعينه ينفع من ذاته ويفعل بذاته معاً فأما إذ كان التصور بالعقل المجرد من جميع الانفعالات إنما هو خاصّة المعقول المفارق للقوة والمادة مفارقة تامة كما قد تبين فليس تلزمنّا شناعة متى قلنا في العقل إنه يعقل ذاته (١٢٦) وأيضاً فإن كان فعل العقل هو الحياة والعقل الذي بالفعل هو الحياة الأزلية وكان فعل الشيء الفاضل هو أيضاً فاضل<sup>٣٨٧</sup> وكذلك أيضاً الحال في اللذة متى كانت تفعل فعلها بغير عائق إذ كانت اللذة التي<sup>٣٨٨</sup> تصدر عن فعل الملكة<sup>٣٨٩</sup> الطبيعية غير منفصلة كما قد تبين فقد يجب إذن أن تكون حياة العقل حياة فاضلة في الغاية ولذيذة في الغاية إذ كان إنما يفعل دائماً في الأشياء الفاضلة بغير مانع ولا عائق

<sup>٣٨١</sup> أيضاً: ناقص في ظ

<sup>٣٨٢</sup> أعني أن ته ط: أعني في أن ج ظ

<sup>٣٨٣</sup> ربما كانت مفارقة للأشياء التي تعقل: ناقص في ج

<sup>٣٨٤</sup> أي المحرك الأول ظ

<sup>٣٨٥</sup> ذلك: بذلك ظ

<sup>٣٨٦</sup> فلو: فإذا ظ

<sup>٣٨٧</sup> وكان فعل الشيء الفاضل هو أيضاً فاضل: وملكة العقل الشيء الفاضل ظ

<sup>٣٨٨</sup> التي ج ظ: ناقص في م ته ط

<sup>٣٨٩</sup> الملكة ج ظ: المادة م ته ط

I mean it is both intellect and intelligible at the same time. For if every thinking intellect may possess this property, namely that it thinks itself, as has been shown, then that thing which always thinks would be much fitter to be in that state. (124) For those things which think may be separate from the things which they think and sometimes may also not be intelligible, that is when they are not themselves one of the things which may be thought. But this, because it always thinks, must always think itself and must always be that very thing which it thinks. (125) Also if its thinking were accompanied by an affection, it would be absurd to say that the thinking subject and the intelligible are the same thing in all respects, since it is most objectionable and absurd that the same thing should both be affected and affect by itself. But since thinking, free from all affection, is the property only of the intelligible <thing> absolutely separate from potentiality and matter, as has become clear, then no absurdity results for us when we say that the intellect thinks itself. (126) Again, if the actuality of the intellect is life and the intellect which is in actuality is eternal life and the actuality of the excellent thing is also excellent, and such is also the state of bliss when it achieves its actuality without hindrance, since bliss which results from the actuality of the natural disposition cannot be affected, as has been shown, then the life of the intellect must be a supremely excellent and supremely blissful life, since it is always actual in excellent things, without obstacle or hindrance; these things agree with the notions preexisting



وهذه الأشياء موافقة لما قد سبق وقوعه في أوهام جميع الناس في العقل  
 الالهي وذلك أنا نقول إن لذلك الأمر الالهي حياة أزلية سعيدة  
 (١٢٧) فإذا كان المحرك الأول إذن <sup>٣٩٠</sup> على ما وصفنا وكانت أيضاً حال  
 الأشياء التي تتحرك عنه بغير متوسط <sup>٣٩١</sup> على هذه الحال فإنه يتبع حركة  
 هذه الأشياء كون واستحالة الأجسام الفاسدة ذوات المادة بحسب ما يصل  
 إليها <sup>٣٩٢</sup> من قوة تلك على اختلافها وبحسب تشبه تلك <sup>٣٩٣</sup> الأشياء  
 المختلفة <sup>٣٩٤</sup> التي قلناه <sup>٣٩٥</sup> لما عليه حركتها من التغير والاختلاف كما قلنا  
 آنفاً (١٢٨) وهذه الطبيعة <sup>٣٩٦</sup> والقوة هما سبب اتحاد العالم وانتظامه  
 وبحسب ما يجري الأمر عليه في المدينة الواحدة التي لها مدبر واحد مقيم  
 فيها غير مفارق لها كذلك نقول إن قوة ما روحانية تسري في جميع العالم  
 وترتبط بعضه ببعض (١٢٩) ولما كانت المدينة إنما يدبرها واحد فقط وهو  
 إما رئيسها وإما الشريعة <sup>٣٩٧</sup> الموضوع لها فكذلك <sup>٣٩٨</sup> أيضاً العالم الواحد  
 لما كان جسماً واحداً <sup>٣٩٩</sup> متصلاً أزلياً <sup>٤٠٠</sup> غير فاسد مشتملاً على جميع ٢٧٤  
 الأشياء محيطاً بها ضامناً لنشرها <sup>٤٠١</sup> وكان جميع الأشياء التي فيه إنما تطلب  
 الاتصال بالشئ الذي هو غير متغير <sup>٤٠٢</sup> وتقصد للاتحاد <sup>٤٠٣</sup> الهيلواني بما

<sup>٣٩٠</sup> إذن: ناقص في ط

<sup>٣٩١</sup> متوسط ج ط: توسط م ط ته

<sup>٣٩٢</sup> إليها ته ط: إليها أيضاً م: خرم في ج: ناقص في ط

<sup>٣٩٣</sup> بحسب تشبه تلك: بحسب نسبة تشبه تلك ط: بحسب نسبة تلك ج: بحسب

تسمية تلك م ته ط

<sup>٣٩٤</sup> الأشياء المختلفة صح: المختلفة م ته ط: المختلفة الأشياء ط: خرم في ج

<sup>٣٩٥</sup> قلناه م ته ط: قبلنا ط

<sup>٣٩٦</sup> يعني المحرك الأول ط<sup>٢</sup>

<sup>٣٩٧</sup> الشريعة: الناموس ط<sup>٢</sup>

<sup>٣٩٨</sup> فكذلك م ته ط: كذلك ج ط

<sup>٣٩٩</sup> واحداً ج ط: ناقص في م ته ط

<sup>٤٠٠</sup> أزلياً ته ط ط: ناقص في ج م

<sup>٤٠١</sup> ضامناً لنشرها م ط: ناقص في ج ته ط

<sup>٤٠٢</sup> غير متغير ط<sup>٢</sup>: غير متنفس ط: متنفس من النفس ج م ط: غير متنفس من

النفس ته

in the mind of all people concerning the divine intellect. For we say that this divine thing has an eternal happy life.

(127) Since the First Mover is as we have described it, and the things moved by it without intermediary are also in that state, there follows from the motion of these things the generation and change of the perishable bodies having matter, according to the power of those <heavenly bodies> reaching them according to <the former's> diversity, and according to the assimilation of those different things which we have mentioned, because of the change and diversity of their motion, as we said before. (128) This nature and power are the cause of the unity and order of the world. In the same way as happens in one city having one ruler residing in it, not separate from it, we also say that a certain spiritual power penetrates the whole world and holds its parts together. (129) Since the city is ruled by one authority only which is its leader or established law, so is the one world, since it is one body, continuous, eternal, imperishable, containing and encompassing all things, and comprehending them, and all things which are in it seek to be in contact with the thing which is unchangeable and aim at the material union with that which rules

يدبره ويسوسه ويحفظ عليه ترتيبه<sup>٤٠٤</sup> ونظامه بقوة<sup>٤٠٥</sup> روحانية تسري في جميع أجزائه التي تليق بها أن تكون سارية فيه بحسب ما يراه هو لا القوم (١٣٠) وذلك<sup>٤٠٦</sup> أنه ليس يتصل بشيء من الحيوانات التي الوجود لها إنما هو في القول والوهم بل الأمر العام لجميع الأشياء التي في العالم والأشياء التي تباين بعضها بعضا مباينة ظاهرة هو القصد للاتصال بذلك الجوهر الأول بحسب ما يخص كل واحد منها في طبيعته الملائمة<sup>٤٠٧</sup> له وهذا هو السبب في بقائها وثباتها ولزومها للموضع الذي يخصها (١٣١) فإن من الأشياء التي فيه<sup>٤٠٨</sup> ما هو فاعل فقط ومنها ما هو منفعل فقط ومنها ما هو فاعل ومنفعل معاً ولذلك يتهياً أن يتصل بعضها ببعض ويلزم بعضها بعضاً (١٣٢) وذلك أنه لما كانت الطبيعة السارية<sup>٤٠٩</sup> في جميع أجزاء العالم هي قوة الهية تؤم<sup>٤١٠</sup> وتنحو نحو أفضل الموجودات ولذلك صارت مشاركة جميع<sup>٤١١</sup> الأشياء التي تشاركه<sup>٤١٢</sup> إنما هي<sup>٤١٣</sup> بحسب حال كل واحد منها عنده وموقعه<sup>٤١٤</sup> منه (١٣٣) وكما أن جميع أجزاء البيت إنما يقصد بها نحو أمر واحد بعينه وهو الذي به<sup>٤١٥</sup> يتم البيت ويلتئم حتى يصير واحداً كذلك الحال في الأحرار فإنهم يفعلون جميع ما يفعلونه أو

<sup>٤٠٣</sup> للاتحاد م ظ: الاتحاد ج: لاتحاد الهيولى ته ط

<sup>٤٠٤</sup> ترتيبه ج ته ط: مرتبته م ظ

<sup>٤٠٥</sup> بقوة م ظ: قوة ج ته ط

<sup>٤٠٦</sup> وذلك ج ظ: فقال ته ط: يقول م

<sup>٤٠٧</sup> طبيعته الملائمة ج: طبيعة الملائم

<sup>٤٠٨</sup> فيه ظ: فيه منها ج: فيها م ته ط

<sup>٤٠٩</sup> السارية ج ظ: ناقص في م ته ط

<sup>٤١٠</sup> تؤم م ظ: صار لذلك تام ته ط: صار لذلك تومر (?) ج

<sup>٤١١</sup> جميع: لجميع ج

<sup>٤١٢</sup> التي تشارك ظ: المشاركة م ته ط: المركبة ج

<sup>٤١٣</sup> إنما هي ظ: وإنما هي ج: ناقص في م ته ط

<sup>٤١٤</sup> وموقعه ظ: موضعه ج: موضعها م ته ط

<sup>٤١٥</sup> به ج ظ: ناقص في م ته ط

and governs <the world> and preserves its arrangement and order by a spiritual power which penetrates all parts of it which deserve that it should penetrate them according to what <the ruler> thinks, not the people. (130) For it is not in contact with any of the animals which have existence in speech and imagination, but what is common to all things in the world and to the things which are manifestly distinct from one another is to aim at being in contact with this first substance according to what is proper to each one of them in the nature appropriate to it. This is the cause of their duration and permanence, and of their remaining in the place proper to them. (131) Among the things which are in <the world>, some are purely active, some purely passive, and some both active and passive. Therefore, they may be in contact with one another and issue from one another. (132) For since the nature penetrating all parts of the world is a divine power, it follows and turns to the most excellent being; therefore, all things which share in it do so according to the state and position of each one of them in relation to it. (133) Just as all the parts of the house aim at one and the same thing, viz. that which will bring it about and fit it together so that it becomes one, so is the state of free men: they do all that they do, or

أكثره على ترتيب ونظام وجميع ما يفعلونه فإنما قصدهم فيه سلامة البيت <sup>٤١٦</sup> إذ لا سبيل لهم إلى أن يحيوا <sup>٤١٧</sup> وهم أحرار على خلاف هذه الجهة ( ١٣٤ ) وأما العبيد وغيرهم ممن يجري مجراهم فإنهم لهم شركة يسيرة في هذا النظام والتهيؤ <sup>٤١٨</sup> الذين جعلوا بسبب خلاص <sup>٤١٩</sup> الكل وبسبب هذه الشركة اليسيرة صاروا أيضاً باقين إذ <sup>٤٢٠</sup> كانوا بعض أجزاء البيت وأكثر ما يصدر عن هذه الطبقة <sup>٤٢١</sup> من الأفعال فإنما هو بالبخت والاتفاق وذلك أن الطبيعة التي تخصصها التي هي في كل واحد من أجزائها مبدأ وسبب لوجوده ليست قابلة من حسن <sup>٤٢٢</sup> الترتيب والنظام شيئاً ذا قدر ( ١٣٥ ) والحال في العالم مثلها في المدينة والبيت فإن من الأشياء التي فيه ما قد <sup>٤٢٣</sup> جعلته الطبيعة التي تخصصه جاريّاً أبداً على ترتيب ونظام إذ كان غير متهيئ لقبول شيء من الاضطراب <sup>٤٢٤</sup> أعني عدم النظام ومنها ٢٧٥ ما هو على هذه الحال في أكثر الأمر ومنها ما يشاركها في هذه الحال أعني حال الترتيب والنظام مشاركة يسيرة ( ١٣٦ ) وبهذا الضرب من الترتيب والسياسة يبقى الكل أزليّاً غير فاسد فمنه ما هو كذلك في العدد ومنه <sup>٤٢٥</sup> ما هو بهذه الحال في النوع من قبل الحركة المتصلة المنتظمة على اختلافها وتفننها وهي التي قلنا إن الأزلية لها إنما هي في العدد ( ١٣٧ ) وليست

<sup>٤١٦</sup> فيه سلامة البيت ظ : فيه السلامة للبيت ج : نحو سلامة البيت ته ط : نحو

السلامة للبيت م

<sup>٤١٧</sup> أن يحيوا ظ : الحياة

<sup>٤١٨</sup> التهيؤ ج ظ : التحقيق م ته ط

<sup>٤١٩</sup> خلاص ج ظ : خواص م ته ط

<sup>٤٢٠</sup> إذ ج م ته : أو ط ظ

<sup>٤٢١</sup> الطبقة ج ط ظ : الطبيعة م ته

<sup>٤٢٢</sup> حسن ته ظ : جنس

<sup>٤٢٣</sup> ما قد ته ط : ما ج : قد م ظ

<sup>٤٢٤</sup> اضطراب : اضطراب ظ

<sup>٤٢٥</sup> منه ج : منها

most of it, according to an arrangement and an order, and their aim in all that they do is the preservation of the household, since there is no way for them to live as free men in opposition to that. (134) But the slaves and suchlike have only a feeble share in this order and disposition which have been established in the interest of the whole; and because of this feeble share they also endure, since they are a part of the house. Most acts issuing from this class are merely by chance and spontaneity. For the nature proper to it, which is in all its parts principle and cause of its being, does not receive anything of importance in the way of good organization and order. (135) The state of the world is similar to that of the city or the house: among the things which are in it, the nature proper to them has caused some of them to happen always according to organization and order, because they are not susceptible to any kind of disturbance, I mean lack of order; others are in this state most of the time; others still have a feeble share in this state, I mean the state of organization and order. (136) By this kind of organization and government, the universe remains eternal and imperishable: part of it is such in number, and part of it is in this state in species because of the continuous motion, ordered according to its diversity and variety, of which we have said that eternity belongs to it in number. (137) The state of this is not

الحال في ذلك كالحال في لهيب النار وفي وقت تكونه وسرعة فساد  
وعودته<sup>٤٢٦</sup> إلى الكل الذي عنه تكوّن<sup>٤٢٧</sup> إذ<sup>٤٢٨</sup> ليس في طاقة الهيولى أن  
تحفظ نظاماً واحداً وصورة واحدة لعجزها عن ذلك ( ١٣٨ ) وذلك أنه لما  
كان لأجزائها من قبل حركة الأشياء الازلية<sup>٤٢٩</sup> استحالة متصلة إلى الضد  
لم يلحقها من الكلال ما كان<sup>٤٣٠</sup> يلحقها لو كانت مخالفة لصورة واحدة  
بعينها غير مفارقة لها لأنه لما كانت الأجسام مستحيلة من واحد إلى آخر  
صارت حال كل واحد من أجزاء الأنواع عند نوعه الذي يخصّه كأنه  
الساعة حدث فيه ( ١٣٩ ) ولذلك صرنا لا نخاف أصلاً أن يكون العالم  
عسى أن يفسد<sup>٤٣١</sup> لعجزه عن الاتصال وهذا الضرب من الفساد الموجود  
في الكل ليس هو شيئاً صار له بمشيئة غيره وإرادته أعني بذلك الأمور  
الالهية لكنه شيء في نفس طبيعته<sup>٤٣٢</sup> الخاصّ به ( ١٤٠ ) وذلك أنه ليس<sup>٤٣٣</sup>  
يليق بالطبيعة الالهية أن تشاء<sup>٤٣٤</sup> ما ليس ممكناً كما أنه غير ممكن أيضاً  
بحسب رأي من يقول<sup>٤٣٥</sup> بالحدث أن يلحق ما لم يتكون قط فساد  
البتة<sup>٤٣٦</sup> ولا الغلبة أيضاً ولا الدحوض<sup>٤٣٧</sup> متى أخذ كل واحد منهما على

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<sup>٤٢٦</sup> وفي وقت تكونه وسرعة فساد عودته ظ : فإن لهيب النار في وقت ما إلى العودة  
ته : فإن لهيب النار واري ( ؟ ) أثره في وقت ما إلى العودة ط : النار وأمرى أثره في وقت ما  
إلى العودة م : في وقت تكونه وسرعة فساد صورته ج

<sup>٤٢٧</sup> عنه تكون ج : فيه تكون ظ : إلى الكل الذي عنه تكون : ناقص في م ته ط

<sup>٤٢٨</sup> إذ : أو ظ

<sup>٤٢٩</sup> الازلية : الالهية ظ

<sup>٤٣٠</sup> ما كان : ما ظ

<sup>٤٣١</sup> يفسد ظ : يبيد

<sup>٤٣٢</sup> في نفس طبيعته ظ : له في نفس طبيعته ج : في مغير ( ؟ ) طبعه م ته ط

<sup>٤٣٣</sup> ليس : ناقص في ظ

<sup>٤٣٤</sup> أن تشاء ما م ته ط : إرادة الفساد والتغير والاستحالة وإنه منها ج : ما ظ

<sup>٤٣٥</sup> يقول : يقر ظ

<sup>٤٣٦</sup> البتة : ناقص في ظ

<sup>٤٣٧</sup> ولا الدحوض : والدحوض ظ

like that of the flame of the fire, of the instant of its generation and rapidity of its disappearance and return to the whole from which it was generated, since matter cannot preserve the same order and the same form, because it is incapable of that. (138) For since its parts possess, on account of the motion of the eternal things, continuous change into the opposite, it is not affected by the weariness that would affect it if it were opposed to one and the same form, not separate from it; for since bodies change into one another, the state of each one of the parts of the species, in the species proper to it, is as if it had arisen this very moment. (139) Therefore, we should not at all fear that the world might perish because of its incapacity to exist continuously. This kind of perishability existing in the universe is not something happening to it by the will and resolution of some other being, I mean by that the divine things, but it is something inherent in its proper nature. (140) For it does not fit the divine nature to will that which is not possible, just as it is not possible either, according to the opinion of those who profess the doctrine of creation, that perishability should attach to what has not been generated at all, nor victory and defeat either, when both are taken to be



أنه جزء من الموجودات<sup>٤٣٨</sup> لضرورة ما يدعو إلى ذلك ( ١٤١ ) فإنه يلزم أن يكون في حال ما سبباً<sup>٤٣٩</sup> لفساد العالم وفي حال أخرى سبباً لكونه وذلك أن النسبة المختلفة التي لحركة الأجسام الالهية الدورية إلى كل<sup>٤٤٠</sup> واحد من الأشياء التي قلنا لما كانت سبباً<sup>٤٤١</sup> للهيولى في الاستحالة المتصلة إلى الضد أمنت خوفنا عليها من أن تفسد وأزالت إشفاقنا من أن يكون العالم يفسد بغتة أو ينتقل عن حاله التي هو عليها ( ١٤٢ ) ولا يجب أيضاً أن نقول إن السبب فيما يشاهد هذا العالم عليه من الحركة والتقلب ومشاركة الأجسام التي فيه بعضها بعضاً المتنفسة منها وغير المتنفسة<sup>٤٤٢</sup> وما يجري عليه الأمر في ذلك من الترتيب والنظام الموجبين سلامته<sup>٤٤٣</sup> هو<sup>٤٤٤</sup> البخت والاتفاق ( ١٤٣ ) وذلك أنه لا شيء من الأشياء التي كونها محدود جارٍ<sup>٤٤٥</sup> على نظام يحدث<sup>٤٤٦</sup> عن الاتفاق لكن الجسم الالهي ما دام يفعل ٢٧٦ فعله الخاص<sup>٤٤٧</sup> به أعني أن يتحرك الحركة الدورية الأزلية البسيطة<sup>٤٤٨</sup> المنتظمة بالشوق<sup>٤٤٩</sup> إلى ذلك الشيء الذي هو أفضل الموجودات فإنه بحركته هذه يكون سبباً لاستحالة الأجسام التي في الكون والفساد الجارية على نظام بحسب اختلاف أحوالها بعضها عن<sup>٤٥٠</sup> بعض وهذه الحركة هي

<sup>٤٣٨</sup> جزء من الموجودات ج: جزء للموجودات ظ: يعلم بموجودات ته ط: لعلمه بموجودات م

<sup>٤٣٩</sup> في حال ما سبباً: في حال سبب ظ

<sup>٤٤٠</sup> إلى كل: التي لكل ج

<sup>٤٤١</sup> سبباً ته ط: شيئاً ج م ظ

<sup>٤٤٢</sup> منها وغير المتنفسة ج ته ط: ناقص في م ظ

<sup>٤٤٣</sup> سلامته ته ط: للسلامة م ظ: خرم في ج

<sup>٤٤٤</sup> هو م ته: وهو ظ

<sup>٤٤٥</sup> جار: جارياً ظ

<sup>٤٤٦</sup> يحدث: ويحدث ظ

<sup>٤٤٧</sup> فعله الخاص: أفعاله الخاصة ج

<sup>٤٤٨</sup> البسيطة: ناقص في ظ

<sup>٤٤٩</sup> بالشوق ظ: بالشوق

<sup>٤٥٠</sup> عن م ته ط: عند ج ظ

part of the existents, because of a necessity which would entail this. (141) It must be, in one state, the cause of the destruction of the world, and, in another state, the cause of its generation, for the different relationships of the motion of the divine rotating bodies towards each one of the things which we have mentioned, since they are the cause of matter in its continuous change towards the opposite, should exempt us from the fear that it might perish and should dispel our anxiety that the world might perish at all or pass into another state than that in which it is. (142) We must not say either that the cause of the motion and mutability which are observed in this world, and of the share that the bodies which are in it have in one another, both the ensouled and the soulless, and of the kind of organization and order followed in it which ensures its preservation, are chance and spontaneity. (143) For none whatever of the things whose generation is determined and follows a certain order happens spontaneously, but it is the divine body, so long as it performs the act proper to it—I mean that it moves with the circular, eternal, simple and ordered motion, by desire for that thing which is the best of beings—which by its motion is the cause of change for the bodies subject to generation and destruction which follow an order according to the diversity of their states in relation to one another; it is this motion which preserves

التي تحفظ هذا<sup>٤٥١</sup> العالم الجديد الغض الشابّ وتمنحه الأزلية وعدم الهرم الزمان كله (١٤٤) فهكذا يجري الأمر في سياية الكل بحسب ما أخذناه عن الالهي أرسطوطالس على طريق المبدأ والاختصار فإن لكل واحد من الأشياء التي فيه حافظ لطبعه<sup>٤٥٢</sup> الخاصّ به وتتبع أفعاله التي تخصّه أزلية الكل وانتظامه (١٤٥) وهذا الرأي مع أنه فقط<sup>٤٥٣</sup> دون غيره<sup>٤٥٤</sup> ملائم للسياسة الالهية فهو المنظور إليه والمصدق به دون ما سواه من الآراء لمطابقته<sup>٤٥٥</sup> للأمر<sup>٤٥٦</sup> المشاهدة للعالم<sup>٤٥٧</sup> ومناسبتها لها (١٤٦) وقد ينبغي لجميع من يتفلسف أن يعمل بهذا الرأي ويختاره على غيره كيف كانت الأحوال إذ<sup>٤٥٨</sup> كانت أصوب الآراء التي قيلت في الله عز وجل والجسم الالهي وهو فقط من بين الآراء يحفظ اتصال ونظام الأشياء التي تحدث عنهما وبسببهما (١٤٧) فإن ظهر لاحد من الناس أن في شيء مما قلنا ما<sup>٤٥٩</sup> يحتاج إلى فحص أكثر والطف فليس ينبغي بسبب صعوبة سيرة لعلها أن تظهر فيه أن نتراخى فيما نحن عليه من العناية والاجتهاد في نظرة<sup>٤٦٠</sup> جميع هذا الرأي وأن ننفر منه<sup>٤٦١</sup> ونستوحش منه<sup>٤٦٢</sup> لكن قد ينبغي لنا مع تمسكنا بهذا الرأي تصويبنا<sup>٤٦٣</sup> له إذ كان أفضل الآراء<sup>٤٦٤</sup>

<sup>٤٥١</sup> هذا ج ظ: ناقص في م ته ط

<sup>٤٥٢</sup> لطبعه: لطبيعته ظ

<sup>٤٥٣</sup> فقط: ناقص في ظ

<sup>٤٥٤</sup> دون غيره: دون غيره من الآراء ج

<sup>٤٥٥</sup> لمطابقته ظ: لمطابقته ج: المطابقة م ته ط

<sup>٤٥٦</sup> للأمر: الأمور ظ

<sup>٤٥٧</sup> المشاهدة للعالم ظ: الموجودة في العالم

<sup>٤٥٨</sup> إذ ج م ته: أو ط ظ

<sup>٤٥٩</sup> مما قلنا ما صح: مما قيل ج: مما قيل مما ته: مما قلنا مما م

<sup>٤٦٠</sup> نظرة ج: نظرة

<sup>٤٦١</sup> ننفر منه: نبعد ج

<sup>٤٦٢</sup> منه ج: ناقص في م ته ط ظ

<sup>٤٦٣</sup> تصويبنا ج م ته: نصرتنا ط ظ

<sup>٤٦٤</sup> أفضل الآراء ج م ته: من جميع الآراء ط ظ

this new fresh and young world and grants it eternity and lack of decrepitude for all time. (144) Such is the government of the universe according to what we have borrowed from the divine Aristotle in outline and summary. Each one of the things which are in it preserves the nature proper to itself, and the acts which are proper to it follow the eternity and order of the universe. (145) This opinion, besides the fact that it is the only one, to the exclusion of others, suitable for the divine government, is that to which we must look and assent, to the exclusion of other opinions, because it corresponds to the things observed in the world and is appropriate to them. (146) Whoever lays claim to being a philosopher must work according to this opinion and prefer it to others, whatever the conditions, since it is the most correct of the opinions put forward concerning God Most High and the divine body. This alone among the opinions accounts for the continuity and order of things which issue from the two of them and because of the two of them. (147) If it should seem to somebody that some of the things which we have said require further and more precise inquiry, we should not, on account of a slight difficulty that might appear in it, give up the care and effort we have expended in examining all this doctrine, nor should we shrink from it and desert it, but we must hold firm to this opinion and uphold it, since it is, of all opinions held about God Most High, the best

التي أُعتقدت في الله عز وجل وأولاهها به ( ١٤٨ ) فالصواب <sup>٤٦٥</sup> أن نقصد  
 لحل <sup>٤٦٦</sup> جميع الآراء المضادة له وإصلاح الفساد المعترض <sup>٤٦٧</sup> فيها بحسب  
 الطاقة بعد أن يتقدم فنعتقد أنه قد <sup>٤٦٨</sup> يعسر أن نجد رأياً من الآراء النظرية  
 معرّى من الشكوك ( ١٤٩ ) فأما السبب في اختلاف الآراء وتضادها فليس  
 يخلو من هذه الجهات التي أصف إما <sup>٤٦٩</sup> أن يكون ذلك لحبة الرئاسة والغلبة  
 الصادتين <sup>٤٧٠</sup> عن الوقوف على الحق والانقياد له وإما أن يكون لصعوبة  
 الأشياء التي الكلام فيها ولطفها وغموضها وإما أن يكون لضعف طبيعتنا  
 نحن وعجزنا <sup>٤٧١</sup> عن إدراك الحقائق ( ١٥٠ ) إلا أنه ليس يجب لذلك أن  
 نرفض <sup>٤٧٢</sup> ما <sup>٤٧٣</sup> اعتقدنا وارتأيناه <sup>٤٧٤</sup> على طريق <sup>٤٧٥</sup> النظر والتفلسف بل إنما ٢٧٧  
 يجب في الجملة من القول أن نعتقد ما قد فحصنا عنه وسبرناه ووضح لنا  
 أمره وأن يتقدم قبل النظر في الشكوك <sup>٤٧٦</sup> التي يتشكك بها <sup>٤٧٧</sup> وحلها  
 النظر في الأمر نفسه <sup>٤٧٨</sup> والتماس الوقوف على حقيقته كما يفعل الإنسان  
 في الأمر الذي <sup>٤٧٩</sup> يخصّه ويعنيه ( ١٥١ ) ولا نقصد بسبب شكوك يسيرة  
 إلى إطالة القول والاسهاب فيه فيغمض لذلك المعنى ويخفى حسنه بل

<sup>٤٦٥</sup> به فالصواب ظ: بالصواب ته ط: في الصواب ج

<sup>٤٦٦</sup> لحل ج م ط: لحمل ته : كل ظ

<sup>٤٦٧</sup> المعترض: المتعرض ظ

<sup>٤٦٨</sup> قد: ناقص في ظ

<sup>٤٦٩</sup> إما: وإما ظ

<sup>٤٧٠</sup> الصادتين صح: الصادين ج ظ: العائق م ته ط: و...نع ظ<sup>٢</sup>

<sup>٤٧١</sup> عجزنا: عجزها ظ

<sup>٤٧٢</sup> نرفض ج ظ: ننقض م ته ط

<sup>٤٧٣</sup> ما: بعض ما م

<sup>٤٧٤</sup> ارتأيناه ظ: رأيناه

<sup>٤٧٥</sup> طريق: سبيل ته

<sup>٤٧٦</sup> في الشكوك ج ظ: في فتح الشكوك م ته ط

<sup>٤٧٧</sup> يتشكك بها ظ: يشك منها ج ته: شك منها ط: يشد (؟) منها م

<sup>٤٧٨</sup> نفسه ج ظ: بعينه م ته ط

<sup>٤٧٩</sup> الأمر الذي: الأمور التي ج

and the fittest to be regarded as sound; (148) and <we must> refute all opinions opposed to it and correct the errors previously encountered in them as far as we can; for we believe that it is difficult to find any theoretical opinion devoid of doubts. (149) As for the cause of the divergence and opposition of opinions, it is bound to be due to one of the following reasons: either to a desire to rule and dominate which diverts from discerning the truth and following it, or to the difficulty, subtlety and obscurity of the matters under discussion, or to the weakness of our nature and our incapacity to attain realities. (150) But we should not for all that reject what we have come to believe and think by way of reflection and philosophizing. Generally speaking, we must believe what we have investigated, scrutinized and clarified, and, before examining the doubts that have been raised about it and solving them, <we must> examine the matter itself and try to discern its truth, as does a man concerning what is proper to himself and regards himself; (151) and <we should> not, on account of some slight doubts, aim at expanding our discourse and becoming long-winded, which would make the meaning obscure and conceal its elegance; rather we should obtain, by means of the sciences which are not doubtful,

نصل بما لا تعترضه الشكوك من العلوم والمعارف<sup>٤٨٠</sup> للتصديق<sup>٤٨١</sup> بما سبق إلى الوهم أنه مشكوك فيه منها ولا نطرحه .

تمت مقالة الاسكندر في مبادئ الكل على رأي أرسطوطالس نقلها من السرياني إلى العربية ابراهيم بن عبد الله النصراني الكاتب و من اليوناني إلى السرياني أبي ( ! ) زيد حنين بن إسحاق ونقلته من خط توما في مستهل ذي القعدة من سنة ثمان وخمسين وخمسمائة ( ؟ ) هجرية والحمد لله رب العالمين وصلواته على سيدنا نبيه محمد وآله أجمعين ظ

تمت المقالة في المبادئ ( ! ) الكل استخراج حنين بن إسحاق على انقطاع اولها ج

تمت المقالة في مبادئ الكل للاسكندر ترجمة إسحاق بن حنين والحمد لله على ذلك كثيراً في خمس عشر من شهر رمضان المبارك في منزل مولانا ومقتدانا سلمه الله تعالى ته<sup>١</sup> تمت... كثيراً ته<sup>٢</sup> ط

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<sup>٤٨٠</sup> العلوم والمعارف: المعارف ظ

<sup>٤٨١</sup> للتصديق ج: التصديق

confirmation of what we previously imagined to be doubtful in these sciences, and not reject it.



## TEXT B

مقالة الإسكندر الأفروديسي في القول في مبادئ الكل على رأي  
أرسطوطاليس

( ١ ) قال لما تأملت الفحص الذي مخرجه مخرج التوبيخ الجميل وقعت من التوبيخ اللطيف الموقع مني على الفحص الكائن عما أكتب به إليك فيما التمسته مني وأنت بمعرفة ما سألت عنه من ذلك ليس بدون أحد من الناس لم أتكاسل عن إظهار اعتقادي فيها لك عند مسألتك إياي ذلك ومثلت القول في المبادئ الأول على رأي أرسطوطاليس بحسب طاقتي وإبداع ذلك كتابي ( ٢ ) وإذ كل ما ثبت به أمثال هذه الأشياء بحسب رأيي هو أن نبين أن المبادئ التي توطأ لها موافقة مطابقة للأمر الواضحة الظاهرة إذ كان ليس يمكن أن نستعمل فيها الأقاويل البرهانية من قبل أن البراهين إنما تكون من أشياء هي أشد تقدماً ومن أسباب وأن المبادئ الأول لا شيء يتقدمها ولا لها سبب ( ٣ ) والأشياء المطلوبة منها هي أن يعلم ما العلة الأولى وما فعلها وأي صنف من أصناف الحركة يتحرك عنها الجسم المستدير ولم صارت أصناف حركة الجسم المستدير كثيرة وهل تملك الأجسام بالجملة اختياراً ما أو معرفة بالأشياء التي تتكون في المواضع التي دون القمر بسبب حركتها أم لا فالأقاويل التي أظن أنها يمكن أن تقال في هذه الأشياء على رأي أرسطوطاليس هي هذه ( ٤ ) لما كان كل جسم طبيعي متحركاً من ذاته في مكان وذاك أن الذي له في نفسه مبدأ وسبب يحركه هو متحرك من ذاته وكان كل جسم طبيعي فله في نفسه مبدأ حركة وذلك المبدأ هو الطبيعة وكان كل ما يتحرك من ذاته بالطبع متنفساً كان أو غير متنفس فإنما يتحرك بالشوق إلى شيء إذ ليس يحدث شيء من الأشياء الطبيعية باطلاً وهذا هو المتحرك إلى غايته وكماله وكان الجسم المتحرك دوراً الذي قد بين أمره في الأقاويل التي قلت فيه أنه إلهي غير متكون ولا فاسد هو أيضاً جسم طبيعي والحركة التي يتحركها إنما يتحركها بطبعه فهذا الجسم أيضاً إنما يتحرك على هذه الجهة بالشوق إلى شيء

( ٥ ) فأما الأجسام الغير المتنفسة فإن تشوقها إنما هو إلى الشيء الذي إليه لها الحركة بالطبع وهذا المعنى نفسه إنما سمي تشويقاً لأنه ميل بالهيئة الطبيعية إلى شيء هو لها بمنزلة الأمر الخاص السبب لفعلها الطبيعي وذلك أنه على هذا الوجه يتحرك كل واحد من الأجسام إلى موضعه الطبيعي الذي إذا صار إليه كان كمال قوته التي تخصه ( ٦ ) وما كان من الأجسام الطبيعية أكمل من هذه ولها نفس يتحرك بها في المكان فإن الحركة التي لها بالشوق إنما تكون بتوقان ومن هذا التوقان ما يسمى شهوة ومنه ما يسمى غضباً ومنه مل يسمى إرادة وذلك أن الحركة في المكان للأشياء المتنفسة إنما تكون بواحد من هذه ( ٧ ) والجسم الإلهي متنفس بأسره إذ كان أفضل الأجسام كلها فلا جسم أفضل منه وكل جسم غير متنفس فقد يوجد جسم ما أفضل منه وهو الجسم المتنفس فليس الجسم غير المتنفس هو الأفضل ( ٨ ) فالأفضل إذاً هو المتنفس إذ كان كل جسم إما متنفساً وإما غير متنفس وقد تبين أن الجسم المتحرك على الاستدارة أفضل من جميع الأجسام من أنه غير<sup>١</sup> فاسد وأنه يتحرك الحركة المتقدمة للحركات ويتحركها دائماً على ترتيب وتشابه ( ٩ ) فليس حركته إذن بتوقان والشهوة والغضب انفعلا ن ولذلك صارت نفس الأجسام الإلهية غير متساوية في النوع لشيء من الأنفس الكائنة المائتة إذ كان قد يجب ضرورة في هذه أن تكون ما توجد له منها القوى التي هي أكمل أن توجد له قبلها القوى التي هي دونها في الكمال من قبل أنه ليس يمكن أن يوجد أو يسلم واحد منها خلواً من تلك ( ١٠ ) ولذلك ما كان منها فيه إرادة ففيه أيضاً غضب وشهوة فأما أنفس الأجسام الإلهية فليست مشاركة لواحدة من القوى الناقصة الكمال من قبل أن ذوات هذه الأنفس ليست محتاجة أصلاً في سلامتها وبقائها من المعونة إلى ما تحتاج إليه تلك القوى ( ١١ ) فبقي<sup>٢</sup> إذن أن يكون التوقان الذي في هذه إنما هو إرادة والإرادة الحقيقية هي التوقان إلى الخير أو ما يرى أنه خير فالإرادة على التحقيق إنما توجد في الأمور الإلهية وحدها وهي التوقان إلى الخير ( ١٢ ) وذلك أن الشيء المشتهى هو

<sup>١</sup> من أنه غير ر : أنه من غير ب : من غير أنه بر ته

<sup>٢</sup> فبقي : فينبغي ب

الخير الذي يرى أنه خير كما يقول أرسطاطاليس والمراد هو الخير الأول والتوقان إذن إلى الخير الحقيقي هو سبب حركة الجسم الإلهي الطبيعية (١٣) وأريد بالتوقان الذي يكون بالفعل وذلك أن الإرادة ليست لها بقوة انفعالية من قبل أنه ليس يوجد فيها أصلاً شيء حاله هذه الحال لكنها إنما يتشوق المعقول من حيث يعقله (١٤) وذلك أن اشتياق الأشياء التي لها شيء خاص بالشيء الأفضل إليه تابع لتصورها إياه بالعقل ولهذا الاشتياق بعينه صارت تتحرك بهذا الوجه من الحركة لا من حيث يتصوره بالعقل لأن التصور بالعقل ليس هو حركة أصلاً كما قد تبين (١٥) وقد يوجد هذا المعنى أبين مما هو في الأشياء التي تتصور بالعقل أموراً واحدة بعينها إذ ليس تتحرك الأجسام الإلهية من حيث تتصور بالعقل (١٦) فسبب حركتها ودورانها الطبيعي إنما هو اشتياقها وتحريكها في ذلك الجسم المصور بهذه الصورة من أجل الميل الطبيعي إلى الحركة المستديرة (١٧) وهي الحركة التي يتحركها اضطراراً بالنفس والعقل لأن هذه النفس من أول الأمر هي صورة لهذا الجسم لأنه ليس ينبغي أن ترى طبيعته شيء سوى نفسه (١٨) فإنه ولا في الحيوان أيضاً والأجسام المركبة يرى أن طبيعتها من حيث هو حيوان شيء آخر سوى نفسها إلا أن هذه الأشياء من طريق ما هي مركبة قد توجد لها حركة أخرى سوى الحركة التي بالنفس فهي الطبيعة التي توجد لها من حيث هي أجسام غير متنفسة لأن هذه الحركة وحدها توجد في الجسم المركب غير المتنفس بحسب الغالب عليه من الأجسام الأخر وذلك أنه قد كان في كل واحد منها قبل أن يختلط بعضها ببعض اختلاطاً يصير به الكل متنفساً حركة ما طبيعية (١٩) فأما الجسم الإلهي فإنه لما كان بسيطاً وذلك أنه ما كان يمكنه أن يكون شيء من الأشياء أرضياً وهو مركب وكان أبعادها تتحرك حركة واحدة بسيطة ثم لم توجد له طبيعة أخرى غير النفس ولا حركة طبيعية غير الحركة النفسانية ولكن قد يفضل الجسم الإلهي غيره من الأجسام البسيطة بأن طبيعته وإن كان جسمًا بسيطاً فهي نفس وطبيعة في غاية الكمال (٢٠) ولذلك صارت نفسه ليست صورة لجسم آلي لأن مثل هذا الجسم لم يكن محتاجاً إلى حركات مختلفة من الحركات التي تكون بالنفس من قبل أنه ليس

يحتاج في سلامته وبقائه إلى معونة من خارج ولما كان يتحرك حركة بسيطة بنفسه وطبيعته صار بهذا الفعل نفسه ينال كماله الخاص به ( ٢١ ) وذلك أن جميع الأمور التي قوامها بالطبيعة قد يوجد لها في نفس طبيعتها اشتياق إلى السبب الذي أول الأسباب وأفضل الموجودات إذ كان معنى الطبيعة إنما أن تكون<sup>٣</sup> الأجسام تفعل جميع ما تفعل بطبيعتها شوقاً منها إلى التشبه بذلك الذي هو أول شيء عنه كان لها الوجود ( ٢٢ ) وهذا التشبه ينال منه كل واحد منها بالكمال الطبيعي الذي له بمبلغ طاقته وإذا كان هذا هكذا فعلى هذه الجهة يوجد في الجسم الإلهي إذ هو أقدم الأجسام الطبيعية الاشتياق بالطبع إلى التشبه بالعلة الاولى ( ٢٣ ) وهذا هو الغرض في فعله الطبيعي أعني بفعله الحركة الدورية التي بتوسطها يتشبه الجسم الإلهي بالعلة الاولى بحسب ما يمكن جسم ما إذا تحرك حركة أزلية أن يتشبه بجوهر ليس بجسم ولا متحرك ويصير باستواء حركته الأزلية مقتدياً بأزلية العلة في أنها غير متحركة ( ٢٤ ) فالحرك إذن للجسم المستدير الحركة والذي إياه يشترك هو الخير على الحقيقة والوجود وإذا هو بهذه الحال فقد يفضل بالشرف على الجسم الغير الإلهي وذلك أن الشيء الذي عنه توجد لكل واحد من الأشياء الغاية والكمال الذي له في طبيعته هو أشرف منه ( ٢٥ ) فيجب أن يكون الجسم الإلهي إذ يشترك إلى شيء ما أفضل منه فمن أجله يتحرك وإليه يقصد بالحركة وإن كانت هذه حال المشوق فهو أفضل الأشياء كلها وليس يمكن أن يكون جسماً ( ٢٦ ) لأن الجسم الإلهي الذي عنه يتحرك أفضل من جميع الأجسام إذ هو بسيط غير منفعل ويتحرك حركته التي تخصه التي هي وحدها من بين الحركات يمكن فيها أن تكون متصلة أزلية وذلك أن الحركة الدورية وحدها يمكن فيها أن تكون بهذه الحال كما قد تبين في مواضع آخر ( ٢٧ ) وأيضاً فإنه إن كان جسماً فبين أنه طبيعي لأن كل جسم طبيعي أقدم وأشرف مما ليس كذلك فإذا كان طبيعياً فهو أيضاً يتحرك فإذا كان يتحرك فله شيء غيره وهو سبب لحركته الطبيعية من قبل أن كل حركة إنما تكون بالاشتياق إلى

<sup>٣</sup> إنما أن تكون ر: إنما تكون

شيء ( ٢٨ ) وهذا الشيء إن قال فيه قائل إنه جسم أيضاً خرج الأمر في الأجسام الإلهية إلى لا نهاية فبقي<sup>٤</sup> إذن أن يكون الشيء الذي يتشوقه الجسم الإلهي جوهرًا ما ليس بجسم ولا متحرك فإن بهذا الوجه ليس يحتاج إلى غيره إذ كان كل ما يتحرك حركة طبيعية فإنما يتحرك باشتياق إلى شيء ما ( ٢٩ ) والأمر في أن المحرك الأول غير متحرك قد بينه الإنسان بأن المحرك المتحرك مركب مما يحرك ويتحرك ومن الواجب متى كان أحد الشيئين البسيطين الذين عنهما يركب المركب بحال ما من الوجوه أن يكون الآخر أيضاً بتلك الحال ( ٣٠ ) أعني بذلك أنه كان أحدهما يفارق الآخر بالقول فقط فإن الآخر يفارقه أيضاً على ذلك المثال بالقول وإن لم يكن يفارقه بالقول فقط فإن الآخر يفارقه أيضاً على ذلك المثال بالقول وإن لم يكن يفارقه بالقول بل يمكن فيه أن يكون موجوداً وهو مفارق قوله فإن حال الآخر يكون بهذه الحال بعينها ( ٣١ ) والمحرك ليس أنما يفارق المتحرك بالقول فقط بل قد يفارقه في أشياء كثيرة بالوجود أيضاً وأول أنه قد توجد أشياء آخر تتحرك عن أشياء آخر أصلاً فقد توجد أيضاً أشياء أوائل تحرك شيئاً ما من غير أن تكون متحركة ( ٣٢ ) وذلك أنه إن قال قائل إن كل محرك فإنما يحرك بأن يتحرك وكذلك يجب أن يكون المحرك الأول يتحرك أيضاً قلنا له إنه ليس يجوز أن يكون الذي يحركه خارجاً عنه لأنه إن كان كذلك ارتفع عنه أن يكون المحرك الأول فيجب إذا كان محركاً أن يكون يتحرك من ذاته وهو يحرك أيضاً ذاته ( ٣٣ ) وقد يجب أن يبحث كيف يمكن أن يكون متحركاً من ذاته ومحركاً لنفسه فإن بهذا الوجه يتضح المطلوب فنقول إنه قد يلزم ضرورة من يقول إن شيئاً يتحرك من ذاته أن يقول إن ذلك الشيء إما أن يكون كله متحركاً عن كله حتى يكون كله محركاً متحركاً معاً من حيث يحرك من هناك يتحرك وإما أن يكون كله يتحرك من جزء من أجزائه وذلك الجزء المحرك داخل في جملة المتحرك أو يكون كله محركاً وجزء منه يتحرك عنه أو تكون

<sup>٤</sup> فبقي: فينبغي ب ته<sup>٣</sup> (؟)

أجزاء الكل إذا حرك بعضها بعضاً عادت وتحركت عن الأجزاء التي كانت متحركة عنها أو يكون جزء من الكل محركاً وجزء آخر متحركاً فإن هذا القسم أيضاً يقال فيه أنه متحرك من ذاته من قبل أنه قد يوجد فيه متحرك ومحرك ( ٣٤ ) فإذا كان مبلغ عدة الجهات التي بها يمكن أن يقال في الشيء أنه يتحرك من ذاته هذا المقدار فإن القول فيها بأن كل شيء يتحرك عن كله حتى أنه يحرك ويتحرك في حال واحدة بعينها ممتنع لأن الحركة التي بها يحرك المتحرك بها بعينها يصير متحركاً وهذا ممتنع وذلك أنه كيف يمكن أن يكون المحرك لشيء يتحرك معاً عن المتحرك تلك الحركة بعينها ( ٣٦ ) وكيف يمكن أن يكون المفيد للصحة من حيث يفيدها يستفيد تلك الصحة بعينها بذاته لا بالعرض ( ٣٧ ) أو كيف يكون المنمي ينمي بنفسه من غير أن تأتيه زيادة ما من خارج ( ٣٨ ) أو يكون المعلم يتعلم من المتعلم الأشياء التي يعلمه إياها بعينها وأن يصير المعلم والمتعلم واحد <sup>أ</sup> بالعدد والمتحرك والمحرك والمنمي والنامي وذلك أن المحرك إن كان إنما يحرك إذا كان موجوداً بالفعل والمتحرك يوجد بالقوة ويخرج إلى ما يكون بالفعل بتوسط الحركة فإنه يلزم من ذلك أن يكون شيئاً واحداً بعينه موجوداً بالقوة وبالفعل معاً ( ٣٩ ) وذلك أنه من حيث يحرك فله الفعل ومن حيث يتحرك فليس هو بعينه له بعد لأن الإنسان من حيث يعلم يعلم ومن حيث يجهل يتعلم ومن حيث يسخن الشيء ويحرك فهو مسخن حار وليس هو مسخنًا من حيث يتحرك ذو تسخن وإذا كانت هذه الأشياء ممتنعة فممتنع أن يكون كل شيء يحرك نفسه بالنحو الذي ذكرنا ( ٤٠ ) وهذا بعينه يلزم من قال في الشيء المتحرك من ذاته أن كله يتحرك من ذاته عن بعض أجزائه لأن ذلك الجزء إذا حرك الكل حرك أيضاً نفسه من قبل أنه موجود أيضاً في الكل الذي تحرك عنه ويصير أيضاً على هذه الجهة شيئاً واحداً بالعدد يحرك ويتحرك حركة واحدة بعينها معاً ( ٤١ ) ومن قال أيضاً أن جزءاً من المتحرك من ذاته يتحرك عن الكل لزمه أن يكون الجزء المتحرك يتحرك عن نفسه لأن الجزء المتحرك عن الكل موجود أيضاً في الكل المحرك ( ٤٢ ) وهذا بعينه يلزم من يقول أن أجزاء

الكل تحرك بعضها بعضاً وتتحرك بعضها عن بعض حركة واحدة بعينها إذ كان كثير فرق بين ما يحرك بتوسط ما وبين ما يحرك بغير متوسط وكان كل واحد من الأجزاء يحرك ذلك الجزء بعينه الذي عنه يتحرك حتى يكون كل واحد من هذه الأجزاء متحركاً عن نفسه بتوسط شيء ما ( ٤٣ ) فبقي إذن أن يكون شيء متحركاً من ذاته بهذا الوجه فقط يمكن أن يكون وهو أن يكون بعض أجزائه يحرك من غير أن يتحرك وبعضها يتحرك عن ذلك المحرك ( ٤٤ ) فيلزم إذن مما قيل في المتحرك من ذاته أن يكون المحرك الأول غير المتحرك إذ كان كل ما يتحرك فإنما يتحرك بجهة من الجهات التي وصفنا من قبل أن الحيوانات أيضاً التي قد يظن بها أنها تتحرك من ذاتها إنما تبدأ هذه الحركة لها من خارج إذ كانت هذه الحركة إنما توجد لها بالشوق إلى شيء أو القرب من شيء فليس يوجد شيء متحركاً من ذاته على الإطلاق إذ كان السبب الأول لهذه الحركة فليس هو فيها ( ٤٥ ) فإن كان المحرك للجسم الإلهي حاله هذه الحال فواجب ضرورة أن يكون أزلياً إذ كان أفضل الموجودات كلها وكان الخير الأول أفضل مما ليس كذلك وذلك أن ما ليس بموجود ليس يمكن أن يقال فيه أنه أفضل ( ٤٦ ) والأمر في أن محرك الجسم الإلهي أزلي يتبين مما وقع الإقرار به من أن الحركة المتصلة هي حركة واحدة بالحقيقة وخاصة إذا كانت مع اتصالها مستوية وقد تبين من أمر حركة الجسم الإلهي أنها هذه حالها أبداً وذلك هي واحدة بالحقيقة ( ٤٧ ) ولكن ما كان يمكن أن تكون حركة بهذه الحال واحدة لو لم يكن المحرك واحداً بالعدد بمنزلة المتحرك هذه الحركة وذلك أنه لو لم يكن المتحرك شيئاً بعينه واحداً بالعدد لم تكن الحركة تبقى واحدة متصلة لأنها كانت تشتتت عن انتقال الأشياء المتحركة ( ٤٨ ) وهذا بعينه يلزم إذا كان المتحرك واحداً والمحرك ليس بواحد وذلك أن الحركة حينئذ لا تكون بهذا الوجه واحدة متصلة بل كثيرة منفصلة متشتتة لأنها عند نقل المحرك تشتتت استواءها ( ٤٩ ) وأيضاً فمحرك الجسم الإلهي إذن واحد بالعدد وإذا كان واحداً بالعدد ويحرك حركة أزلية فواجب ضرورة أن يكون هو أيضاً أزلياً وإلا فقد يجوز أن تكون حركة المحرك التي يتحركها المتحرك

حركة أزلية فأما أي صنف من أصناف الحركة يتحرك عنه الجسم المستدير ولم صارت اختيارات أصناف حركت الجسم المستدير فهل لتلك الأجسام بالجملة اختيار ما أو معرفة بالأشياء التي تتكون في المواضع التي دون القمر بسبب حركتها أم لا فالأقاويل التي يمكن أن تقال في هذه الأشياء كثيرة هذا آخر ما وجد من هذه المقالة من نقل سعيد بن يعقوب الدمشقي والحمد لله رب العالمين وصلى الله على نبينا محمد وآله أجمعين°

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° والحمد لله رب العالمين برته: غفر له والحمد لله رب العالمين ب ر: رحمه الله والله المعين ع



بسم [ ] قال [ ] والأجسام البسيطة النار و [ ] مثل الحيوان والنبات واما [ ] ل الطبيعة وذلك أن [ ] كان إلى الهبوط و ٠٠٠ لهما [ ] وما كان منها لا نفس له فهو [ ] الأربعة مصعداً أو هابطاً ومتوسطاً بين الحركتين فقد وجب أن الأجسام كلها متحركة من ذاتها وقد يمكن أن تتحرك بغيرها كما يتحرك الحجر إلى فوق عن الرامي به مصعداً فقد بان أن الأجسام تتحرك على ضربين إما بذاتها وإما من غيرها فنريد أن نوضح على أي الجهات فنقول أن الشيء يتحرك بذاتها وهل يمكن أن يكون شيء واحد محركاً متحركاً فنقول إنه لا يخلو الشيء المتحرك بذاته من أن يتحرك على إحدى خمس جهات إما أن يكون محركاً كله فيكون كله محركاً متحركاً وبما هو محرك هو متحرك أو يكون بجزء منه يحرك كله والجزء المحرك محصور في الكل المتحرك أو يكون كله محركاً للجزء منه فالجزء المتحرك محصوراً في الكل المحرك أو تكون الأجزاء يحرك بعضها بعضاً ويتحرك بعضها من بعض فيكون كل واحد من الأجزاء محركاً الآخر ومتحرك منه أو يكون بعضها متحركاً وبعضها محركاً فإذا قد لخصنا جميع الجهات اللاتي يمكن أن يتوهمها متوهم على الشيء المتحرك بذاته فنريد أن ننظر على أي جهة من الجهات الخمس يمكن أن يكون الشيء متحركاً بذاته فنقول إنه لا يمكن أن يكون كل شيء متحركاً كله والجهة التي هو محرك يكون متحركاً لأنه لا يمكن أن يكون الشيء يحرك ويتحرك بجهة واحدة وذلك أن المعلم لا يمكنه أن يكون معلماً [ ] له من المتعلم منه ولا الغاذي أن يتغذي من المغتذي منه بغدائه وذلك أن المحرك [ ] من أن يكون بالفعل والمتحرك إنما يكون بالقوة ليظهر ما فيه من القوة إلى [ ] ما يعلم بالفعل والمتعلم بالجهل ما يعلم من قبل [ ] لعلم واحد بالعدد لأنه لا يمكن أن يكون عالماً [ ] متحرك بحركة واحدة فإذا بطل أن يكون كل شيء [ ] الجزء لأن الجزء في الكل محصور [ ] أيضاً أن يكون

...and the simple bodies are fire and...like animals and plants, but...nature, for...moving downwards...and among them that which has no soul...the four moving upwards or downwards and intermediate between the two motions. All bodies must be moved by themselves, but they may be moved by another, like the stone which is moved upwards by him who throws it upwards. It is clear that bodies are moved in two ways, either by themselves or by another. We want to explain in what way; therefore we say that the thing is moved by itself; is it possible that one thing should be mover and moved? We say that the thing moved by itself must be moved in one of five ways: (a) the whole imparts motion so that the whole imparts motion and is moved, and insofar as it imparts motion, it is moved; or (b) a part of it moves the whole and the moving part is comprised in the whole which is in motion; or (c) the whole imparts motion to part of itself and the moving part is comprised in the whole which imparts motion; or (d) the parts impart motion to one another and are moved by one another so that each one of the parts imparts motion to the other and is moved by it; or (e) part of it is moved and part of it is moving. Having summed up all the ways in which it is possible to conceive of the thing moved by itself, we want to examine in which one of the five ways a thing may be moved by itself; we say that it is not possible that every thing should be moved in its entirety and moved in the <same> way in which it imparts motion, for it is not possible that a thing should impart motion and be moved in the same way. For it is not possible that the teacher... from him who is learning from him, nor that he who feeds should be fed by him who receives his food from him; for the mover ... be in actuality and the object moved only in potentiality so that its potentiality should pass from potentiality ...what he knows in actuality and he who learns by ignoring what he knows before...knowledge the same in number, because it is not possible that he should know...moved of the same motion, and since it is impossible that every thing... the part, because the part is comprised in the whole... also that each one of the

كل جزء من أجزاء الكل] [الجهات الأربع فقد صح أن يكون حركة الشيء بذاته على الجهة] [أعني أن يكون بعضه محركاً لا متحركاً وبعضه متحركاً لا محركاً فإن هذا هكذا قلنا<sup>٦</sup> أن نقول إن من الأشياء ما يتحرك بحركة غيره كما يتحرك السفينة بالمجذاف ومنها ما يحركها محرك لا يتحرك كالفلك المتحرك عن العلة الاولى فإن قال قائل إن محرك الفلك متحرك فلا بد من أن يكون له محرك ومحركه لا يخلو من أن يكون متحركاً أو لا متحركاً فإن كان لا يتحرك فقد أوجب ما أنكر وإن كان يتحرك ترقى ذلك إلى ما لا نهاية له فقد وجب أن يكون للفلك محرك لا يتحرك فإن كان محرك الفلك غير متحرك وكان كل ذي جسم يتحرك كما ذكرنا آنفاً فمحرك الفلك لا جسم ونقول أيضاً إن كان لا يتحرك فهو لا محالة أزلي وذلك لثلا يكون متحركاً لأن الكون حركة فقد صح أن محرك الفلك جوهر لا جسم فإنه أزلي غير متحرك فنقول أيضاً إن كان محرك الفلك لا يتحرك فإنه بسيط وذلك لأن المركب متحرك لأن التركيب لا يكون إلا بحركة فمحرك الفلك بسيط لأنه غير متحرك فإن كان بسيطاً فهو واحد فإن ادعى مدع أن علل حركة الفلك كثيرة لا واحدة واحتج في ذلك باختلاف حركات الأفلاك قلنا إنه إن كان علل الفلك كثيرة فهي لا محالة مختلفة والمختلفة إما أن يكون اختلافها بالأشخاص كما تخالف سقراطيس أفلاطون وإما أن تختلف بزيادة فصول كالإنسان للفرس بزيادة النطق وإما أن تختلف بالشرف والدناءة والزيادة والنقصان كما يخالف المولي العبد والحر البارد ولا يمكن أن تكون هي علل تخالف بعضها بعضاً بالأشخاص فإن الأشياء التي تختلف بالشخص وتتفق بالنوع إنما يكون اختلافها من قبل اختلاف العنصر والعلة الاولى لا عنصر لها لأنها لا جسم وغير مركبة كما بينا آنفاً ولا يمكن أن نقول إن اختلاف حركة الفلك بزيادة فصول فيها لأن إن زعمنا لها أوجبناه لها بهذا القول أنها مركبة وهذا محال ولا يمكن أيضاً أن نقول إن اختلاف حركة الفلك

<sup>٦</sup> فلنا صح: قلنا

parts of the whole...the four ways. It is true then that the motion of the thing by itself in the way.... I mean that a part of it should impart motion and be unmoved and another part moved without imparting motion. If <this is> so, we must say that there are things which are moved by the motion of something else like the boat by the oar, and others which are moved by an unmoved mover like the sphere moved by the First Cause. If somebody said that the mover of the sphere is moved, it would then have a mover and its mover would then have to be either moved or unmoved. If it is unmoved, then <that man> has postulated what he had denied, and if it is moved, this will go on *ad infinitum*. The sphere, then, must have an unmoved mover, and if the mover of the sphere is unmoved and every corporeal thing is moved as we said before, then the mover of the sphere is not a body. We also say: if the mover of the sphere is unmoved, it must be eternal in order to be unmoved, because generation is a motion. It is true, then, that the mover of the sphere is an incorporeal substance and that it is eternal and unmoved. We also say: if the mover of the sphere is unmoved, it is simple; for the compound is moved because composition occurs only through motion. The mover of the sphere is simple because it is unmoved, and if it is simple, it is one. If somebody claimed that the causes of the sphere's motion are many, not one, and used as argument the differences of the spheres' motions, we would answer that, if the causes of the sphere are many, they must then necessarily be different, and what is different is either different as individual, as Socrates is different from Plato, or through the addition of a specific difference, as man differs from horse through the addition of reason, or it is different in nobleness and baseness, increase and decrease, as the master is different from the slave and hot from cold. But these cannot be different from one another as individuals, for things which are different as individuals but agree in species only differ through matter. The First Cause has no matter because it is incorporeal and not composite as we have explained above. We cannot say that the diversity of the motion of the sphere is due to the addition of specific differences to it, for if we claimed <this> for it, we should imply thereby that it is composite and this is impossible. It is also impossible to say that the diversity of the motion of the sphere

بالشرف والدانة والزيادة والنقصان وهذا يوجب لها مخالطة الأضداد لأن  
الحرار إنما يخالف الفاتر بمخالطة البرد فإن أوجبنا أن في علل الفلك أضداد  
لزمنا أن تكون مركبة لا بد لها من مركب ويكون مركبها غيرها كما  
خبرنا آنفاً فقد بطل أن تكون علل حركات الفلك كثيرة وصح أنها علة  
واحدة بسيطة أزلية لا جسمانية فإن كان ذلك كذلك قلنا إن الفلك دائم  
الحركة لم يزل متحركاً وذلك أنه لا يمكن أن تكون الحركة محدثة وحجتنا  
في ذلك لا يخلو حدوث الحركة من أن يكون إما لحدوث اتصال فما  
بينهما لم يكن وكل صفة لا تكون إلا بحركة قبل حدوث حركة كانت  
حركته فهذا متناقض لأنه لو كانت الحركة محدثة فالحدوث لا يكون إلا  
بحركة مثل حدوث الحركة فقد وجب أن الحركة أزلية ونقول أيضاً أن  
الزمان غير محدث وذلك أنه إن قال قائل إنه كان وقت ما ولم يكن زمان  
فإنما إنه قال إنه كان زمان ولم يكن زمان وهذا أبين التناقض فإن كان الزمان  
غير محدث والزمان قدر حركة الفلك فحركته غير محدث فنقول أيضاً  
في الزمان إنه كل زمان يقع عليه آن وقبل كل آن زمان متقدم لأن الآن  
متوسط بين الزمان الماضي والمستأنف فا] كل وقت من زمان يقع عليه  
الآن وقبل كل آن زمان متقدم فالزمان غير محدث فإذا قد أوضحنا العلة  
الاولى وأن الفلك عنها يتحرك بقي على أي الجهات يتحرك الفلك عنها  
يصح لنا ذلك إذا نحن وصفنا كل الجهات التي عليها يتحرك المتحرك  
الفلكي عن المحرك نظرنا على أي الجهات يمكن أن يتحرك الفلك عن العلة  
الاولى فنقول إن كل ما يتحرك إما أن يتحرك بحركة محركة وإما أن يتحرك  
من غير أن يتحرك محركة وقد بينا آنفاً أن محرك الفلك لا متحرك فالفلك  
يتحرك من غير أن يتحرك محركة ونقول أيضاً إن كل ما يتحرك لا بحركة  
محركة بل بأن ابتدأ حركته فيه فلا يخلو أن يكون إما ذا نفس وإما لا نفس  
له فإن كان لا نفس له فحركته بالميل الطبيعي كالأرض المتحركة بالثقل إلى  
الهبوط والنار المتحركة بالخفة إلى الصعود فإن كل شيء ذا نفس فحركته  
لامحالة تشوق ولا يمكن أن نقول حركة الفلك بالميل الطبيعي لأننا قد  
أوجبنا أن محرك الفلك جوهر وإن لم تكن حركته بالميل الطبيعي فهي لا

is according to nobleness and baseness, increase and decrease, for this implies the mixture of opposites. For hot is opposed to warm through admixture of cold. If we implied that there are opposites in the causes of the sphere, it would follow that they are composite, they would be associated with another element and this element would be other than they, as we explained above. The causes of the sphere's motions cannot therefore be many and it is true to say that there is one cause, simple, eternal and incorporeal. If this is so, we say that the sphere is moved eternally and has always been moved. For motion cannot have a beginning in time. Our argument for that: the beginning of motion must be due either to the occurrence of a connection while that which is between the two <i.e. the mover and the object moved?> did not exist; every attribute only occurs through a motion before the beginning of motion which was its motion; but this is contradictory, for if motion had a beginning, the beginning would only take place through the occurrence of a motion; therefore motion is eternal.<sup>1</sup> We also say that time has no beginning in time; for if someone should say that there was an instant when there was no time, he merely says that there was time when there was no time, which is a blatant contradiction. If time has no beginning in time and time is the measure of the sphere's motion, <the latter's> motion has no beginning in time. Concerning time, we also say that every time is an instant, and before every instant there is anterior time, because the instant is intermediate between past time and future... every moment of time is an instant, and before every instant there is anterior time. Therefore time has no beginning in time. Having explained <the nature> of the First Cause and that the sphere is moved by it, it remains <to say> in what way the sphere is moved by it. We are in a position to do so since we have explained all the ways in which the spherical object moved may be moved by the mover. We have examined in what ways it is possible for the sphere to be moved by the First Cause and we say that everything which is moved is either moved by the motion of its mover or is moved without its mover's being moved. We have explained before that the sphere's mover is unmoved, so that the sphere is moved without its mover's being moved. We also say that everything that is moved not by its mover's motion, but by initiating motion must be either ensouled or soulless; if it is soulless, its motion occurs through natural inclination, like earth which is moved downwards by heaviness or fire which is moved upwards by lightness. The motion of every-

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<sup>1</sup> This sentence is garbled; there is no response to the *either* clause. I translate literally. The general meaning can be made out from *Mabadi*' 64-66.

محالة بالشوق والشوق إلى ثلاث جهات منه شوق إلى الانتقام وهو الغضب ومنه شوق إلى ما به قوام الحياة وهو الغذاء ومنه شوق إلى فضل الأشياء وهو الرأي الحمود المصيب ويقول إن أفضل الأشياء العلة الاولى فشوق الفلك لا محالة إليها شوق رأي مصيب وليس فيه شهوة ولا غضب لأنه جوهر بسيط فإن كان شوقه فهو لا محالة بعقل لأن الرأي الحمود لا يكون إلا عن عاقل فحركة الفلك لا محالة بالشوق منه إلى التشبه بالعلة الاولى لأن العلة الاولى سرمدية صار الفلك سرمدى الحركة لتشبهه بها فالعلة الاولى لا متحركة فقد كان ينبغي أن يكون الفلك غير متحرك قلنا إن الجسم كما خبرنا أنفًا لا بد من أن يكون متحركًا فإن كان كذلك لا يمكن أن يكون الفلك غير متحرك فصار تشبهه بالعلة الاولى بدوام حركته وسرمديتها فإذا بينا ما علة حركة الفلك فنحن نوضح لما اختلفت حركة الأفلاك فنقول إن حركة الأفلاك اختلفت لقوام الأجسام التي تكون وتفسد ولم يكن لها بد من حركة مختلفة بها تكون مرة وتفسد أخرى وتستحيل وتنتقل بضروب مختلفة فإن قال قائل ما يدريك<sup>٧</sup> في أن تكون الأجسام التي تحت العنصر كائنة فاسدة مستحيلة من حال إلى حال قلنا إنها لو لم يكن كذلك [ ] وذلك أن بعض العنصر الذي منه كونها لم يكن أن يبقى على جنس واحد ولا أن يحفظه نوع واحد وإن فعل [١] للضعف طبعه فذلك احتاج استحالة محيل آخر له من الضد إلى الضد وتنتقل أنواعها وبكل من حفظها لنوع واحد فاستحالة الأجسام بعضها إلى بعض يجدها فيكون نوع كل واحد منها فيه أبد (=أبدًا؟) جديدًا فلذلك يبقى العالم جديدًا لا يهرم فإن قال قائل إنه يفسد إذا شاء الخالق قلنا إن الخالق لا يليق به مشيئة المحال لأنه حكيم وما لم يكن محدثًا فمحال أن يلزمه الفساد ولذلك قلنا إن العالم لا يفسد وبالله الحول والقوة تمت الرسالة لاسكندر في حركة الكل ولله المن (=الله المستعان) .

<sup>٧</sup> يدريك صح: ادرك

thing which is ensouled is necessarily desire. We cannot say that the sphere's motion occurs through natural inclination as we have demonstrated that the sphere's mover is a substance. If its motion does not occur through natural inclination it must occur through desire, and desire <is divided> into three kinds: the desire for revenge, i.e. passion, the desire for what sustains life, i.e. food, and the desire for the best of things, i.e. praiseworthy and right opinion. We say that the best of things is the First Cause, and the desire of the sphere is necessarily for it; it is the desire for right opinion in which there is no appetite and no passion because it is a simple substance, and if it is its desire <which is the cause of its motion>, it must occur through intellect because right opinion can only proceed from a rational being. Therefore the sphere's motion must occur through its desire to become similar to the First Cause. Because the First Cause is eternal the sphere has acquired an eternal motion through its becoming similar to it. The First Cause is unmoved, so that the sphere will be unmoved. We say that the body, as we explained before, must be moved, and if so the sphere cannot be unmoved; its assimilation to the First Cause occurs through the continuity and eternity of its motion. Having explained what is the cause of the sphere's motion, we will now elucidate why the motions of the spheres are diverse. We say that the spheres' motions are diverse in order to sustain the bodies that come into being and pass away. They must have different motions through which they come to be at some times and pass away at others, change and move in different ways. If somebody said: how do you know (?) that the bodies that are in matter come to be and pass away and change from one state into another, we would answer that if it were not so...for part of the matter from which it came to be could not stay in the same genus, nor could the same species preserve it, and if it did its nature would weaken (?). It needs the change of a cause of change (?) from one opposite into another and its species move... all who keep them in one species (?). The change of bodies into one another renews them, so that the species of each one of them in it is always new (?). This is why the world remains new and does not grow old. If somebody said that it will perish when the Creator wills it, we would reply that it is not worthy of the Creator to will what is impossible because He is wise, and it is impossible that what has no beginning in time should be affected by destruction. Therefore we say that the world will not perish. In God is strength and power. The epistle of Alexander on the motion of the universe is finished. God is our succour.



## COMMENTARY

(1) This dedicatory sentence, with its convoluted style, is not without some analogies to that of the *de Fato* and clearly posed problems to the translators. Furlani noted that the Syriac text is certainly corrupt (“Il Trattato” p. 2, n. 3). The phrase “according to Aristotle’s opinion” is placed differently in Z and in the other mss. (see *app. crit.*), a fact which would tend to confirm that it is an addition made by the translators, here as elsewhere (see Zimmermann, “Proclus Arabus” 23). On the other hand, it is already found in Sergius’ Syriac text; one may also compare the beginning of the *de Fato* (1,17; 2,9): τὴν δόξαν τὴν Α.; note also the allusion to the difficulty of the subject (*su’ūba* = χαλεπωτάτη).

**starting point:** one might be tempted to read *mukhrīj* (author) instead of Badawī’s *makhrāj*. In that case the sense would be: “The investigation whose author criticized the matters...” Alex. seems to be referring to a previous epistle of his and to the criticisms levelled at it by his correspondent or by an unknown person.

**fair criticism:** *al-tawbikh al-jamūl*, “gentle” or “fair” criticism, perhaps “apposite”; cf. the title of al-Ghazālī’s epistle *al-Radd al-jamūl li-ilāhiyyat ‘Īsā*. *Tawbikh* is used in the Arabic translation of the eighth book of the *Topics* ascribed to Ibrāhīm b. ‘Abdallāh (738,11 Badawī) to render ἐλέγχεσθαι; hence perhaps “refutation”; at 739,13, it is the equivalent of ἐπιτιμᾶι and at 740,18 of ἐπιτίμησις.

**I did not defer:** some mss. readings are ambiguous in A due to the lack of diacritical points; *atathāqal* is somewhat supported by B’s text *atakāsal*, “to show laziness”, “to be reluctant”.

(2) The dialectical method, taking as a starting-point the things that are better-known to us, is contrasted with apodictic demonstration (*burhān*); it is based on such Aristotelian texts as *Phys.*, I 1, 184a 16-21. Alexander’s own formulation in *Quaest.* I 1, p. 4, 4-7 is very close to our passage: οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε τῆς πρώτης ἀρχῆς ἀποδείξιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑστέρων τε καὶ φανερῶν ἀρξαμένους κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ταῦτα συμφωνίαν (*tuwāfiq*) ἀναλύσει χρωμένους συστήσαι τὴν ἐκείνου φύσιν. Cf. also on apodictic demonstration *Quaest.* IV 25, p. 151, 5; in *Met.*, 237,12-3; 266,20.

**the principles that lead up to them:** “principles” here obviously cannot mean first principles, since the whole point of the argument is that the latter do not have principles, but something like “starting-points”.

(3) This summary corresponds only approximately to the actual contents of

the treatise: (a)=62-75; (b)=32-44; (c)=4-23; (d)=86-96; (e)=114;120, although the different themes overlap to a great extent. It should be noted that the developments on the intellect and intellection are not mentioned here, which strengthens the suspicion that they were not part of Alexander's original treatise. See introduction above p. 17. The same summary is found in Sergius.

**First Cause:** this is a predominantly Neoplatonic phrase that is not very common in Greek, at least in this sense (cf. Nock, *Sallustius Concerning the Gods and the Universe*, p. xlii); it has often crept into Arabic translations of Aristotelian texts and is widely used in Arabic philosophy (cf. Kraemer, *Philosophy in the Renaissance of Islam* 291, n. 52). In Greek, however, the first occurrences of this expression, as far as I know, are found in a text belonging to the Aristotelian tradition, the *de Mundo* (398b 36; 399a 26) and in Alex. himself (*Quaest.* I 1, p. 2, 19). For the relationship between the *de Mundo* and Alexander, see above p. 2; 18-9.

**these bodies:** the plural refers to the bodies of the "planets" (including the sun and the moon). Alexander uses the singular sometimes for the first body (the sphere of the fixed stars), and sometimes as a kind of collective for "the heavens", so that the contradiction is more apparent than real.

**by choice or knowledge:** with the majority of mss. (and in accordance with B and Sergius), I excide *aw* before *innamā* (see *app. crit.* n. 14): the question is whether earthly things which are caused by the heavenly motions arise on account of or without choice and knowledge on the part of the heavenly bodies or of the First Mover; that sublunar beings are caused by the heavenly motions could hardly be questioned by Alexander. In other words, what is raised here is the problem of providence. Cf. *Ināya* 67, 1-3: *wa-qad yatba'u al-'ilma bi-'l-khayrāt allatī takūnu min ajli al-ālīhati an yakūna aydan dhālika sādīran 'an ikhtiyārī-hā*; *Tadbīr* 67, 4 has *al-ajrām al-uwal al-sharīfa* instead of *al-ālīha*; cf. also *Ināya* 61, 14-18: the providence of the divine body is for something other than itself, i.e. for the body which is *tahta falak al-qamar*; 5, 4: *ikhtiyār al-ālīha*; instead of *ma'rifa*, *Ināya* has *'ilm* at 7, 20; 67, 9 (with *irāda*); 59, 2-3.

(4) For the theory of motion set forth in this and the following paragraphs, see the introduction above pp. 6-9. The existence of a body moved in a circle by nature is established at the beginning of Aristotle's *de Caelo* (I 1-3).

**principle of motion:** this is the Aristotelian definition (see *Phys.* II 1, 192b 21-23 etc); cf. Alex. *de Fato* 7, 9-11: τὰ μὲν φύσει γινόμενα ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχει τὴν ἀρχὴν τε καὶ αἰτίαν τῆς τοιαύτης γενέσεως (τοιοῦτον γὰρ ἡ φύσις), where γενέσεως=κινήσεως l. 15.

**in vain:** nature does nothing in vain, cf. Ar., *de Caelo* I 4, 271a 33 etc.

**ungenerated and imperishable:** ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀφθαρτον (Ar., *de Caelo* I 3, 270a 13-14).

(5) The theory of the four elements and of their natural motions and places

(fire and air move upwards; water and earth move downwards) is based on such Aristotelian texts as *de Caelo* III 2 and IV; *Phys.* VIII 4 etc. For Alex., cf. *Quaest.* II 3, p. 48, 11-12: ἡ ἐπὶ τοὺς οἰκείους αὐτοῖς (scil. the four elements) τόπους κίνησις γίνεται, καθ' ἣν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν τῆς ἰδίας τυγχάνει τελειότητος (*kamāla-hū alladhī yakhuṣṣu-hū*); II 18, p. 62, 20-21: καὶ ἔστιν ἡ κίνησις αὐτοῖς συνεργοῦσα πρὸς τῷ ἐν τῷ οἰκείῳ γενέσθαι τόπῳ, ἐν ᾧ γενόμενα ἡρεμεῖ (= *istaqarra*) τε κατὰ τόπον καὶ ἔστι καθό ἔστι γινόμενα ἐν (following Sharples' emendation in his transl. p.100) τελειότητι; cf. also *de Anima* 6, 30-7, 2.

**impulse:** *ishtiyāq* = ὄρμη. Cf. *Quaest.*, I 1, p. 3, 14-16: πᾶν τὸ κινούμενον ὑπὸ τινος κινεῖται, καὶ τοῦτο ὃν καὶ τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν κινούμενον πᾶν ὑπὸ τινος, εἴ γε τὸ μὲν κατὰ ψυχὴν κινούμενον καθ' ὄρμην κινεῖται, ἡ δὲ ὄρμη κατ' ἔφεσιν τινος; *ibid.* I 25, p. 40, 10-11. There is however a difference between this conception and that expressed in the Arabic text which considers *ishtiyāq* to be present both in animate and inanimate bodies (cf. below), whereas the Greek *Quaestio* restricts its application to animate bodies. But Aristotle assigns ὄρμη to inanimate bodies (*Phys.* II 1, 192b 8-22). On all this, see introduction above pp. 6-7.

**inclination:** *mayl* = ὁσπή, cf. introduction above p. 6 and n. 11. The term ὁσπή is applied tentatively by Aristotle to the motion of light and heavy bodies in *de Caelo* IV 1, 307b 33.

(6) **more perfect:** cf. *Quaest.*, I 1, p. 3, 11-12: ἄμεινον γὰρ σῶμα τὸ ἔμψυχον τοῦ ἀψύχου; *Ināya* 77, 6: *al-mutanaffis afdal min ghayr al-mutanaffis*. See also Ibn Rushd, *Talkhīs* 127, 13-4.

**desire:** *shahwa* (A), *tawaqān* (B), corresponding to Greek ὄρεξις; cf. introduction, above p. 7.

**will:** the reading *irāda* corresponds more closely to the Greek βούλησις used in parallel texts than the variant *ikhtiyār* (= προαίρεσις) and would therefore seem to be preferable. The two terms however are not always clearly distinguished either in Greek or in Arabic and occur together in Alexander's *de Anima* 173, 13-14 and *Ināya* 59, 3.

(7) **ensouled:** ἔμψυχον, cf. Arist., *de Caelo* II 2, 285a 29; Alex., *Quaest.* I 1, 3, 11-3; cf. introduction above p.

**the best of bodies:** cf. *Quaest.* I 1, p. 3, 9; 12: ἀριστον δὲ τῶν σωμάτων τοῦτο.

(8) For Aristotle, circular motion is the primary kind of motion: *Phys.* VIII 9, 265a 13-24; *Met.* Λ 7, 1072b 8-9; Alexander (*Quaest.* I 1, p. 3, 8-9) insists on its being eternal and continuous: αἰδῖος καὶ συνεχὴς μόνη τῶν κινήσεων ἡ κυκλοφορία; cf. also *Quaest.* I 25, p. 40, 13 (αἰδῖος καὶ συνεχὴς καὶ

ὁμαλή); II 18, p. 62, 29; *Ināya* 73, 2: *al-ḥaraka al-sarmadiyya wa-'l-muttasila wa-'l-mutasāwiya*.

**regularly:** *'alā nizām musāwīn* is closer in meaning to ὁμαλή, but could also correspond to συνεχής.

(9) On this hierarchy of the soul's faculties, cf. Alex., *de Anima* 74, 2-8: ἐπιθυμία is present in all animals, θυμός in some of them, and βούλησις in man only.

**cannot be affected:** cf. Simplicius, *in Phys.* 1218, 20-22 (ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος φησὶν) τὸ ... κυκλοφορητικὸν ἀπαθές ἐστι, and below 26.

**in the case of the latter:** *fī hādhihī* can refer indifferently to the souls of the divine bodies or to material things.

**be preserved:** cf. (10) n. on **preservation**.

(10) **will:** *ikhtiyār*, here used as equivalent to *irāda*; cf. commentary *ad* (6) above, and introduction p. 7; 36.

**preservation:** *salāma*= σωτηρία; while Aristotle ascribes to sense-perception the function of ensuring the animal's safety, see *Parv. Nat.* 436b 18-22: αἱ δὲ διὰ τῶν ἔξωθεν αἰσθήσεις ... σωτηρίας ἔνεκεν ὑπάρχουσιν, ὅπως διώκουσί τε ... τὴν τροφήν ... καὶ τὰ φθαρτικὰ φεύγωσι, Alexander ascribes it to the nutritive (*de Anima* 35, 14) or vegetative faculties (*ibid.* 75, 31). Ibn Rushd follows Aristotle rather than Alexander in this, cf. *Talkhīs* 136,10-11; *Tahāfut* 495,7-9.

(11)-(12) Love of the good is not *in* God, but in the divine body and directed towards God. B probably has the more accurate rendering (Gr. ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς rather than ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς or ἐν τῷ θεῷ).

**that which is thought to be good:** Ar., *de Anima* III 10, 433a 27-28 κινεῖ μὲν τὸ ὀρεκτόν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ'ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν; *Eth. Nic.* III, 1113b 15-6 (with βουλευτόν). In the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle is careful to distinguish the irrational appetite for what appears to be good from the rational desire of the true good (Λ 7, 1072a 27-28): ἐπιθυμητὸν γὰρ τὸ φαινόμενον καλόν, βουλευτὸν δὲ πρῶτον τὸ ὄν καλόν. What is surprising here is the term *mutashawwaq*, from the same root as *shawq* and corresponding therefore to ἐπιθυμία, the lowest of the three kinds of "longing". B is consistent with its terminology and has *mushtahā*, from *shahwa* = ὀρεξις. But Alexander has just said (9-10) that the heavenly body does *not* possess the two lower kinds of longing. This is by no means an exceptional instance of the same word being used in the same passage in a technical and in a non-technical sense.

(13) **passive faculties:** i.e. passion and appetite, cf. above (9).

**perceive by the intellect:** *mutaṣawwar bi-'l-'aql* is a phrase commonly

used in our text and in some other translations as equivalent to νοεῖν; it was replaced later by *‘aqala* or *ta ‘aqqala*. The root *‘-q-l* at first did not have the sense of “mind”, “intellect” or “to think” at all, and acquired it only gradually (Cf. Endress, *Proclus Arabus* 138-9). It is however strange that the expressions *taṣawwara bi-‘l-‘aql* and *ta ‘aqqala* should be used concurrently in the same text; it is probably a matter of a revision’s not being carried through; see also introduction above p. 17.

**represented:** *mutawahham*; although sometimes used to render φαντασία (Walzer, *al-Fārābī* 384-5), this term should certainly be taken in the present passage together with *mutasawwar bi-‘l-‘aql* as a “double translation” (νόησις is rendered by *wahm* in the transl. of the *Physics* IV 12, 222a 16=462, 12 Badawi). It could hardly mean “imagination” (φαντασία), as the latter faculty depends on sense-perception and there is no hint in our treatise that the heavenly bodies should possess it, although this belief was held by Aristotle in his dialogue *de Philosophia* (Walzer, “Aristotle de Philosophia fr. 24”), and will be held later by al-Kindī, *Rasā’il* I 254.

(14) A very awkward sentence. B: “the impulse of the things which have something proper to the best thing follows that thing because they perceive it by the intellect.” The meaning must be that the desire of the heavenly bodies for the First Mover follows that part of them which has some analogy and kinship with the First Mover, i.e. their intellect.

**appetite:** *shawq*, cf. (11) above.

**not a motion:** Ar., *de Anima* I 3, 407a 32-3: ἡ νόησις ἔοικεν ἡρεμήσει τινὶ καὶ ἐπιστάσει μᾶλλον ἢ κινήσει.

(15) Again an unclear sentence for which B’s text does not offer much help. Alexander gets into difficulties when he tries to reconcile his doctrine that the motion of the heavenly bodies is due to intellection with the Aristotelian pronouncement that intellection is not a motion.

(16) This paragraph alludes to the existence of the fifth element or ether (a body with a natural inclination towards circular motion). Cf. *de Mixtione* 223, 10: ἡ τοῦ θείου καὶ κυκλοφορητικοῦ καὶ αἰθερίου σώματος φύσις.

**This:** i.e. this appetite. B repeats the word: “the cause of their motion and of their natural rotation is merely their desire and choice”.

**direction and government:** *tadbīr wa siyāsa*, an early “double” translation of πρόνοια (later *‘ināya*). But the situation is more complex: see Thillet, “Sur le vocabulaire” 30. Moreover, it would be odd to say that the ether is in charge of providence over the heavenly bodies; Alexander’s doctrine is that it is the heavenly bodies themselves which exert providence over the world of generation and destruction (*Ināya*, 61, 14-8). The translators clearly had difficulties with this passage: B is equally unclear and some words seem to have been skipped.

(17) For this distinctive Alexandrian doctrine see in particular Simplicius, *in de Caelo* 380, 29-381, 2; 387, 14.

(18) Ensouled bodies also have a purely physical motion due to the elements of which they are formed; insofar as they are compounds, their motion will be that of the element prevailing in them; see Ar., *de Caelo* IV 4, 311a 29-33. That soul is the result of the mixture of the elements is also a characteristically Alexandrian doctrine, his so-called materialism; see Sharples, “Alexander of Aphrodisias” 1202-3 and the references given there.

**composed of other bodies:** i.e. of the four elements.

(19) That a compound cannot be eternal is already a Platonic argument (*Phaedo* 78c ff.) in favour of the immortality of the soul. It will be greatly elaborated by later Neoplatonists; cf. Proclus, *Elements of Theology* prop. 48 and Dodds’ commentary *ad loc.* The divine body is simple because it is made up of ether, the fifth element which does not combine with others.

**surpasses:** or: “is distinct from” (see *app. crit.*).

**perfection:** cf. Simplicius, *in Phys.* 1219, 6-7 τελειότερα γὰρ φύσις ἡ ψυχῇ: εὐλογον δὲ τοῦ τελειότερου σώματος καὶ τὴν φύσιν εἶναι τελειότεραν.

(20) The heavenly souls are not like the souls of human or animal beings which perform different motions depending on their fears or desires. It must be borne in mind that for Alexander, soul is the result of the mixture of the bodily elements, which clearly cannot be the case with heavenly bodies since they are not composite. Pines, “Refutation of Galen” 45, n. 109 follows the text of C and translates as if there were no negative “its soul is the form of its body”. But even the variant adopted by Pines would not yield that meaning; it would have to be translated: “This soul is not the form of a body except insofar as this body does not need the different motions which are in the soul” which is pure nonsense.

**help:** the reading *ma’ūna* is that of all mss. except Z (*ma’rifā*) and is clearly better; cf. *‘Ināya* 61,8: (the divine body) *ghayr muhtāj fi amri wujūdi-hī ilā ma ‘ūnati ākhar*. Cf. also above *ad* (10).

(21) This paragraph introduces the key principle of “imitation” or “assimilation” (*iqtidā’, tashabbuh*), going back to Plato’s *Theaetetus* (176b). Cf. Alex., *Quaest.* I 25, p. 40,17-9: ὁμοιωθῆναι κατὰ δύναμιν αὐτῶι; II 18, p. 62, 28-34; II 19, p. 63,20-1: ἐφessei μιμήσεως τῆς ὁμοιώσεως αὐτοῦ; and especially I 1, p. 4,2-3 ἔφεσιν καὶ ὄρεξιν ἔχειν τῆς ὁμοιώσεως αὐτοῦ. It is noteworthy that it seems here to extend to the whole of nature and not only to the heavenly bodies. Cf. the beginning of the *Nic. Ethics* (1094a 2-3): “The

Good is that which all things desire”. This concept is prominent in Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rushd. On all this, see introd. above pp. 8-9.

**generated:** *takawwanat* (=prob. ἐγένετο), a verb which paves the way for the notion of creation—or at least of beginning in time—of the world of nature and the heavenly bodies, a notion which is inconsistent with the Aristotelian-Alexandrian world-view.

**primarily:** Aristotle distinguishes four modes of production: by nature, by art, by chance and by spontaneity (e.g. *Metaph.* Λ 3, 1070a 6-7). Alexander and after him some Arab philosophers differentiate between production “according to the first (second) intention” (‘*alā ’l-qaṣd al-awwal, al-thānī*). There is little doubt (*pace* Endress *apud* Neuwirth, ‘*Abd al-Laṭīf* 190) that this new distinction was elaborated in order to solve the difficulties besetting the problem of divine providence (although its use could later be extended to other questions). What exists ‘*alā ’l-qaṣd al-awwal* is what is expressly willed by the gods (‘*Ināya* 59,2-3), i.e. the motion of the spheres; what exists ‘*alā ’l-qaṣd al-thānī* is the concomitant effect of that motion, i.e. generation and destruction on earth (*ibid.* 57,12-4). But providence cannot be a pure accident; this would be a contradiction in terms. Alexander’s position thus seems to be a kind of *tertium quid* (as Sharples, *Alexander* 1216 puts it) between two extreme solutions, roughly that of the Stoics and that of the Epicureans. ‘*Alā ’l-qaṣd al-awwal* corresponds to προηγουμένως; by accident, *bi-’l-ittifāq*, to κατὰ συμβεβηκός (compare Alex., *Quaest.* II 21, p. 65,23 with ‘*Ināya* 1,15; 9,18; etc.). The Arabic translators usually distinguish between *bi-’l-’araḍ* = κατὰ συμβεβηκός and *bi-’l-ittifāq* = ἀπὸ τύχης; but in Aristotle the two concepts can be very close indeed, as shown by *Phys.* II 5, 196b 23 (where the Arabic transl., I 121; 125 Badawi, has *bakht* = τύχη). In my *Ibn Rushd* 25, n. 2, I mistakenly took κατὰ συμβεβηκός to be the equivalent of ‘*alā al-qaṣd al-thānī*. It is true, nevertheless, that προηγουμένως is often contrasted with κατὰ συμβεβηκός by Alexander. In the *Quaest.* III 4 we encounter the couple προηγουμένως/δεύτερα which may well be the origin of ‘*alā al-qaṣd al-awwal/al-thānī*.

(22) **achieves:** cf. *Quaest.* II 3, p. 48,6 ff. πάντα τὰ σώματα ... μεταλαμβάνειν αὐτῆς (*scil.* the power emanating from the divine body) τὰ μὲν πλεῖον τὰ δὲ ἔλαττον.

**prior:** cf. *Quaest.* I 25, p. 40,14-5: πᾶσα σωματικὴ οὐσία ὑστέρα τοῦ σώματος ἐκείνου.

(23) The eternity of the heavenly body’s motion is the closest approach to the immobility and eternity of the First Cause of which it is capable. See *Quaest.* I 25, p. 40,19-20 ὁμοιοῦται δ’ αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν κίνησιν τῷ τε αἰδίῳ καὶ τῇ ὁμοιότητι καὶ ὁμαλότητι τῆς κινήσεως; II 18, p. 62, 28-30 ὁμοιοῦσθαι τῷ τῶν ὄντων ἀρίστῳ τῇ αἰδίῳ τε καὶ συνεχεῖ καὶ ὁμαλῇ κινήσει,

μιμούμενα τό τε ἐνεργεῖαι δεῖν εἶναι αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ ἀκίνητον καὶ τὴν στάσιν.

(24) The mode of reasoning used in this paragraph may be regarded as an authentically Alexandrian application of the Aristotelian principle (e.g. *Metaph.*, a 1, 993b 24-5): ἕκαστον δὲ μάλιστα αὐτὸ τῶν ἄλλων καθ'ὃ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει τὸ συνώνυμον. See also Proclus, *El. Theol.*, prop. 18.

**generosity:** *al-ghāya fi-'l-jūd* ; *jūd* in Arabic philosophy is an attribute of the First Cause as source of emanation and creation and eventually became synonymous with *ḥayd* (Ibn Sīnā, *Ilāhiyyāt* 367,11); it often corresponds to ἀγαθόν. In pseudo-Plutarch's *Placita*, *fi ghāyat al-jūda* = χρηστότατος (Daiber, *Aetius Arabus*, Glossar n° 765). The notion may have been influenced by the well-known passage of Plato's *Timaeus* (29e) asserting that there is no φθόνος in the deity.

(25) **follows:** *ya'ummu*; cf. Ibn Sīnā, *Ilāhiyyāt* 399,11: *al-ghāya allatī ta'ummu-hā*.  
**this is the state:** i.e. it is supremely generous.

(26) **simple:** cf. 19 above.

**impassive:** cf. 9 above.

**many other places:** cf. *Quaest.* I 1, p. 3,8 (cited above *ad* (8), and presumably in his lost commentary on the *Physics*.

(27) *Quaest.* I 10, p. 20,23 also shows that the heavenly body is natural (ἀλλὰ μὴν φυσικὸν σῶμα καὶ κεῖνο) and explains what is meant by “what is not so”, viz. mathematical substance; but that text does not establish, as does ours, a hierarchy between the two kinds of substances.

**impulse:** cf. above (5).

(28) This paragraph sums up in a very concise manner the conclusion of the last chapter of the *Physics* (VIII 10, 266a 10-267b 26).

(29)-(31) Although based on Aristotle, *Phys.* VIII 5, 256b 20 ff and *Metaph.* Λ 7, 1072a, 24-5, this argument in its present form belongs unmistakably to Alexander. Aristotle does not say that the moved mover is “composed” of a mover and a moved, and regards the proof as merely plausible (εὐλογον). Simplicius in *Phys.* 1227, 10-21 reports the argument in very much the same form as we have here (σύνκειται ἔκ τε κινουντος καὶ κινουμένου), without however naming Alexander. But Ibn Rushd, *Tafsīr* 1589,3-8 quotes it directly from Alexander's commentary on the *Metaphysics*, saying that it is a compelling (*wājib*) argument. Interestingly, Simplicius praises Aristotle for considering it as εὐλογον, not ἀναγκαῖον. Is this an implicit criticism of Alexander? For another argument of the same form, see below (118).



(32) This is probably aimed at Galen; although this proposition does not appear in the texts published by Rescher and Marmura, the general drift of his argument there is to regard the First Cause as self-moved along Platonic lines. See introd. above p. 4. The words “from outside, then it is not the mover” occur only in Z and look like a marginal comment inserted in the text by mistake. B is clearer: “we would reply that it is impossible that the mover should be outside it (i.e. the self-moved), for in that case it (the latter) would no longer be the First Mover.” The “if somebody should say...we would say” form may in any case be an addition of the translator; it is an outstanding feature of the *Theology of Aristotle*.

(33) This passage is based on Aristotle, *Phys.* VIII 5, 257a 31-258b 4. The examples are the same (the same person would teach and learn at the same time, provide and receive health; that which heats must already be hot). The neat fivefold division of the present passage, however, is not found in Aristotle or in the Greek texts of Alexander. According to Simplicius, in *Phys.* 1233,36-1234,3, Eudemus introduced a fourfold division: (a) the whole moves the whole; (b) a part moves the whole; (c) the whole moves a part; (d) a part moves a part. Simplicius then adds (1234,3-6) that Eudemus proceeded to refute (a), (b) and (c) and to establish that (d) alone was acceptable. Alexander would thus have added a fourth kind of unacceptable solution, namely his subdivision (d): reciprocal setting in motion of the parts; this refinement, to be sure, has its source in Aristotle’s text (257b, 13-5) where it is shown that it is impossible that each part should be moved by another.

(35) This example is missing in B.

(39) **because something heats etc.:** this sentence is confused, particularly in A, because of the ambiguity of the active and passive forms. It has no equivalent in VE 35 or in Sergius. B offers a clearer text. The general drift of the argument, however, is obvious; it should probably be connected with Aristotle, *Phys.* VIII 4, 255a 23: τὸ ἐνεργεῖαι θερμὸν κινητικὸν τοῦ δυνάμει θερμοῦ.

(42) **There does not appear to be any difference:** B omits the negative, which does not make sense.

(44) **one of the self-moved things:** the flat contradiction in this sentence is certainly due to the clumsiness of the translation. B avoids it: “it follows from what has been said concerning the self-moved that the First Mover is unmoved.” As Aristotle pointed out (*de Anima* III 11, 433b 13-15), even in the case of animals, which appear to be self-moving, there is an unmoved element, namely the external object after which they strive.

**to flee:** cf. *Quaest.* I 25, p. 40,11: πᾶν τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν κινούμενον ἐφέσει τινὸς ἢ ἀποστροφῇ κινεῖται.

**primarily:** cf. 21 above.

(45) That the eternal substance is better than the non-eternal is an Alexandrian axiom, cf. *Quaest.*, I 1, p. 3,9-10: τὸ γὰρ αἰδίων τῶν οὐκ αἰδίων ἄμεινον.

**in this state:** i.e. unmovable.

**the thing which does not exist:** understand: if the mover were not eternal, it would at some time be non-existent.

(46) **elsewhere:** the reference here seems to be principally to Aristotle, *Phys.* V 4, 228b 15-6; VIII 8 (the whole chapter); *de Caelo* II 6, 288a 13: περὶ δὲ τῆς κινήσεως αὐτοῦ ὅτι ὁμαλὴς ἐστὶ, and 289a 8: εἰς τε μόνος ἐστὶν ὁ οὐρανός, καὶ οὗτος ἀγέννητος καὶ αἰδῖος, ἔτι δὲ κινούμενος ὁμαλῶς. Alexander, *Quaest.* II 18, p. 62,29.

(47) **in this state:** i.e. continuous and regular.

(48) The plurality of movers envisaged (and rejected) in this paragraph is that of movers succeeding one another in time, not of movers existing simultaneously and imparting motion to different spheres, discussed in *Metaphysics* Λ 8. Cf. *Physics* VIII 6, 259a 13-20, and below (86). A is ambiguous, whereas B, by using *intiḡāl* (47) and *naql* (48) shows that it is the transmission of motion which is meant.

**the things moved:** although all mss. have *mutaḥarrika*, there is no doubt that the sense requires *muḥarrika*. B is phrased altogether differently but is coherent: Alexander wants to show first that a plurality of objects moved by a single mover could not preserve the continuity and regularity of the motion (47), and then that assuming a plurality of movers would entail the same consequence.

**homogeneity and continuity:** *talā'um wa-ittiṣāl*, possibly a double translation of συνέχεια; cf. however *de Fato* 48,7: ἐπισύνδεσιν καὶ συνέχεια.

(49) The text of this paragraph is very uncertain (see *app. crit.*). The end of it at last makes clear what kind of plurality is meant, i.e. successive. The words “on the contrary...from outside” look like a gloss interpolated in the text by mistake.

(50) **in this way:** a marginal note in Z says: “by ‘in this way’ he means ‘by being desired’” (*mutashawwag*).

**the motion prior to all motions:** cf. above (8).

**first of the motions:** this would appear to support the view that the

First Mover is the cause of a plurality of motions, not just of that of the first heaven. See introd. above p. 13.

(51) **this must be the mover:** marginal note in Z: “he means the divine body”, which is misleading: it is the First Mover which is, albeit indirectly, the source of all natural motions and processes.

(52) The First Mover and the first mobile (i.e. the sphere of the fixed stars) are the cause of the eternity of the motion of the whole world, including the spheres of the planets. This would seem to imply that the movers of the planets are only responsible for the irregularities of their motions, not for their eternity. Interestingly, Philoponus (*in de Gen. et Corr.* 291, 18-28) blames Alexander for ascribing the *continuity* of generation and destruction to the motion of the sphere of the fixed stars; for Philoponus, the oblique spheres are the cause both of the continuity of generation and destruction and of their irregularity (τὸ ἀνώμαλον).

(53) Cf. *Quaest.* I 25, p.39, 10-12: ἀσώματος ... αὐλον καὶ χωριστόν, ἐνέργεια ... πάσης δυνάμεως κεχωρισμένη.

(54) In all this Alexander follows fairly closely Aristotle’s *Physics* (VIII 6) and *Metaphysics* (Λ 6).

**species:** *anwāʿ*, i.e. specific forms.

**towards it:** *nahwa-hū*; a slightly awkward expression because the circular motion of the sphere cannot properly be said to be “towards” its mover, especially since the latter is immaterial; perhaps “according to” or “by analogy with” would be better.

(55) **the first thing moved:** i.e. the sphere of the fixed stars.

**other eternal and divine bodies:** i.e. the spheres of the seven “planets”.

(56) The doctrine sketched in this paragraph will be expanded and refined by later Muslim philosophers, notably al-Kindī and al-Fārābī; see Fazzo-Wiesner, “Alex. of A.” and Druart, “Al-Fārābī”. The Arabic is rather compressed but, I think, clear: material things share in the eternity of the heavenly motions by eternally changing into one another.

**in this state:** i.e. eternal.

(57) See the quotation from Theophrastus, introduction above p. 5. The problem of a possible destruction of the world had acquired additional relevance in the days of Alexander as a result of the Stoic theory of cyclical ἐκπύρωσις.

**For it is etc.:** this sentence may be construed in two ways: 1) *al-jāriya*

looks forward to *azaliyya*, standing for *allatī tajrī* and *azaliyya* being its subject (for this type of construction cf. Reckendorf, *Arabische Syntax* §§203 et 206); transl. “<the world> originates from and is connected with the non-perishability of the divine body and its circular motion, and the eternity in species etc.” 2) read *talzamu wa tattaṣilu* with *azaliyyatu* as subject; transl. “the eternity of the material bodies results from and is in contact with the non-perishability of the divine body and its circular motion which proceeds according to the continuity of its variation.” The second possibility is less satisfactory because *ikhtilāf* is better applied to the world of generation.

**eternity in species:** the correct reading must be *fī ‘l-kawn fī ‘l-naw‘*, not *fī ‘l-kawn wa fī ‘l-naw‘* (cf. *app. crit.*), because *fī ‘l-kawn* refers to *ajsām* and *fī ‘l-naw‘* to *azaliyya* (cf. below 80 and above). The construction is awkward and the text was for that reason “emended” by the scribe of Th. Another possibility would be to delete *fī ‘l-kawn* which is not indispensable after *hayūlanīyya*; the text had *fī ‘l-naw‘* which was misunderstood by a scribe who wrote instead *fī ‘l-kawn*, more frequent and more familiar; hence Z’s correction which crept into the text later on. I would however favour the first explanation. This distinction between things which are eternal (or the same) either specifically or numerically is frequently resorted to by Alexander: *Quaest.* I 25, p. 40,4; III 5, p. 88,15; 89,20; *Ināya* 33,2; below 80 and 136. It is based on such Aristotelian texts as *de Generatione Animalium* II 1, 731b 31-5; *de Gen. et Corr.* II 11, 338b 11-9. In Arabic, the same formulation is found in al-Kindī, *Rasā’il* I 252. Ibn Rushd will go one step further and say that the numerically eternal substance is the cause of the eternity of the specifically eternal (*Tafsīr* 1577,14-1578,1).

(58) This justification for the earth’s existence and immobility at the centre of the universe could be an answer to Theophrastus’ objection (*Metaph.* 5b 10-26). Cf. introd. above p. 5. See also *Quaest.* I 23, p. 36,22-3 : οὐδέ γὰρ ὁ κόσμος εἶναι <ἀν> ἀναιρουμένου τοῦ περὶ ὃ ἡ φορὰ αὐτῶι, and Fārābī, *Madīna* p. 124 (where Walzer’s transl. should be corrected as “is to be around a body”).

**because:** this sentence expresses the consequence of (57) rather than of what precedes it immediately.

**in species:** cf. above (57) and *Tadbīr* 87, 10-11: *ṣārat dā’imatan bi-‘l-ṣūra, lā bi-‘l-‘adad.*

**the body which is like the nature:** this, as it seems, is one of the few allusions to the ether, with (16) above, to be found in the *Mabādī’*.

(59) **of this kind:** i.e. if the eternal bodies are eternal in number.

**in this state:** i.e. eternally change into one another.

(60) This is puzzling since generated things are precisely *not* “enduring”, and if it refers to species, then the expression “something” (*shay’ mā*) is odd.

(61) **regularity and order:** *nizām wa tartīb*, a “double translation” corresponding generally to τάξις. Cf. *Ināya* 23,13 and Daiber, *Aetius*, Glossar 3399.

**animal:** this expression is puzzling in the present context; it is of course reminiscent of Plato, *Timaeus* 37d. Cf. also Simplicius, *in de Caelo* 78,20: ζῶιον ὁ οὐρανός ἐστιν.

(62) **substance:** cf. Arist., *Metaph.*, Λ 8, 1073a 36 τὸ πρότερον οὐσίας οὐσίαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι.

**rank:** cf. Ibn Rushd, *Tafsīr* 1647,3 where the same idea of precedence in rank is applied to the whole hierarchy of the spheres.

(63) Cf. Arist., *Metaph.* Δ 5, 1015b 11-2; K1, 1059b 34-5.

(64) Here Alexander again asserts the eternity and immobility of the First Mover (see Arist., *Phys.* VIII 5-6, 258b 4-15), but he does so before he has really demonstrated the eternity of motion which is the base of the whole argument in Aristotle. Something is wrong with the syntax anyway, for in order to make sense of the text, one has to translate *idh* as “then”, which is strictly possible, but odd.

(65) This and the following paragraphs (up to 71) are based on Arist., *Phys.* VIII 1 and 2.

**alteration:** cf. Arist., *Phys.* VIII 1, 251a 9-10; III 1, 201a 10-1, where however actuality (ἐντελέχεια), instead of change (*istiḥāla*), is mentioned; see Ross’ note *ad loc.*

(66) The text of this sentence is unclear both in Z and C and in the different version offered by Th (cf. *app. crit.*). The correct form of the argument is found in Arist., *Phys.* VIII 1, 251a 17-20: the movable things could only be generated through motion and therefore there was motion before the assumed first motion.

(67) Cf. Arist., *Phys.* VIII 2, 252a 14-5: τὸ δ’ἄπειρον χρόνον ἡρεμεῖν, εἴτα κινηθῆναι ποτε.

**invented expressions:** *aqāwīl muḥtadī’a*, *ibid.* 252a 5: ἔοικε τὸ οὕτω λέγειν πλάσματι μᾶλλον.

(68) **absurd:** *ibid.* 251a 20-1: εἰ δ’ὄντα προὔπηρχεν ἀεὶ κινήσεως μὴ οὔσης.

(69) **when we discussed time:** this could also be translated “in the chapter (or treatise) ‘On Time’”; but it looks like a reference to some earlier part (*qad tabayyana*) of the same work (in this case IV, 10-14) rather than to a dif-

ferent treatise. Alexander's *Quaestiones* are self-contained dissertations and contain very few cross-references; this would lend support to the view that some fragments of the commentary on the *Physics* have been incorporated into the *Mabādi'* (see introd. above p. 11 and p. 31).

(70) **for every existing “now”**: reading *yūjad* (cf. *app. crit.*); reading *yu'khaḏh*: “for every ‘now’ that is assumed”.

(72) **as has been said before**: cf. above (49), (62), (64).

(73) **For motion...potentiality**: *sic!* What is meant is of course the reverse: “if the former should ever be moved etc.”.

(74) **towards**: cf. (54) above.

**is not a body**: *laysa bi-jism*, which could also be understood “is not in a body”, though this is not likely; the underlying Greek is probably ἀσώματος.

(75) **species**: this is odd, and might result from a confusion on the two meanings of εἶδος in Greek (form or species); moreover, it occurs only in Z.

(76) **longing**: here *tawqān* which is normally the term used in version B. For the thought cf. *Quaest.* I 25, p. 40,17 ff.: ἡ δ'ἐφεις αὐτῶι ... τοῦ ὁμοιωθῆναι ... ὁμοιοῦται δὲ ... κατὰ τὴν κίνησιν.

(77) Cf. *Quaest.* II 18, p. 62,33-4: διὰ δὲ τοῦ συνεχῶς καὶ τεταγμένως καὶ ὁμοίως αἰεὶ κινεῖσθαι τὴν αἰδίον αὐτοῦ (*scil.* τοῦ τῶν ὄντων ἀρίστου) μεμίμηται φύσιν; p. 63, 20-1: ἐφέσει μιμήσεως τοῦ πρώτου θεοῦ; I 25, p. 40,17-21: ἡ δ'ἐφεις αὐτῶι (*scil.* τῶι θείῳ σώματι) οὐ τοῦ λαβεῖν αὐτὸ (*scil.* τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν) ἀλλὰ τοῦ ὁμοιωθῆναι κατὰ δύναμιν αὐτῶι κατὰ τὴν κίνησιν (τῶι τε αἰδίῳ καὶ τῇ ὁμοιότητι καὶ ὁμαλότητι τῆς κινήσεως: στάσει γὰρ ἔοικε πῶς ἡ περιφορὰ ἡ αἰεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχουσα. For the impact of this on Neoplatonism, cf. Plotinus, *Enn.* II 2,1,1; III 2,3,29-31. These explanations of the divine body's imitation of (or assimilation to) the First Mover may again have been prompted by Theophrastus' doubts expressed in *Metaph.* 5a 23-7 where the notions of desire and imitation are connected perhaps for the first time (see Ross' note *ad loc.* p. 44). Laks and Most n. 41, p. 35-36 have misunderstood the argument.

**this is the state**: i.e. it is a natural body.

(78) **governing**: *siyāsa*; on this term (probably corresponding to πρόνοια), see above (16) and n. and introd. p.

(79) **the motion from the East**: the variant in Z has *dhāt al-yamīn*, “the

right-hand motion”, corresponding to ἐπὶ τὰ δεξιὰ, ἐπιδέξιος (susceptible of opposite meanings as Moraux observes; see his introd. to Aristotle’s *de Caelo* p. XCIII, n. 5). For Aristotle the east is the right-hand side of the universe because motion always starts from the right, *de Caelo* II 2, 285b 16. *Al-ḥaraka al-sharqiyya* thus clearly derives from the Greek and was not readily intelligible in Arabic, as witness Ibn Rushd’s paraphrase (*Tafsīr* 1660,9); see also Neuwirth, ‘*Abd al-Laṭīf* 69,3, and my remarks in *Der Islam* 55 (1978), 363.

(80) **specifically eternal:** cf. *Quaest.* II 19, p. 63,22-4: ὅσον δὲ αὐτοῦ (*scil.* τοῦ κόσμου) γενητόν τε καὶ φθαρτόν καὶ τῆς παρ’ ἄλλου βοηθείας δεόμενον πρὸς τε τὸ εἶναι καὶ πρὸς τὴν διὰ τῆς εὐτάκτου μεταβολῆς κατ’ εἶδος αἰδιότητα. See also above 57 and below 136.

(81) For this commonplace hellenistic idea of universal συμπάθεια see below (128) and introd. above p.

**natural bounty:** *lutf ṭabī‘ī*, cf. ‘*Ināya* 97,3-4: *ammā al-ashyā’ al-muntashī’a fī al-arḍ fa-laṭāfat* (*scil.* *al-ṭabī‘a*) *la-hā fī amri ghidhā’i-hā* and 57,13 *app. crit.*

**creator:** this may but need not be an Islamic intrusion; cf. pseudo-Arist., *de Mundo* 397b 21; 399a 31 (γενέτωρ); it might also be a translation of δημιουργός, as in Galen’s paraphrase of Plato’s *Timaeus* (ed. Kraus-Walzer) 11,7, etc.

(82)-(84) In this passage, rendered somewhat obscure in Arabic by the indiscriminate use of pronouns, Alexander argues that the world of generation and decay could not endure as it is if anything were altered in the heavenly order.

(83) **none of these things is eternal:** i.e. in species.

(84) A similar instance of *reductio ad absurdum* in Alexander is provided by *de Fato* 62, 16-19.

(85) **compulsion:** the heavens cannot be moved by compulsion, cf. Arist., *de Caelo* I 2, 269a 7-9.

**know:** God (or the gods) knows what proceeds from Himself, ‘*Ināya* 65,9-16.

(86) On the plurality of the heavenly movers, cf. introd. above p. 10 ff.

**the same thing:** on matter as principle of individuation see Arist., *Metaph.* A8, 1074a 33-4; Z 8 1034a 7.

(87) Since the heavenly movers cannot be differentiated by their matter, it has generally been claimed that each one of them constitutes a distinct or ultimate species, a class of its own (Guthrie, *History* VI 273). This solution is

here rejected by Alexander on the grounds that this also would entail the existence of multiplicity in them, a species being constituted by a genus *plus* a specific difference. This seems to be the earliest evidence of the theory evolved much later by the schoolmen in order to explain how the movers can be multiple while being free from matter, namely that each one of them is the unique member of an *ultima species*. Cf. below (92) and introd. above p. 10 ff.

(88) In this paragraph, Alexander also rejects the notion that the movers might differ in species within the same genus by being *more* or *less* of the same thing, on the grounds that this too would involve compositeness. By speaking of “the nature which has no opposite”, Alexander shows that he is thinking of the ether, that is of the heavenly body rather than of the movers. It is nevertheless the solution which he will advocate at 92-93 below.

(89) On this quotation from the *Physics* (259a 6-13) cf. introd. above p. 11. Its insertion in this place clearly rests on a misunderstanding as it asserts the impossibility of a plurality of movers *in succession*, not of their simultaneous existence. On the other hand, the *Quaestio* I 1, p. 3,3 stresses the impossibility of a plurality of bodies being moved eternally and continuously in succession. The last words, “and that the cause of the eternal motion should be one too”, do not belong to Aristotle’s text and seem designed to exclude the possibility of the eternal motion’s being the result of an impulse caused by a plurality of movers.

**should be preferred:** all mss. have here an unaccountable negative.

(90) Continuation of the quotation from the *Physics* (259a 13-9); the last sentence is not an accurate rendering of the Greek which means: “if it is continuous it is one, and it is one if it is caused by one mover only and is the motion of one single thing.”

**eternal:** the term used here is *sarmadī* which means eternal (*a parte ante et a parte post*) and continuous, and applies specifically to heavenly motions.

(91) **according to these things:** (*bi-hādhihī al-ashyāʾ*): the expression is obscure; what it means is presumably that there are other motions beside the regular daily motion of the first heaven.

**their choice and disposition for this:** what these two pronouns refer to is not obvious; normally, in such a context, choice (*ikhtiyār*) would belong to the gods (cf. *ʿInāya* 59,3 and 67,3), whereas disposition (*tahayyuʾ*) would refer to the predisposition of the world of generation to receive the influence of the heavens (*ibid.* 75,4-5 etc.). Cf. also above (3).



(92) Aristotle does not quite say this in the *Metaphysics*. The reference is probably intended to be to  $\Lambda$  8, 1073b 1-3: ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν οὐσίαι, καὶ τούτων τις πρώτη καὶ δευτέρα κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν τάξιν ταῖς φοραῖς τῶν ἄστρον, φανερόν, which is not the same as saying that their is a hierarchical, or qualitative, order between these substances. The idea of a hierarchical and qualitative order of the movers is dominant in Arabic philosophy, even in the absence of a theory of emanation, and seems to originate with Alexander. See Ibn Rushd, *Tafsīr* 1647,3 ff. (*bi-'l-sharaf wa-'l-jawhar*); *Talkhīs* 138,16-7.

**complete dissimilarity:** the movers cannot be specifically different because of the multiplicity and compositeness that this would entail. Cf. above (87). It does not appear that Alexander has succeeded in removing the contradiction between the two passages.

(93) **lowly disposition:** on this comparison with fire see *Quaest.* II 17, p. 61,32-62,2: οὐκ ... τὸ ἔλαττον θερμὸν μίξει τοῦ ἐναντίου. ἡ γοῦν φλόξ ἔλαττον μὲν θερμὸν τοῦ πεπυρωμένου σιδήρου, ἀλλ'οὐ ψυχρότερος μίξει. It is noteworthy that VE 35 (above p. 139) says exactly the opposite.

(94) **the earlier part of our treatise:** cf. above (55), (79) and (86).

(95) What seems to be meant in this rather obscure passage is that the incorporeality of incorporeal things is not a sufficient reason for regarding them as being (specifically?) identical, in the same way as the corporeality of corporeal bodies is not. "The genera which are predicated of substance" must be the ten categories, which are in the same situation; for Aristotle, as is well known, the categories are not the species of a genus (see e.g. *Metaph.*  $\Gamma$  2, 1003a 33 and Ross' note *ad loc.*). This is the doctrine to which G.E.L. Owen gave the name of "focal meaning" (see in particular his "The Platonism of Aristotle"). I am not aware of any other text by Alexander, or one of the Greek commentators on Aristotle, drawing the same parallel. See introd. above p. 12. It is worth remarking that this "solution" to the problem of the plurality of unmoved movers is that of Ibn Rushd, *Talkhīs* 140,14 ff. as well as G. Patzig, "Theology and Ontology". But the whole paragraph might also refer to "genera" in the normal sense.

**some people:** it is difficult to see who these people may be, possibly the Epicureans.

(96) **the nature of these things is the soul:** on the identity of soul and nature in the heavenly bodies cf. above (17).

**organic bodies:** the definition of an organic body is given by Alex., *de Anima* 16,11-4: it is a body having different parts subject to different psychic faculties. This obviously does not apply to the heavenly bodies.

(97) It would be as easy as pointless to pile up hundreds of references for this most celebrated theme; see above all Arist., *Metaph.* Λ 7, 1072a 26-8; b 3; Alex., *de Anima* 79,6-7; *Ināya* 93,10; Fārābī, *Madīna* 88,8; Ibn Sīnā, *Ilāhiyyāt* 369,1.

(98) **inhabit the earth:** what is usually emphasized is the dependance of human life on the sun and the other stars (e.g. *Ināya* 41,6-15). The more general statement made here is probably inspired by such Aristotelian passages as *de Caelo* I 9, 279a 28-30; *Metaph.* Λ 7, 1072b, 13-4 (which is also followed by an allusion to the blissful life, not of man but of the First Principle itself). A passage in Ibn Rushd, *Talkhīṣ* 162,13-4 is obviously based on the present text.

**has been shown:** reading with CMTTh *tabayyana*. If one were to keep Z's reading *bayyana*, the subject would naturally be Aristotle. In any case, the reference is to such passages as *Eth. Nic.* X 8, 1178b 7-8; X 7, rather than to Alexander's own writings such as the fourth book of the *Quaestiones*, dealing with ethical problems, from which the topic of contemplation is conspicuously absent.

(99) **what it contains:** this reading is my conjecture (see *app. crit.*); it could also be translated as "what contains it".

**true perfection exists only in these things:** cf. Arist., *Metaph.* Γ 7, 1072b 18-9 ἡ δὲ νόησις ἡ καθ'αὐτὴν τοῦ καθ'αὐτὸ ἀρίστου, καὶ ἡ μάλιστα τοῦ μάλιστα. A marginal comment ascribed to Ishāq in all mss. but Z (see introd. above p. 32) says: "he means the things which are perceived (reading the verb as a passive) by the intellect."

(101) The First Mover's being consists in thinking. All this paraphrases Arist., *Metaph.* Λ 7, 1072b 19-22; 9, 1075a 3-5; *de Anima* III 4, 430a 1-3. Alexander laid even greater stress than Aristotle on the actual identity of intellect and intelligible; cf. Merlan, "The Peripatos" in Armstrong (ed.), *Cambridge History* 120; Armstrong, "The Background of the Doctrine" 408 and the references there; Sorabji, *Time* 146-7. When intellect and intelligible have become one, the intellect necessarily thinks itself, Alex., *de Anima* 86,18; 90, 16-9; 109,4-7.

(102) **it is so:** scil. perceiving by the intellect.

(103) On the type of intellection described in this paragraph, *i.e.* intellection of potentially intelligible forms, see Alex., *de Anima* 87,24-5; 108,3-4; 110,16ff.

(104) Cf. Alex., *de Anima*, 87,25-8; 88,3-5; 109,27-8.

(105) the first intellect (*al-ʿaql al-awwal*): this expression does not occur in Aristotle nor, at least in this sense, in Alexander. If it occurred in the original Greek at all, it must have been designed to distinguish the First Mover, that of the sphere of the fixed stars, from the movers of the planets (which Alexander preferably calls souls, cf. introd. above p. 12).

(106) This paragraph and the following, though based on Arist., *Metaph.* Λ 9, evinces some significant shifts of emphasis. Whereas Aristotle insists that the Good must think what is best, and consequently only itself, Alexander objects to the presence of motion in the intellect as would be the case if it thought different things at different times; this would also impair its simplicity (*basītē* 107, cf. Arist., *Metaph.* Λ 7, 1072a 32-4).

**continuously:** the contemplative activity of intellect is the most continuous (συνεχυστάτη), Arist., *Eth. Nic.* X 7, 1177a 21-2; see also *Metaph.*, Λ 9, 1074b 29.

(107) That continuous action is better is asserted in *Eth. Nic.* IX 9, 1170a 5-8: μονώτῃ μὲν οὖν χαλεπὸς ὁ βίος· οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον καθ'αὐτὸν ἐνεργεῖν συνεχῶς ... ἔσται οὖν ἡ ἐνέργεια συνεχεστέρα, ἥδεῖα οὖσα καθ'αὐτήν, ὁ δεῖ περὶ τὸν μακάριον εἶναι.

(109) **as Aristotle said:** probably in the passage of *Metaph.* quoted above *ad* (99), although he does not express himself so emphatically. Cf. also *Eth. Nic.* X 7, 1177a 27, where αὐτάρεκτα could well correspond to *infirād wa tahādūd*.

**when both of them pass from potentiality...:** cf. Alex., *de Anima*, 86,25.

(111) **all intellects:** i.e. the intellects of the spheres.

**the divine intellect:** i.e. the first intellect; cf. 105 above.

(114) Though clearly depending on *Metaph.* Λ 9, 1074b 25, this paragraph must have been misunderstood by the translators. Since there are three unwanted negatives, it is not a matter of a mere slip: the whole meaning of Aristotle's text has been distorted, perhaps by a pious Muslim who took exception to the assertion that God should ignore certain things. What is odd is that this stands in manifest contradiction with the previous and the next sentences. Part of the objectionable passage does not occur in CTTh, which strengthens the suspicion that it is a late intrusion.

(116) cf. 106 above.

(117) **what has been said:** cf. 104 above.

(118) For arguments of this form cf. above (29) and Arist., *Metaph.* A 7, 1072a 24-5.

**ad infinitum:** i.e. matter.

(119) This paragraph clearly implies that the First Mover is the only truly incorporeal being.

(120) Alexander is here concerned with forestalling the inference that if the First only thinks itself, it cannot have knowledge of what is below itself, or what proceeds from itself, and consequently cannot exert providence over it (see above 85). Concern about the existence of providence seems to have developed first in Platonic circles, mostly in connection with the exegesis of the *Timaeus*, in the second cent. A.D. (Sharples, "Alexander of A." 1216 ff.) and from there to have spread to the Aristotelian school. It is usually *Metaph.* A 9 and 10 which was regarded as the proper place to set forth an Aristotelian view of providence, as can most clearly be seen in Ibn Rushd's *Tafsīr*. The fact that Plato is named a few lines below is interesting in this respect.

**if one said etc.:** the text is uncertain at this point (see *app. crit.*) and the sense even more so.

(121) **Plato:** this alleged Platonic saying is impossible to trace.

(122) This paragraph, though unclear in some particulars, seems to correspond fairly closely to a passage of Alexander's commentary on the *Metaphysics* quoted by Simplicius (*in de Caelo* 270,5 ff.). He says there that the mover of the rotating body, being immaterial, mere reason (λόγος μόνος=*qawl?*) and form, it is the same in number (ταὐτὸν ἔσται κατ' ἀριθμόν=*wāḥid bi- 'ayni-hī fi al- 'adad*). In the same passage, Alexander expresses the view that "the First Mover, if it moves as object of desire, could impart motion to a plurality of bodies, since nothing prevents several beings from desiring the same thing" (*ibid.* 270,10-2), which is exactly what the present paragraph says.

(123) **the exaltedness and lowliness etc.:** the meaning of this sentence is also quite obscure.

(124) **But this:** "he means the first mover" (marginal note in Z).

(125) In the *de Anima* (88,10-3), Alexander says that in the case of enmattered forms there cannot be complete identity between intellect and intelligible. It is the same idea which is expressed here, although the allusion to "affection" (i.e. matter?) does not appear in the Greek text. Cf. above (9) where it was explained that the desire that moves the heavenly bodies is a purely rational will devoid of all affection.

(126) On the blissful life, i.e. intellectual or contemplative (θεωρητική) life, the principal source is *Eth. Nic.* X 6 and 7.

**eternal life:** cf. *Metaph.*, Λ 7, 1072b 26-8.

**the actuality of the excellent thing is also excellent:** this seems to be a better reading than Z's "the disposition of the intellect is the excellent thing." Cf. *Eth. Nic.* X 4, 1174b 18-20.

**it achieves:** the feminine forms *kānat* and *fi'la-hā* are due to the attraction of *ladhdha* but the subject is of course 'aql.

**without hindrance:** cf. *Eth. Nic.* VII 13, 1153b 9-11 εἴπερ ἐκάστης ἕξσεως εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι ἀνεμπόδιστοι, εἴθ' ἢ πασῶν ἐνέργειά ἐστιν εὐδαιμονία εἴτε ἢ τινὸς αὐτῶν, ἂν ᾗ ἀνεμπόδιστος.

**as has been shown:** above (125) or in the *Nic. Ethics*.

**notions:** *awhām*. In *Metaph.* Λ 8, 1074a 38 ff., Aristotle appeals to ancient traditions to support his view that the stars are gods. Here the idea seems to be that the traditional Greek notion of the gods as blissful beings agrees with the views set forth in this passage. *Awhām* is used to render Gr. ἔννοια in *Metaph.* Λ 8, 1073b 12 (Ibn Rushd, *Tafsīr* 1657,12): "to get an idea of what some mathematicians have said." But here, as Jonathan Barnes pointed out to me, the term surely reflects the Greek πρόληψις, common in the *de Fato*.

(127) The text of this paragraph is uncertain (see *app. crit.*). The general meaning is that the diversity of the objects of nature is due to the varying degree of their assimilation with (or imitation of) the heavenly or the First Mover.

**without intermediary:** i.e. the heavenly bodies which are moved directly by the desire they feel for the First Mover, as opposed to nature (the world of generation and decay) which is moved through the agency of the heavenly motions.

**as we said before:** above (80).

(128) On the doctrine expounded in this and the following paragraphs see introd. above p. 18-9.

**nature:** here a literal translation of φύσις in *Metaph.* Λ 10, 1075a 11. The term, however, is ambiguous in this context; hence the marginal note in Z: "he means the First Mover", which, however, is not really adequate. This paragraph echoes another short tract of Alexander's, the *Quaestio* II 3, which discusses the "power" or "nature" (δύναμις τὲ καὶ φύσις p. 48, 9) originating from the divine body and governing the formation of the elements, of the world of nature and even of the souls. The Arabic translation of this text, which I owe to the kindness of Dr F. Zimmermann, is quite free, but uses the terms *quwwa* and *ṭabī'a* in the sense required here. Cf. also Fazzo-Wiesner "Alexander of Aphrodisias."

**spiritual:** literal transl. of *rūḥāniyya*. The sense (and certainly the under-

lying Greek) is “immaterial” or “divine”. The Arabic rendering of θεῖος in the *Quaestio* II 3 is *sharīf*, also an archaism. On these two adjectives, see Endress, *Proclus Arabus* 128-31.

(129) On the parallel traced in this paragraph between the cosmos and the city see introd. above p. 17-8.

**established law:** *sharīf*; interestingly the variant in Z (*nāmūs*) seems to have preserved an older reading which was subsequently replaced by the more Islamic term.

**unchangeable:** here again it is the variant of Z which has the correct reading.

**material:** *hayūlānī*; this reading is unintelligible; the corruption could be explained through the Syriac in which *hwāyā* (essence) and *hūlā* (matter) are very close (see Brockelmann, *Lexicon Syriacum* 173). The sense would thus be quite satisfactory: “essential union” instead of “material union”. The only difficulty is that the adjective *hwāyānā* is apparently unattested.

**union:** *ittiḥād*, has here the same meaning as “contact” (*ittiṣāl*) in (130); cf. also e.g. Ibn Rushd, *Epitome de Anima* 127,10-1; the distinction which some scholars have sought to draw between the two terms is insubstantial.

**the people:** *al-qawm*, a term which applies better to the city than to the universe.

(130) The meaning of this slightly puzzling paragraph is probably that only actually existing beings are in contact with the “spiritual power” and receive from it their distinct and concrete existence.

(131) This must refer to the four elements. Cf. *Quaest.* II 3, p. 50,21-4: the bodies which are closer to the heavenly motion (=fire and air) are λεπτότερα καὶ ποιητικώτερα, the others παχυμερέστερα καὶ παθητικώτερα.

(132) The same *Quaest.* II 3 insists on the relationship between the nature of the four elements and their proximity or remoteness in relation to the heavens (p. 49,6-9).

**it follows:** *ta’ummu* is certainly the correct reading, cf. above 25.

(133) In this, Alexander seems to extend the analogy of the household (see 134) to include the physical and architectural reality of the house as well.

(134) **whole:** cf. Arist., *Metaph.* A 10, 1075a 21-2.

**good organization and order:** *tartīb wa-niẓām*; cf. above (61) and pseudo-Arist., *de Mundo* 2, 391b 11.

(135) The three classes of things mentioned here are (1) the heavenly bod-

ies, (2) the sublunar world of nature which contains, according to Aristotle, that which happens “for the most part in a certain way”, or the species, and (3) the individuals, or that which happens according to chance and spontaneity.

(136) Although the idea of the eternity of species is quite basic in Aristotle, as well as the distinction between what is one in number and what is one in species, the opposition between the numerically and the specifically eternal (corresponding to the heavenly bodies and the sublunar world respectively) occurs only occasionally; see *de Gen. et Corr.* II 11, 338b 12-3; *de Gen. An.* II 1, 731b 31-5 ἀριθμῶι μὲν οὖν ἀδύνατον (*scil.* αἰδίων εἶναι τὸ γινόμενον) ... εἶδει δ' ἐνδέχεται; Alex., *Quaest.* III 5, p. 88, 15-6; 89, 20-1; *Ināya* 33,2 ff; Ibn Rushd, *Tafsīr* 1577, 14-5; cf. also above 57 and 80.

(137) This slightly puzzling paragraph should be understood in the light of the *Quaestio* II 24, p. 75, 17-23: the continuance of species and regularity of form is quite unlike the simple bodies which change into one another without retaining anything of their former nature.

(138) That the heavenly motions are the cause of the cyclical change of the elements into one another is asserted in Alex., *de Mixtione* 225, 30-4.

**it is not affected:** *lam yalhaq-hā*; the feminine forms in this sentence must agree grammatically either with *hayūlā* or with “its parts” (*ajzā'u-hā*), although the logical subject is clearly the universe. For the idea, cf. Arist., *de Caelo* II 1, 284a 14-8.

(139) The *Quaestio* I 18 argues that the universe could not be imperishable on account of God's will if it were not imperishable in its own nature. The present statement somehow provides the counterpart to the former thesis. Cf. also Ibn Rushd, *Tafsīr* 1631, 15-7.

(140) The text as it stands is ambiguous. Alexander means that we should not follow the opinion of those who regard the world as created in time and consider it to be perishable as well, because the world is not created; moreover victory and defeat cannot be regarded as the causes of generation and destruction respectively. This last observation derives from Arist., *Metaph.* Λ 10, 1075b 2-4 where Aristotle criticizes Empedocles for making love and strife both efficient and material causes. For *ghalaba*=νεῖκος see Daiber, *Aetius* 42-3. The odd thing in the present passage is the term *duḥūd* (“slip”) which does not appear to be used elsewhere in this sense. Somebody must have realized that “love” (*maḥabba*) was not an appropriate counterpart to “victory” and contrived this new expression.

**those who profess:** Plato. Cf. 139 above and Sharples' transl. of *Quaest.* I 18, p. 66, n. 196.

(141) The subject of this sentence is not specified. Alexander combines here *Metaph.* A 6, 1072a 10-5 with *de Gen. et Corr.* II 10, 336a 31-b 10. What is in turn the cause of generation and destruction is the inclination of the spheres of the planets on the ecliptic, which causes their position in relation to the earth to vary. Here the reference is clearly to these spheres, but Alexander speaks of them in the singular as a single collective phenomenon, as does sometimes Aristotle (*de Gen. et Corr.* 336b 3-6 and Joachim's note *ad loc.*). Cf. Ibn Rushd, *Tafsīr* 1578,10-1580,1.

**the different relationships:** the Arabic has the singular, but it must be taken in the collective sense.

**the fear that it might perish:** change or motion, rather than matter.

(142) Cf. '*Ināya* 51, 1-4: the heavenly bodies and their motions are the cause of the order (*intizām*) and preservation (*salāma*) of the things on earth, not *bakht* and *mā min tilqā'i nafsi-hī*. The underlying Greek expression is undoubtedly *τύχη καὶ αὐτομάτῳ*, although it must be admitted that *min tilqā'i nafsi-hī* is a better rendering of *αὐτόματον* than *ittifāq*, which also occurs in '*Ināya*.

(143) See above and introd. p. This is in outline the thesis of '*Ināya*.

**it is this motion which preserves:** i.e. the diurnal motion, or motion of the first sphere, which is the cause of the world's permanence. See also above (57).

**lack of decrepitude:** '*adam al-haram* = ἀγήρατον Arist., *de Caelo* I 3,270b 2.

(144) **preserves:** see *de Mundo* 391b 12 φυλαττομένη; 397b 20 σωτήρ et *passim*.

(145) **the things observed in the world:** this is none other than the principle σῶζειν τὰ φαινόμενα.

(146) **accounts for:** *yahfazū*, cf. above (145).

(149) These final considerations echo the similar remarks made by Aristotle in *Metaph.* a 1, in particular 993b 7-11, where the difficulty of philosophical studies is ascribed both to the intrinsic obscurity of the subject and to the weakness of our minds. The personal contribution of Alexander consists in the addition of a third cause, namely the arrogance and contentiousness of



scholars. Interestingly, this last point is also stressed in the parallel text of al-Kindī, *Rasā'il* I 103-4; cf. also Fārābī, *Harmony* 16; 32 Dieterici; 94; 109 Nader; Maimonides, *Guide* I 107.

**divergence:** this is the διαφωνία of the Sceptics; see introd. above p. 3 and Mansfeld, “*Diaphonia*”.

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